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After the Cold War the transatlantic link between Europe and America is no 
longer self-explanatory. The allies focus increasingly on internal problems and 
prosperity of their own countries. Traditional alliances and partnerships seem to 
play a diminished role. However, _this dividing trend is countered by a number of 
new problems, uncertainty about the future, and a worldwide interrelation in many 
facets of political, economic, social, and technological life. The state is no longer 
able to solve problems within an isolationist approach. From this perspective, 
partners have to be found. Because of their common history, common belief and 
value system, and common ideological basis, Europe and America are natural 
partners. On this common ground a multidimensional transatlantic partnership 
should be established. Structures of this partnership rely on traditional organizations 
like NATO, additionally however, transatlantic links have to be modernized and 
broadened. Both partners, America and Europe, will have advantages from this. 
Both, however, will have to make contributions: the Americans by being prepared 
to take the lead, the Europeans by overcoming their traditional antagonisms, by 
taking over burdens and responsibilities, and by developing a European identity. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism the old 
familiar coordinates for half a century, internal priorities of nearly all states, and 
the world community have changed. The assertion of United States Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher that no region in the world is more important for 
America than the Asian-Pacific, underlines a general trend to new priorities. These 
goals are to stabilize the United States economy, to 'bring one's own house in 
order' and, in general, to create an increased capability for international 
competition in all necessary areas. 
American interests, when dealing with Russia, are derived from power politics 
of two big powers, no longer from socio-politico relations between two blocs. This 
causes a strong tendency for a new 'unilateralism' or 'bilateralism', leaving out 
former partners, friends and allies. Whether this tendency can be channeled into a 
new strategic relationship also with Europe, for example under the auspices of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), remains to be seen. It depends on the 
relationship between Europe and America. 
Economic trends and the development of a European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) with a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) underlines that 
there is some possibility that Europe will achieve a degree of stability and power 
to be a possible strategic partner for the United States. However, it should not be 
ix 
an exclusively European duty to accomplish this. It is the whole community of 
Western states that matters. Europe and America have together a duty of leading 
the world to a common future. The Atlantic community has been very important 
in the past, and should continue to be it in the future. 
'Internal' reasons are not less important than 'external', when discussing an 
intensified transatlantic partnership. Domestic consensus for foreign policy and, in 
general, for engaging 'abroad' is essential. Until today, neither the United States 
nor the states of the European Union were able to create such a consensus about 
their role in the world. In this situation, orientation is difficult and the temptation 
to find solutions in a new bilateral 'balance of power' diplomacy is strong. 
In the new security environment with uncertainties not only about the 
question where the real power lies, but also about who will be a future frie:t?-d or 
foe, it is necessary to search for commonality, for equal belief and for value 
systems. On this basis, 'old' partnerships can be renewed and modernized, 'new' 
ones can be built. 
Europe needs America. It lacks military means to project power to parts of 
the world, to protect itself, and to engage decisively in wars like the former 
Yugoslav conflict. It is on the way towards a closer Union, but still having not yet 
decided the complete goal and the way to reach this goal. Nevertheless, Western 
Europe will get new security partners from Central and Eastern Europe, while at 
the same time having to cope with the uncertain, but still big and powerful 
X 
neighbor Russia. America is necessary to give the basis for Europe on which its 
future can be built. 
America equally needs Europe. Pointing out the common heritage, it is 
possible to find a reference for internal problems which seems to become 
overwhelming important in the near future. The United States will have European 
partners, if not 'the' European partner, it needs 'partners in leadership' and a 
community which 'raise its eyes to other parts of the world', economically, 
politically, and, under certain circumstances, militarily. America, thus, has 
something to gain from such a partnership. The major advantage for the 
transatlantic link is, that it combines political hardware with a long since developed 
'spirit of commonality'. 
Established transatlantic structures are no longer instruments that do of 
themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of politicians, economists, 
and citizens. Therefore, it is necessary to engage actively, to name the problems, 
to try to find solutions, and to explain to the people why all this has to be done and 
why it has a real pay-off. This means, Europe has to come to grips with forming 
its identity of becoming an equal partner for the United States. America has to 
overcome isolationist and unilateralist tendencies and to lead where it is needed. 
Common institutions must be established. These are the 'necessities' for future 
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The transatlantic link is indispensable for security and stability in Europe. As 
Europe undergoes radical change, it is now of all times that the continent needs the 
continuing commitment of the USA in particular to maintain its inner balance. The 
vitality of the transatlantic link is also in the interest of North America, as this link 
enables it to deal with global challenges in cooperation with a Europe that is a 
stable and predictable partner capable of taking action. 1 
The above describes the German position when discussing the transatlantic link. It 
is asserted that 'Europe needs America' and, with the same emphasis, 'America needs 
Europe'. An analysis of the above, however, leads to more questions than affirmations. 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism the familiar 
coordinates for half a century, internal priorities of nearly all states, and the world 
community have changed. The familiar Europe-centric map, with a divided Pacific (often 
incompletely shown) and the two poles, America in the West and Russia in the East, is no 
longer valid? The assertion of United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher that 
no region in the world is more important for America than the Asian-Pacific, underlines a 
general trend to new priorities. 3 These goals are to stabilize the United States economy, to 
'bring one's own house in order' and, in general, to create an increased capability for 
international competition in all necessary areas. 
Thus, beneath the concentration on Asia and its rising economic importance, an 
American - Russian special relationship is stressed. Despite political and military changes, 
Russia remains a great power, because of its size, population, and its nuclear arsenal. 
American interests, when dealing with Russia, are derived from the power politics of two 
big powers, no longer from socio-politico relations between two blocs. This causes a 
strong tendency for a new 'bilateralism', leaving out former partners, friends and allies. In 
1 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994, No. 421, p. 52. 
2 
see: V. Riihe, Die pazi:fische und atlantische Dimension gemeinsamer Sicherheit, speech at 
Stanford University, Feb 27 1995. 
3 
see: 0. Mager, Alter Kontinent wichtig, in: Information fiir die Truppe, 10/94, p. 51. 
1 
the long run, both sides will accept the other's political interests, as long as world politics 
not again become a zero-sum game. 4 Whether this tendency can be channeled into a new 
strategic relationship with Europe, for example under the auspices of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), remains to be seen. 
It depends, and this closes the circle, on the relationship between Europe and 
America. Economic trends and the development of a European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) with a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) underlines that there is 
some possibility that Europe5 will achieve a degree of stability and power sufficient to be a 
possible strategic partner for the United States. Europe as a 'global player', no longer as a 
'protectorate', will be America's equal partner. This goal is only possible if all European 
partner nations have the same degree of security,6 especially the Partnership for Peace 
states which are becoming the 'new partners'. Thus, beneath the development of a 
'European global actor', the definition of a new relation with Russia, and the strengthening 
of the transatlantic link, the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the 
framework ofWestern organizations, alliances, and institutions is essential.7 
However, it should not be an exclusively European duty to accomplish this. It is 
the whole community of Western states that matters. , There has been an erosion of the 
belief that the West, as the richest and most modern portion of human society, has a 
special responsibility for the world as a whole". 8 This erosion has to be tackled by the 
4 
see: B. von Plate, Russland in einer europaischen Sicherheitsordnung, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, April 95, p. 25. 
5 To be precise, 'Europe' has to be defined. The development of a 'Common Euope' normally is 
seen within the developm~nt of the European Union (EU). However, many European states are not, or not 
yet, members of the EU. Furthermore is the development of 'Europe' dependent on the future of other 
organizations, for example NATO, OSCE etc. Thus, in the following the expression 'Europe' ha:s to be set 
equal with 'Western Europe' which means, if not further defined, the 'European Union'. 
In the same way, 'America' mostly means The United States of America'. If Canada or other states of the 
continent are involved, it will be noticed in the text. 
6 see: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Rtihe bezeichnet die Ost-Erweiterung der NATO als 
unumkehrbar, Apr 21 1995, S. 1. 
7 
see: V. Rtihe, Europa und Amerika - eine Partnerschaft im alten und neuen Geist, speech at the 
Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, Bonn, 11. Mai 1995, p. 6. 
8 M. Woollacott,. The great Atlantic drift away, in: The Guardian, Feb 10 1995. 
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leading states. Europe and America together have a duty to lead the world to a common 
future. The Atlantic community has been very important in the past, and should continue 
to be it in the future. The obvious loss of purpose must be repaired by organizational and 
political means. 'Internal' reasons are not less important than 'external', when discussing 
an intensified transatlantic partnership. Domestic consensus on foreign policy and, in 
general, for engaging 'abroad' is essential. Until now, neither the United States nor the 
states of the European Union were able to create such a consensus about their role in the 
world. In this situation, orientation is difficult and the temptation to find solutions in a new 
bilateral 'balance of power' diplomacy is strong. 
However, this does not solve any problems.9 President Woodrow Wilson's address 
to Congress in 1917 is still valuable: ,The world must be made safe for democracy". 10 The 
international system of the twenty-first century, marked by 'fragmentation' and 
'globalization', is a real challenge for all statesmen. None of the most important countries 
which must build a new world order have any experience with a multistate system as is 
probably emerging.u And, because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices are 
especially crucial. These choices should reflect the preference of multilateralism versus 
unilateralism, of engagement versus disengagement, of promoting democracy versus 
realpolitik, of a world leadership responsibility versus isolationism and concentration on 
internal problems, and, last but not least, of a strategic partnership between America and 
Europe versus economic and strategic rivalry. 12 
In addition to a historical survey of the United States' involvement in Europe, the 
following thesis gives an overview of current security problems after the Cold War. A 
chapter about the common United States - European belief system will create the basis on 
which the transatlantic link is examined from both perspectives, the European and the 
9 
see: U. Nerlich, Deutschland als ungewohnliches Land?, in: Politique Etrangere, 1/95, S. 4. 
10 Woodrow Wilson, address to the Congress, asking for a declaration of war, Apri12, 1917. 
11 
see: H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 26. 
12 
see: H. Mey, Die USA und Deutschland, Studie des Institut fiir Strategische Analysen, Feb 
1993, p. 13 and 15. 
3 
American. Internal problems on both sides are also taken into consideration to create a 
complete picture of the topical question. It would, however, overload this paper, if all 
facets were scrutinized. Thus as an overview, the main opinions and ideas of the actual 
political international discussions are mentioned. However, it is possible to develop 
logically a picture which leads to a future of 'modernized transatlantic links', which 
present the fundamental proposal of the author for the international security of the world 
in the future. 
4 
IT. THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE- HISTORICAL SURVEY 
If one can indeed learn from history is an ongoing academic discussion. 
Assumptions range from a linear development without any repetition and real 
unpredictability of what the future will bring, to a cyclic approach in which basic 
developments will repeat themselves (at least generally) and in which one can 'learn from 
history'. Modern technology, especially the development of chaos theory, shows that in a 
feedback system such as history minimal differences of the 'input' can produce extreme 
differences of the 'output'. From this standpoint history cannot be cyclical. Historical 
study, thus, should be more directed to train political and ethical judgment than to try to 
predict the future because the ,signal characteristic of the successful strategist at all times 
is empathy". 13 Because ,the effort of historical understanding cultivates qualities of 
tolerance, objectivity, and dispassionate judgment",14 the next chapter gives especially a 
brief overview of the stationing of United States troops in Europe. Although this does not 
reflect a complete history of the transatlantic relations and allows only a limited 
perspective into the recent past, it is important to review this aspect because the stationing 
of troops in Europe represents the major hint for ongoing developments in the security 
realm. 
After 1815 the Napoleonic threat to Europe disappeared, and a few years later 
European colonialism in the Americas came to an effective end. Isolationism became the 
American condition. Continental expansion and economic development were America's 
priorities, while a 'Pax Britannica' sheltered the continent. 15 The young United States 
successfully kept its distance from Europe during the nineteenth century, although in their 
unification wars, especially against France, the Germans asked for American naval 
13 
see: D. Moran, History Lessons, in: The National Interest, Fall1991, p. 83. 
14 Ibid. p. 86. 
15 
see: S.P. Huntington, America's changing strategic interests, in: Survival, vol. XXXIII, no. 1, 
Jan/Feb 1991, p. 4. 
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assistance. 16 After the victory over Spain in 1898, the United States emerged as a minor 
colonial power and a major actor on the world scene. It replaced its small, dispersed Navy 
with a ,massive battle fleet second to none, designed to win command of the seas in any 
conflict and thus make possible the projection of American power into Eurasia". 17 During 
the first three years of the first World War, from 1914 to 1917, Berlin and Washington 
clashed on three major issues: the question of Wilsonian peace meditation, the attempts of 
the German government to influence conditions inside the United States by a far-flung 
campaign of propaganda and sabotage, and the conduct of German submarine warfare. 18 
When the latter, against numerous warnings from the German ambassador in Washington, 
was extended to 'unlimited' submarine warfare, Wilson was persuaded to join the war on 
the side of the Entente. ,Ironically, it was. therefore the issue of the freedom of the seas, 
agreed upon in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and 
Frederick the Great's Prussia in 1785, that became one ofthe major reasons for America's 
declaration of war against Germany". 19 The United States went 'abroad' to Europe to 
fight for the idea of freedom, democracy, and the rule of the law. Woodrow Wilson's 
missionary ideas made John Quincy Adams' address invalid:20 
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, 
there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes 
not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom 
and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. 
16 see: F. Trommler, J. Me Veigh, America and the Germans, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 1985, p. 5. 
17 H . 4 untmgton, p. . 
Although this may have been claimed, there is no real question of British superiority before 1922. 
18 
see: TrommlerNeigh, p. 8. 
191bid. 
20 John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, address on July 4, 1821, in: Walter LaFeber, ed., 
John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire, Times Books, Chicago, 1965, cited in H. 
Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 35. 
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The United States entered the war in its own national interest, disdaining the 
concept of the balance of power and considering the practice of Realpolitik immoral. 
Wilson's idealistic vision of a 'community of power' implied democracy, collect_ive 
security, and self-determination.21 The proposal was a world order in which resistance to 
aggression would be based on moral rather than geopolitical judgments. Though 
America's allies had little faith in this new dispensation, they felt too weak to challenge it 
What they did, however, was to ensure that adjustments were made, in order to keep 
Germany down and to prevent a further increase of German power, and thus they 
countered the prevailing principle of self-determination. 
France's attempts to create an independent Rhineland, a ,strong movement for the 
annexation of the Saar coal district and even the whole west bank of the Rhine underlined 
this approach". 22 As far as the Rhineland was concerned, the allies at last agreed on a 
demilitarized zone on the right bank as a provisional reparations guarantee. Another 
problem was that American people were neither ready for a military commitment in 
defense of the Treaty of Versailles, nor to accept the role of global police force. Thus, 
even the American occupation force in Germany was hotly debated. Arguments for a 
quick withdrawal were that the occupation would seriously weaken home defenses, that 
the small force requested by Wilson (less than a division) would be of no moral or physical 
value in the Rhineland, and that American soldiers in Europe desired almost universally to 
return home. 23 
The Rhineland Agreement finally approved the occupation and the German 
reparation payments. The Treaty of Versailles ended the the war officially. Nevertheless, 
the discussions about the troop contribution went on until the United States finally failed 
to ratify the Treaty. In this situation it was evident that the United States either must come 
into Europe 'with both feet' or pull out before a probable clash with France. Pierrepont 
Noyes described the situation as follows: 
21 
see: Ibid., p. 221. 
22 
see: K.L. Nelson, Victors divided, University of California Press, 1975, p. 72. 
23 Ibid. p. 96. 
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As things stand, the American occupation has become, at best, a needless financial 
burden to Germany and an irrelevant factor in the securing of reparations. At the · 
worst, it hat become a cover for French activities aimed at separating the left bank 
of the Rhine or at seizing the Ruhr. 24 
The German attitude towards the United States troops was friendly. Faith in the 
possibility of political and economic assistance was substantial, and this optimism helped 
to give an almost favorable view of the American occupation. In the United States this 
was seen from another perspective. In a presidential election which Wilson himself 
considered a 'solemn referendum on the treaty' the American people gave the majority 
vote to Warren G. Harding, who had repudiated the Wilson interpretation of international 
collaboration. For him it was not the duty of the United States to attempt ,to purge the 
Old World of the accumulated ills of rivalry and greed".25 In 1921 the United States signed 
a separate peace with Germany. The continued existence of the occupation, however, was 
supported especially by two developments. The first was the economic recession of the 
early 1920s, which brought businessmen and farmers a renewed appreciation of European 
markets and a willingness to stabilize them. The second development was the growth of 
public pride in the endeavor, even among pronounced isolationists. This pride is 
demonstrated by the President's remark in 1921 ,that he feared, there would be a bad 
mess all the time in Europe if it were not for the mollifying and harmonizing influences 
which are wielded by spokesmen for this Republic". 26 
American exclusion from the distribution of funds by France and Great Britain 
ignited the discussion again. It distilled the question to its most basic form: Was the 
American occupation in Germany worth preserving if only for the sake of peace in 
Europe? The year 1923 brought lastly the final stage, resulting in France seizing the 
Ruhrgebiet to enforce reparations payments, after the United States withdrew from the 
Rhineland in January. The result was that America was again isolationist. France would 
24 Ibid. p. 138. 
25 C.+M. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, Macmillan, New York, 1927-42, Vol. II, p. 
674, cited in: J.B. Whitton, The Second Chance, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1944, p. 11. 
26 K. Nelson, Victors Divided, p. 189. 
8 
now have to play policemen all over Europe to preserve peace. Had America in the 1920s 
intervened with a 'Marshall plan', Europe's development might have been more peaceful. 
Great Britain, however would have been forced to hand over its claim to politjcal 
leadership in the 'Old World' to the United States. The first phase of American 
intervention in Europe thus failed. By the early 1930s, even Wilsonians abandoned the 
League of Nations as a lost cause. 27 Isolationism led to renew the 'Fortress America' 
which, in effect, put American foreign policy in a straitjacket during the critical years 
before and during the Second World War. 
The debate between interventionists and isolationists during the first years of the 
Second World War was fierce. Only the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 settled 
that debate. For the first time in modem history it became obvious that American territory 
was not an unreachable sanctuary. However, America entered the war not only to retaliate 
against the attack and to prevent German hegemony in Europe. Faced with the challenges 
above, President Roosevelt supplemented Wilson's liberal globalism by a military 
globalism. 
The peculiar dialectic in American world power politics - the global definition of 
one's own national interests in connection with the enemy's claimed bid for world 
domination- is not a phenomenon ofthe post-1945 era but can clearly be 
discerned in the period between 193 7 and 1941.28 
For President Roosevelt the task was to combine the United States national 
interests with its obligations to a civilization of which America is part, against an immoral 
and anti-Western Nazi govemment.29 That meant, however, that the critical task was also 
to commit the United States to postwar international structures before peace could return 
the nation to its old habits. Above all, Roosevelt saw the United Nations (UN) as ,the only 
device that could keep the United States from slipping back into isolationism". 30 Active 
27 
see: A Schlesinger, Jr., Back to the Womb?, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, p. 3. 
28 F. Trommler, J. Veigh, America and the Germans, p. 42. 
29 1bid., p. 43. 
30 A Schlesinger, Back to the Womb?, p. 4. 
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membership in the United Nations was underlined by a moral argument: ,We cannot", as 
Secretary Hull had pointed out, ,move in and out of international cooperation, and in and 
out of participation in the responsibilities of a member of the family of nations, without 
paying the cost of such a policy".31 Nevertheless, after the war America 'brought the boys 
home' at a breathtaking speed. Nearly ninety percent were withdrawn by March 1946.32 
Yet, there were three reasons which justified the presence of American forces in Europe: 
the fear of the Soviet threat, the necessity to make France accept the rearmament of 
Germany, and the hope that Western Europe finally would develop politically, 
economically and militarily, so as to be able to care for itself 
It was clearly seen that, if avoidance of war is the test of its validity, isolationism 
has been completely ineffective. America had fought in both world wars. Furthermore, 
might not the necessary armaments for an 'armed isolationism' ,doom the American 
people to a permanent war economy which could not fail to jeopardize social progress in 
this [American] country".33 And last but not least, would an Anglo-American alliance, as 
an alternative to American international leadership, result in the formation of rival blocs 
and alliances, so that the world would be involved once more in the kind of political, 
economic and military competition which had so often produced major wars.34 
Whether, in retrospect, the stationing of American troops on European soil has to 
be seen in the context of 'pacifying Europe', 'carrying through America's great power 
politics', or whether Europe was the United States' 'empire by invitation' 35 has to be 
discussed. It is a fact that within a few years, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, 
NATO, and other security pacts led to a troop deployment that bound the United States to 
31 G. A Craig, American Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, in: J.B. Whitton, The Second 
Chance, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1944, p. 25. 
32 
see: W. Fechner, Abzug, aber kein Abschied, in: Europaische Wehrkunde, WWR 11/90, 
p. 640. 
33 G.A. Craig, American Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, p. 24. 
34 Ibid. p. 28. 
35 see: W. Krieger, Die Urspriinge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkrii.fte in 
Europa, 1945-1951, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Arbeitspapier, Mai 1988, p. 9. 
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the outside world in a way ,isolationists, in their most pessimistic moments, could hardly 
have envisaged". 36 Although America did not have the intention to engage extensively and 
indefinitely, 37 this was clearly not possible from the very beginning. The scale and 
capability of Soviet forces made close cooperation with West European democracies, and 
forward deployment on a more than symbolic scale necessary. Strategic plans to defend 
Europe in forward positions, 38 and to conduct logistical support, were developed quickly. 
The essential change in American policy towards the West was established after 
Secretary of State Byrnes declared in September 1946 that United States' occupation 
forces would stay in Germany unless other occupation forces would leave it, 39 and after 
America demonstrated military engagement in Europe during the Berlin Crisis, which 
exceeded the 'normal' occupation tasks. Containment was no longer a goal, but an openly 
declared policy. The announcement of the Marshall Plan. and the positive economic 
development in Germany established that German economic recovery would count in 
American eyes as a positive step towards national rehabilitation. ,Germany was entrusted 
with a positive mission of production. In its wake would come the country's recovery of 
sovereignty".40 Thus, for postwar Germany, the influence of the United States obviously 
became fundamental, as military protector, economic investor, and ideological model. 
36 
see: A Schlesinger, Back to the Womb?, p. 5. 
37 
see: W. Krieger, Die Urspriinge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkriifte in 
Europa, 1945-1951,p. 12. 
38 The assessment whether Europe could be defended only from a line 'behind the Pyrenees and 
from the British Islands', from a bridgehead in the Benelux countries, at the Rhine, or on German 
territory changed over the years and was reflected in the formulation of the NATO strategies. Especially 
Germany had, of course, in all the years since the Second World War urged that its territory should not be 
abandoned without defense efforts. Also the French President Auriol declared in 1948 that ,war with 
Soviet Russia would mean civil war in France, since the Communist Party would rise in conjunction with 
the enemy. Moreover, war with Russia would be even worse than with Germany and might involve the 
destruction of the whole elite of the Nation, so that after two years nothing valuable might be left." (cited 
in: W. Krieger, Die Urspriinge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkrafte in Europa, 
1945-1951, p. 36). 
39 see: Documents on Germany 1944-1985, ed: Department of State, Washington DC 1985, pp. 
91-99. 
4° F. Trommler, J. Me Veigh, America and the Germans, p. 67. 
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Each of these roles made possible the other two. This was, not at least, the reason why the 
Cold War quickly led to integration, first of the three Western zones and later of the 
Federal Republic into the Western economic and military alliance system. This meant, 
however, also a German rearmament, which was heavily discussed internally in Germany, 
and between the United States, Great Britain and France. The fears of a new German 
militarism and nationalism were strong, and only the theory of a 'double containment' (the 
containment of the Soviet Union at arm's length, and of Germany 'with an embrace') as 
well as German military self-restraint, could push the pendulum towards a German 
integration. The West German army was the prerequisite for the American forward 
deployment. It contributed to a burdensharing that enabled America to limit its 
contribution and fulfill various tasks in its worldwide containment of Communism. 
However, until the outbreak of the Korean War, the increase in European defense 
capabilities made only little progress while the United States concentrated on the 
consolidation of its nuclear arsenal. Until the late '60s, a maximal number of roughly 
seven-thousand American nuclear warheads were stationed in Europe. Due to various 
alliance decisions, the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and NATO's 
decisions of 199141, the number decreased thereafter. 
The Korean War clearly demonstrated to parts of the American population that the 
forward stationing of American troops in Europe was not a favor but in their own national 
interest. Thus, despite efforts in Congress from time to time to reduce the American 
military commitment to NATO, every president since Truman opposed the idea, until the 
Soviet Union began to dissolve. Nevertheless, burden sharing was permanently discussed. 
First, there was a widespread disagreement among the allies on the nature of the 'burden' 
to be shared as well as over the best means of sustaining order and security. 
41 NATO's NPG approved a substantial reduction in the sole type of U.S. weapons to remain in 
Europe: gravity bombs for delivery by U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft, with approximately 700 to be 
retained. 
President Bush had decided to eliminate all U.S. nuclear artillery shells and warheads for short-range 
ballistic missiles and to withdraw all nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines as well as 
nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft. 
see: D. Yost, U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, slides used during the course NS 3720, Naval Postgraduate 
School Monterey, Autumn 1995. 
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If our allies cannot be made to appreciate either the extent to which 'out-of-area' 
issues impinge upon American regional security or the nature of Soviet 
involvement in Third World conflict, the United States will find it necessary to 
develop unilaterally a force posture appropriate to its national security needs and 
priorities. 42 
Thus, it was not astonishing that between 1966 and 197 4 Senator Mansfield, under 
the influence of the Vietnam experience, brought in the 'Mansfield Resolutions' to reduce 
the United States' oversea's engagement by half The offset agreements 
(Devisenausgleichsabkommen) with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Wartime 
Host Nation Support Agreement (WHNS) of 1982 helped to avoid such reductions. 43 
During the late 1980s, the American House of Representatives revitalized the topic. The 
Defense Burdensharing Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, under the lead of 
Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, published a report in 1988 in which the forward 
stationing of American troops was seen as a further cornerstone of the United States' 
Mili~ary Strategy. It was also asked, however, the European allies, in the long run, should 
prepare to defend European territory without massive American support, because 'this 
engagement could not be guaranteed forever'. 44 Beneath the official reason, the American 
aim was to increase European conventional defense capabilities, so that the European 
allies could contribute 'their fair share'45 and to heighten the nuclear threshold in a conflict 
with the Warsaw Pact. However, the European NATO members saw their security 
interests best maintained by the threat to use nuclear weapons in the early stages of a 
42 J.K. Davis, U.S. global Strategy and Alliance Relationships, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, 
Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 96. 
Especially, this statement has to be seen in the context of the Reagan years. 
43 The WHNS agreement was completed as a result of the Stoessel Demarche which demanded 
increased logistical support, participation at the stationing costs of U.S. troops. (For further details see: 
OTL Rieck, Lastenteilung (Burdensharing) im Bundnis, Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 
7.11.88, aktualisierte Fassung, Jan. 1989, p. 7. 
44 OTL Rieck, Lastenteilung (Burdensharing im Bundnis), p. 9. 
45 
see: W.R. Van Cleave, The Military Sinews of a Global Strategy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, p. 170. 
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conventional war and were, thus, not eager to increase their conventional share, especially 
due to the fear of American disengagement from Europe. 46 
On 19 November 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 
Treaty) was signed by the leaders of the then twenty-two governments from NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. This treaty induced the collective and individual reduction, limitation 
and restriction of conventional weapons in Europe.47 In the framework of the treaty the 
United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to have no more than 195,000 troops 
stationed in Europe. The further detente, the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Pact, and NATO's new cooperative structures with 
the East48 made it possible that, beginning in 1996, the force levels of present American 
troops in Europe would fall to about 100,000. Although this means that two of three 
United States military installations in Europe will be closed, the presence of North 
American conventional and United States nuclear forces in Europe will remain vital to the 
security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that ofNorth America.49 
,Forward deployed U.S. forces in Europe underpin our [America's] commitments 
to NATO, support the U.S. role in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and ensure a 
rapid and flexible worldwide response capability",50 while at the same time the United 
States places greater reliance on their European allies to take increased responsibility for 
meeting collective regional defense requirements. 51 This does not mean that in the long run 
American troops will be unnecessary or that other NATO countries will pay roughly 
seventy-five percent of the American stationing costs, as demanded by the House of 
46 see: W.F. HaJ.lrieder, German-American Relations in the Postwar Decades, in: F. Trommler, J. 
Me Veigh, America and the Germans, p. 112 and 114. 
47 for details see: German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, p. 71. 
48 especially the establishment of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership 
for Peace (PfP). 
49 see: The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Rome 1991. 
50 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, June 1995, 
p. 29. 
51 Ibid. p. 31. 
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Representatives in 1994,52 or seventy-five percent ofthe nonsalaried cost ofUnited States 
troops in Europe after a transitional period of four years, as demanded in 199 5. 53 Yet, 
beneath the American advantages of having an 'allied' forward stationing area for 
worldwide deployments and a reliable security partner, the necessity for an American 
contribution is clearly seen also by the Europeans. A European Union with a common 
foreign and security policy and the means to establish a credible European force, will take 
still some years, if not decades. For fifty years Americans have contributed to freedom and 
peace in Western Europe. Europeans should be thankful. 
America gave its hand when it's mattered most. We will never forget: John F. 
Kennedy's ,Ich bin ein Berliner!", Ronald Reagan's ,ReiBt diese Mauer nieder !", 
[and] President Clinton's ,Wir werden immer an Eurer Seite stehen !".54 
52 
see: 0. Mager, Alter Kontinent wichtig, in: Information fiir die Truppe, 10/94, p. 55. 
53 
see: Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Amendment offered by Mr. Shays, June 
14 1995, pp. H5955-H5962. 
See additionally, Congressional Record, Senate, Amendment offered by Mr. Harkin, Aug 4 1995, pp. 
S11403-S11470. 
54 K. Kinkel, speech at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Apr 19 1995, p. 4. 
The 1994 Frank Amendment called for reducing authorized end strength for NATO Europe unless host 
nations paid 75 percent ofnonpersonnel costs (on the model of the agreement with Tokyo). Without a 
compliance of the NATO allies, America would cut strength to 25,000 personnel in Europe. For further 
details see: D.S. Yost, The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence, in: JFQ, Summer 1995, p. 74. 
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ill. THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Between 1989 and 1991 a tectonic shift in world politics led to the abandonment 
of long standing assumptions about security relationships. The disintegration of the 
Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the 
dismantling of the military confrontation in Europe occurred with a rapidity and 
decisiveness that was wholly unexpected. Not surprisingly, therefore, the emphasis has 
been on the geopolitical changes that took place. 55 Significant as these changes have been, 
they had enormous impacts not only on the view of a changing world, but also on the 
paradigmatic views of states themselves. While the identification, as the adversary of the 
Communist threat, as the major guarantor of peace, freedom and stability of the Western 
world, and the 'owner' of the mission of democracy and free markets, was no longer self-
explanatory, America slid into an identity crisis. Economical frustrations and political 
doubts about the framework of American policy contributed to an overall assessment that 
America's troubles were overwhelming and had to be solved soon. The German-American 
philosopher Hans Jonas explained that the responsibility of the present generation is far 
greater than that of former ones. 56 The decisions of the present generation will determine 
whether life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness can be further extended. However, with 
the West no longer mobilized on the front lines of a grand ideological crusade, it seems to 
be only logical that nations turn inward to solve domestic problems, many of which were 
neglected during the Cold War. This ,places the United States in the same position it 
faced after the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and World War I. Suddenly, 
55 
see: M. Brenner, W.F. Schlor, P. Williams, German and American Foreign and Security 
Policies: Strategic Convergence or Divergence?, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne Studien, Nr. 98/1994, 
Dec 1994, p. 9. 
56 
see: H.D. Genscher, Speech at the Georgetown University, May 26 1990, in: W. Weidenfeld, 
Partnerschaft im Wandel, Tiitigkeitsbericht des Koordinators fur die deutsch-amerikanische 
zwischengesellschaftliche, kultur- und informationspolitische Zusammenarbeit, Auswiirtiges Amt Bonn, 
1991, p. 78. 
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the country has no serious enemies and faces no military threat from abroad. In similar 
situations in the past, American unity has waned". 57 
The danger is clear: A paradigm shift towards isolationism and a concentration as 
far as possible on domestic politics only, or will challenge not only the outside world, but 
also the United States' national security itself European states, at the same time, do not 
contribute much to the 'old' community. While Germany is concentrating on its 
unification, France seeks to regain its world power status, and Great Britain practices its 
'muddling through' policy. In responding to new problems under new circumstances, 
national governments will almost certainly have to create far more effective patterns of 
collaboration. 
However, to be a partner is not enough. Common learning and problem solving 
make it necessary that all parties have the same fundamental belief system, equal political 
and moral concepts, and, if possible, the same historical roots. Only these societies can be 
a reference to each other. Thus Europe and America are 'natural' partners. 58 Christianity 
and Enlightenment have produced a mix of culture and civilization, from which the models 
of Western society are derived. 59 Especially for America, it appears to be a characteristic 
that the nation ,cannot be effective in its military and foreign policy unless it believes that 
both its security interests and its commitment to certain moral principles require the nation 
to act". 60 This provides the basis on which interests and responsibilities of the individual 
can be brought together to develop a 'responsible society'. 61 A legal constitution cannot 
present the only link for society. Because many decisions have emotional elements, there 
must be an emotional link. This link is essentially created by communal spirit, common 
57 B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: Commentary, Nov. 1993, p. 37. 
58 
see: K. Kinkel, German-American Friendship - The Transatlantic Agenda 2000, speech to the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Apr 19 1995, in: German Information Center, Vol. XVIII, No.4, 
p. 2. 
59 see: G. Diehl, Die Deutschen Interessen, in: Politische Meinung, Sep 1994, p. 4. 
60 R.W. Tucker, Nation or Empire? The Debate over American Foreign Policy, The John Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1968, p. 16. 
61 
see: C. Bohr, Aufbruch zur Verantwortungsgesellschaft, in: Die Welt, Apr 19 1995. 
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history, values, and ethnic identity.62 Thus, the American-European community is a mean 
to create the stability and freedom for the Western world. 
However, ,American nationality and the national feeling associated with it were 
from the beginning linked not to national origin, religion, or even language, but to abstract 
ideals of liberty, human rights, representative government, and the equality of all human 
beings". 63 The point of America was not to preserve old cultures, but to forge a new 
American culture. Lincoln was never a hero only for those of English ancestry, Jackson 
never only for ·Scotch-Irish, and Douglass never only for blacks. Thus, it can be 
questioned whether American 'Eurocentrism' has a legitimacy. For example, American 
leaders rejected the European idea that the morality of states should be judged by different 
criteria than the morality of individuals. According to Jefferson, there existed: 
... but one system of ethics for men and for nations - to be grateful, to be faithful to 
all engagements under all circumstances, to be open and generous, promoting in 
the long run even the interests ofboth.64 
The division between the United States and Europe can easily be seen in the fact 
that America, until the tum of the twentieth century, favored democratic governments 
wherever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences. The Monroe Doctrine 
went the next step by declaring that Europe must not become entangled in American 
affairs. 65 Even America's entry into the First World War was for goals which bore little 
relation to the world order Europe had known for some three centuries and for which it 
had presumably entered the war. 
62 see: W. Schauble, Das Nationale als Mittel zum europili.schen Zweck, Interview in: 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Dec 28 1994. 
63 B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, p. 37. 
64 in: H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 32. 
65 
see: H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 35. 
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America disdained the concept of the balance of power and considered the practice 
of Realpolitik immoral. America's criteria for international order were democracy, 
collective security, and self-determination- none ofwhich had undergirded any 
previous European settlement. ... Proclaiming a radical departure from the precepts 
and experiences ofthe Old World, Wilson's idea ofworld order derived from 
America's faith in the essentially peaceful nature of man and art underlying 
harmony of the world .... European leaders had no categories of thought to 
encompass such views. 66 
There are also demographic reasons. Until the 1950s more than two thirds of all 
immigrants to America were from Europe or Canada; in the 1980s this percentage had 
decreased to less than thirteen percent. 67 
Yet, the dominant American ideals, characterized not only by a passion for 
individual, liberty but also by a profound belief in an eternal and unchanging moral law, 
and by a sense of national mission as a beacon light of freedom among the nations of the 
earth, are deeply rooted in the Hebraic-Christian and the Greco-Roman traditions, which 
have shaped the whole Western civilization. 68 After a great wave of change in Western 
moral thought evolved with Christianity during the Dark Ages and medieval times, modem 
ethics were developed. Beneath preparing men and women for heaven, morality had two 
important secular purposes: First, to fit everyone to some degree within society by 
defining standards of behavior, and second, to bring structure, dignity, and meaning to 
peoples' lives. 69 Furthermore, the paradigm . change wrought by the Protestant 
Reformation redefined Western Civilization. The values of individualism, secularism, 
patriotism, capitalism, and rationalism in tum produced the Enlightenment, of which the 
United States of America is a product. Throughout its history these five values have 
defined the national interests of the United States, which has defended them with a 
66 Ibid. , p. 221-222. 
67 
see: M. Reinhold, USA und Deutschland im Einigungsprozess und nach dem Ende des Ost-
West-Konflikts, in: Rissener Rundbrief, Hamburg, 4-5/1995, p. 137. 
68 
see: G.F. Thomas, American Ideals and the Peace, in: J.B. Whitton, The Second Chance, 
Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 199. 
69 
see: T. Hauser, F. Macchiarola, Confronting America's Moral Crisis, Hastings House Book 
Publishers, New York, 1995, p. 15-16. 
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combination of active and structural means. ,The American creed had its antecedents, and 
these antecedents lay primarily in a British inheritance as recast by a century and a half of 
colonial experience". 70 Although today more and more Asian-Confucianist, Buddhist, and 
Islamic acts are being played on it, the stage is still European-Christian. 71 Some people 
may regret that white male Protestants have played so large a role in shaping United 
States' culture, and that nearly eighty percent of Americans are of European descent; but 
one cannot erase history. Even European crimes, Hitlerism and Stalinism, cannot alter the 
fact that Europe was the birthplace of the United States. 
When in 1783 the American war of independence ended, America had found its 
identity. Jefferson's famous Declaration of Independence of 1776 not only strengthened 
America in its war against Great Britain, it was also a model for many European political 
and constitutional ideas. Obviously, Jefferson's inalienable rights still have a great 
attraction today. 72 The European-American community therefore is not, and has never 
been, a one-way street. The constitutional principles on which the United States are 
founded have shown a remarkable ability to work their way into many states and cultures, 
some vastly different from their own. 
Because America and Europe share the same cultural traditions and have the same 
historical roots, common values can serve as a basis for a new common identity, for 
example for a political partnership. The Europeans know that America's participation in 
the European processes is already part of the European security culture. The Americans 
for their part must develop an understanding of the steady progress in European political 
integration and unification. 73 Experience both within and outside Europe shows that 
democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule 
70 A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America, Norton & Company, New York, 1993, p. 
27. 
71 W. Weidenfeld, Speech in Munich, Oct 111991, in: W. Weidenfeld, Partnerscha:ft im Wandel, 
1990/91, p. 105. 
72 
see: J.D. Bindenagel, Amerikanische Aufienpolitik- Grundlagen und Perspektiven, speech at 
the University ofBonn, May 17 1995, in: U.S. Information Service, Amerika Dienst, May 24 1995, p. 19. 
73 
see: V. Rtihe, Europe and America - the Future of the Transatlantic Community, speech at the 
U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York, May 3 1994, p. 15. 
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of law are among the best guarantees of peaceful, predictable and cooperative behavior 
between states. This was the provision of the third basket of the Helsinki Agreement in 
197 5. ,As it turned out, reformers in Eastern Europe used basket III as a rallying point in 
their fights to free their countries from Soviet domination". 74 
In recent years, the Atlantic Community has often been seen as a common destiny, 
based on several pillars. Among these are especially democracy, market economy and free 
trade, security and defense, and the common cultural heritage. 75 The latter pillar does not 
mean that tolerance and openness against other cultures are excluded. Respect for 
individual differences is crucial to prevent further tragedies, like the former Yugoslavia. 
However, there is a striking contrast between Western norms and the reality of profound 
disagreement among nations and regimes, particularly those from the Islamic, Confucian, 
and Hindu worlds. 76 Consider the different reactions to the case of Salman Rushdie: what 
the West saw as an intolerable attack on individual freedom the Middle East saw as a 
proper punishment for an evildoer who had violated the mores of his group. Individualism 
itself is looked on with abhorrence and dread by collectivist cultures, in which loyalty to 
the group overrides personal goals. , The Western commitment to human rights has 
unquestionably been intermittent and imperfect. Yet the ideal remains - and movement 
toward it has been real, if sporadic". 77 
The United States - European community has a good chance to build a system of 
mutual understanding, problem solving, and economical development, based on common 
values, which can be the blueprint for other societies and for international cooperation. 
Therefore, it is necessary that both remember their common belief system and put it in the 
foreground of their policies. This requires courage to stick to moral goals, and to be 
74 
see: H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 759. 
75 
see: M. Rifkind, Die Notwendigkeit einer Atlantischen Gemeinschaft als eines deutlicheren 
Ausdrucks der engen Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten, in: NATO Brief, Nr. 2, 
Marz/Aprill995, p. 12. 
76 
see: D.C. Hendrickson, The Recovery of Internationalism, in: Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 1994, 
p. 32. 
77 A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America, p. 129. 
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reference and partner to each other. The task is to combine due appreciation for the 
diversity of nations and societies with due emphasis on the great unifying Western ideas of 
individual freedom, political democracy, and human rights. 78 In these times, values matter 
most. 
78 Ibid., p. 138. 
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IV. SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR 
After the Cold War the West is confronted with different, and highly demanding, 
challenges. 'Victory over Communism' and reduced physical threats, as the last chapter 
has shown, does not mean that Western ideals and values are of lesser meaning. 79 Since 
the world is developing much faster than a decade ago, it is necessary to care about old 
and new risks and new sources of conflict. One must realize two facts: First, that man is 
ambivalent and equally capable of peace and conflict (the fundamental Christian view of 
man); and second, in many parts of the world, violence and war are regarded as normal 
and acceptable means of conducting policy. The risks emanate mainly from the 
tremendous restructuring process that is now going on in the successor states of the 
former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation is a fragile state still looking for its identity, 
and the outcome of developments there is most uncertain. Only some of these problems 
can be countered with military capabilities. Most of them must be met with political 
means. In general, only a comprehensive view of all political, social, economic, ecological, 
and military aspects can give suitable means to maintain or restore stability and security. It 
is also necessary to develop an ability to deal with the causes of tension and conflict before 
they turn into military hostilities. Conflict prevention and crisis management must be given 
first priority in the security planning. The employment of military force is justified only as 
a means of last resort. However, a credible defense capability will continue to be the basis 
ofWestern security and the main task ofWestern Armed Forces in the future. 
Today 'instabilities' are the dominant structures of rising conflicts. These 
instabilities derive from the changes that have appeared in the post-Cold War security 
environment and are still going on in the international system. They can be generally 
grouped under three main headings: 80 
79 see: W.J. Crowe, Jr., Eine neue Sicherheitsarchitektur fur Europa, speech at the European-
Atlantic Group, London, May 24 1995, p. 2. 
80 for further details see: S.P. Huntington, America's changing strategic interests, in: Survival, 
Vol. XXXIII, no. 1, Jan/Feb 1991, p. 5. 
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First, there are systematic changes in the structures of domestic and international 
politics, like the emergence of a truly global economy, the declining importance and power 
of the nation state, and the intensification of national and ethnic identities. These 
systematic changes have shifted the relevance and usefulness of different power resources, 
with military power declining and economic power increasing in importance. 
Second, changes occur in the distribution of power in the international system. The 
relative economic decline of America versus Japan, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
unification of Germany and the consolidation of its position as the pre-eminent power in 
an emerging European Union, and the rise of locally dominant powers in many Third 
World Regions, are such changes. The world is changing from a loose bipolar system to a 
multipolar system with one (increasingly ambivalent) superpower left, a system perhaps 
best described as 'uni-multipolar'. 
Finally, there are changes in the relations among countries. It is no longer possible 
to characterize all nations as 'allies', 'antagonists', or 'neutrals'. Future international 
relations will be more volatile, with ad hoc coalitions on particular issues probably more 
important than permanent alliances. 
,All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold 
War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant 
surprises and moral ambiguities". 81 This fact leads not only to the difficulty of how to 
prepare one's own country for further challenges and how to preserve national security. It 
is also difficult to define partnerships, alliances, and coalitions, if they exceed a single 
objective. A new transatlantic partnership thus has to be built on difficult ground. History 
suggests that multipolar systems have tended to become Hobbesian, with the 'military' 
trump-card to be used for vital interests. So the world, and especially the American-
European West is at a crossroads. Whether a 'Balance ofPower System', or a 'Multipolar 
System', or something else will evolve, is still unclear. However, this future system is 
determined by today' s actions! When at the tum of the decade President Bush thought of 
a 'new world order' he was right. What he was not able to foresee at that time was that 
81 Ibid., p. 7. 
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this order could not be 'created' but had to be 'developed'. Our time now is determined by 
'Evolution' rather than 'Revolution'. Why do political changes make so painfully slow 
progress? Because, beneath rational reasons, man is guided by particular short range self 
interests, personal needs, feelings and sentiments. However, ideas and convictions are not 
put into reality by themselves. Those who formulate political goals without giving the 
prerequisites for their realization do not change the current situation but create frustration. 
Thus, it is important that political initiatives are combined with the desires of the people so 
they become 'common' initiatives. This takes away the common and general fear of 
change. 82 
A. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
Security after the Cold War cannot be discussed without reference to the former 
Soviet Union and its successor states, especially Russia. Although Russia has still an 
enormous military potential, it has little functioning infrastructure, no prerequisites for the 
market economy, and nearly no experience in democracy. This instability potential has to 
be considered as one of the most dangerous for the current world situation. Thus, it will 
be further described in a chapter of its own. 83 
The new challenges one faces after the dissolution of the East-West antagonism 
are multidimensional. Their spectrum ranges from domestic, social, ethnic, religious, 
ecological, military, and economic crises to interstate rivalries. When German foreign 
minister Kinkel in April 1995 underlined that a shift of emphasis from political to 
economical questions is happening, he accommodated German diplomats to an altered 
situation of 'economic precedence'. 84 This leads to the assumption that military means, for 
82 see: B. Konitzer, Wir miissen der Menschheit die Angst vor Reformen nehmen, in: Die Welt, 
Sep 8 1995. 
83 
see: chapter 4.2. 
84 
see: Deutsche Presseagentur, Kinkel: Au.Benpolitik kiinftig verstarkt unter Wirtschaftsaspekt, 
Apr I 1995. 
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example, might be part of an economic mission or, at best in the long run, the marketplace 
will replace the battlefield. Beside the question whether military means support economic 
goals, the above example points out that ,security is indivisible and that security of each .... 
country is inextricably linked to the security of all states". 85 Also security in one area is 
linked to all others. 'National security' is determined by a lot of risk factors of different 
nature. To investigate all these factors and to propose solutions would be beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the primary dangers for the Euro-Atlantic security can 
be summarized as follows: 
It is first a division of the world along different lines. These lines endanger a 'world 
community'. First, the world is dividing into 'Market Democracies', 'Transitional States', 
and 'Troubled States'. 86 While the Market Democracies comprise a growing community 
of free and prosperous - or at least rapidly developing - nations, Transitional States, 
working towards democracy and free markets, still risk sliding back into political chaos 
and economic decline; the Troubled States are plagued with ethnic and religious 
extremism and are often slipping into anarchy, threatening to become rogue states. Added 
to this prosperity gap are demographic, economic, and ecological developments of global 
significance. 87 These elements in addition to weak political parties, a leaden bureaucracy 
that discourages foreign investment, no functioning military or police, may lead to an 
,anarchic implosion of criminal violence, ... to Yugoslavia-like countries without mini 
states to replace the whole. 88 Thus, a two-track division of the world is in sight. While 
'zones of turmoil' are defined by degenerating nation states with legitimization deficits, the 
growth of fundamentalist and religious movements, ethnological conflicts, and enormous 
environmental problems,89 'zones of peace', defined by wealth and democracy can extend 
85 Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, Paris, Nov 19 1990, cited in: A.D. Rotfeld, W. 
Stiitzle, Germany and Europe in Transition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 217. 
86 see: H. Binnendijk, P. Clawson, New Strategic Priorities, based on: survey of the National 
Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1995, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1995. 
87 see: German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994, p. 30. 
88 RD. Kaplan, The coming Anarchy, in: The Atlantic Monthly, Feb 1994, p. 49. 
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themselves, if they are free of political pressure like the East-West confrontation. They can 
be seen as an attraction point. Though these 'zones of peace' cannot prevent ,zones of 
turmoil and development from having coups and revolutions, civil and international wars, 
and international massacres and bloody repressions",90 it is often argued that nothing can 
threaten them because they are economically and militarily powerful. Furthermore, they do 
not go to war with each other because it brings no gain for them. The destruction of a war 
causes such damage, even to their own country, that even a great victory could not 
balance the costs. However, the interdependence of the world will not allow the 'zones of 
peace' to stay untouched by the outside world. 
First, no economic bloc, as for example the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, is autark in itself The dependencies on raw materials and energy sources 
which are mostly found outside the 'safe' world areas and the need for markets and secure 
sea lines of communications obviously make clear that real dividing lines do not exist. 
Blocs not only can contribute to reducing global trade barriers and improving world 
political cooperation, they must do so, to survive and to prevent the danger of tensions, 
possibly escalating into conflict. 
Second, information technology makes it impossible to be isolationist. 91 -The 
extension ofthis trend does not only suggest that 'information-based' warfare will become 
more widespread, but also 'information warfare' itself Industrial and technological 
espionage cannot be stopped by state borders. 
Third, a source of new crises is the re-emerging of nationalism in some areas of the 
world. Instabilities in Russia, other parts of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the European neighbor regions of the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
give reason for concern. Poverty, having no life perspective and inhuman living conditions, 
89 Kaplan describes 'the environment' as the national-security issue of the early twenty-first 
century. See: RD. Kaplan, The coming Anarchy, p. 58. 
90 M. Singer, A. Wildavsky, The Real World Order, Chatham House Publishers, Inc., Chatham, 
New Jersey, 1993, p. 7. 
91 The modem missile and aircraft technology supports the argument that isolationism is no 
longer possible. 
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extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terror, and a proliferation of new 
states, many with disputed borders, as well as reemerging national minorities claiming 
autonomy or independence, with ethnic cleansing as a result, create uncontrollable and 
unlimited migration. If there is nothing to lose, why not search for a new home in the 
West, where even the lowest living standard is better than your present one ... From Africa, 
for example, because of its geographical neighborhood, the migration wave would spill 
over into Europe. Political, economical and probably military conflicts could be the result, 
when especially today's moderating states of Africa, like Saudi-Arabia, Marokko, Algeria, 
and Egypt or of the Middle East, like Iran which tries to establish its role as a regional 
great power92, would increase their weapon arsenal because of now smoldering rivalries, 
subversive activities and religious indoctrination, further drug trafficking, and resource as 
well as water problems.93 For African nations it will be impossible to tackle such situations 
alone. The Western World would have to intervene, whether on humanitarian reasons or 
because of pure Realpolitik. Especially European interests, thus, should therefore lie in 
creating a stable peace order not only 'in' Europe but 'for' Europe. A trend towards a 
policy concentrating on internal matters only, or the decision to spend money and efforts 
exclusively in the former Soviet Union, would in the long run probably make the situation 
even worse than today and further the overall dangerous environment. 94 
Finally, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means a 
threat to international peace and security. Despite many efforts, the establishment of 
NATO's Senior Group and Senior Defense Group on Proliferation, multilateral 
disarmament and non-proliferation conventions such as· the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) and, at the same time, priorities to continue to strengthen 
92 see: M. Zepperitz, Lagebeurteilung aus deutscher Sicht, in: Europaische Sicherheit, 1195, 
p. 28. 
93 for a detailed description of the North-African scenario see: IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik, 
Nordafrika auf dem Wege zum radikalen Islamismus?- Bedeutung fur die NATO-Mitglieder, Bonn, lAP 
3/95, p. 8-9. 
94 see: E.H. Tilford, Jr., World View: The 1995 Strategic Assessment, Strategic Studies Institut, 
U.S. Army War College, Feb 10 1995, p. 29. 
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export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 
Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the Australian Group and the Zagger Committee, the 
danger of the spread of weapons and technology is still not averted. Especially for the 
Islamic world, the ownership of nuclear weapons is a question of great psychological 
significance. All too often the idea that every important religion has its own nuclear 
arsenal can be found. 95 The pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is imagined, will give Islamism 
social-political equality. The general question is, whether the 'new nuclear danger', as 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin put it, is really one of the most relevant 
threats to Western security, or whether those threats to European and American territory 
and Armed Forces in 'Out-of-Area Missions' are overestimated.96 Whatever the 
assessment will be, to be threatened by these weapons has a great psychological impact. 
The use of nuclear weapons is more likely than ever: fanatics are unafraid of dying, 
drug cartels have no territory to defend. The classical principles of nuclear deterrence, 
which presuppose a fear of reprisals, no longer hold good in the case of such people. 
Making a rudimentary nuclear weapon is now within the reach of a group which has a few 
hundred million dollars. A massive missile attack against Europe becomes more possible 
when in the year 2000 more than nine countries of the Third World own ballistic missiles 
with a range of more than three-thousand kilometers, as Western Secret Services have 
estimated. 97 It is quite obvious that proliferation is one of the most important reason why 
isolationism and probably unilateralism, seen from a security standpoint, is no longer 
possible. 
Today nearly every region of the world is transforming: the East from Communism 
and planned economy to (hopefully) democracy and market economy, the West from the 
95 The islamic historian Mohammed Yacine points out that for the Christians, the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Russia, and South Africa own these weapons, for the Jews it is Israel, for Hinduism 
it is India, for Cnfucianism, Taoism and Buddhism these states are China and India. 
For further details see: C. Range, Die nordafrikanische Mittelmeerkiiste im Umbruch, in: Information fiir 
die Truppe, IFDT 10/94, p. 60-61. 
96 
see: J. Krause, Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?, in: 
Survival, Vol. 37, no 2, Summer 1995, p. 135. 
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see: A. Hofmann, Die Raketenbedrohung aus der Dritten Welt, in: Focus 5/95, p. 38. 
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Cold War to a changed and 'modernized' economy, security and society, and the South 
from a development area to a place with guaranteed economic, and probably also political, 
standards. 98 It will take a great effort and will be impossible for one nation alone to 
overcome, to solve and to manage these 'transformation crises'. 
One cannot intervene everywhere. ,In spite of all the verbal excitement on the 
subject we must leave many of the world's problems and peoples to themselves, especially 
when they reject outside intervention, as it would not help to solve the conflict or problem 
anyway". 99 It is vital therefore to concentrate on what is most important and to act to 
provide convincing evidence of reliability. On the other hand it is also necessary to act 
multilaterally, in connection with others. Due to its welfare, its moral basis and its power, 
but also because·it is affected by strategic developments, the Western World and especially 
the Transatlantic Community has a special responsibility. Human rights can only grow in a 
democratic and economically healthy surrounding. 100 Thus, concentrated and common 
efforts are necessary for preventive actions. 
We live in a time of ongoing and global change. We are not experiencing the end 
of history, but we do see a change accompanied by heavy tremors with historical 
dimensions. We cannot foresee the length oftime it will take for this change to 
take place, nor can we predict its final results. History teaches us that in such a 
time of change it is most important to have a vision, a goal to aim for .... The 
United States is now the only world power still capable of unrestricted global 
action. Although the United States would much prefer to solve its own domestic 
problems at this time, it cannot do so because, as the world's leading power, it 
cannot tum a blind eye to our crisis shaken world .... But America needs partners. 
Even the United States can act only in coalitions. In today' s world, no one can go 
it alone. 101 
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B. RUSSIA- PROBLEM AND CHANCE 
With its 150 million population, one eighth of the landmass spread over nine time-
zones, Russia, as long as it exists, will always be a great presence on the world stage. In 
this decade it has lost its western empire; yet the Russian destiny will, for good or bad, 
remain combined with that of Europe. Since the Seven-years War, at least since the 
Congress of Vienna, Europe lived 'under the eyes' of Russia. East Europe, moreover, was 
in Russian hand.· Thus, it is obvious that its relationship to the 'West' in these days is 
dominated by the intention to maintain its status as a 'player' in international politics, 
especially since East and Central Europe are going to participate in European-Atlantic 
security organizations. Being a superpower today is a matter of de-ideologized greatness, 
after pan-slavism of the nineteenth century and world-communism ofthe twentieth century 
have become obviously part of the past. However, bitterness and humiliation mingles with 
this greatness. 102 The fate of twenty-five million Russians, living in regions which are 
partly characterized by 'chaos', trouble the Russian soul. Russian foreign policy thus 
reaches back to the 19th century. 
Three scenarios are imaginable for the future: first and best, a new democratic and 
stable tsarism103 with close control ofthe army and a slow but stable increasing economy, 
second and worse, an anarchical situation in which a split of Russia into five or six 
provinces is probable and the army is controlled by nobody, taking the function of an 
arbiter, and third, the power struggle between political groups, an up and down of reforms 
and political blockades, which, however, keep the hope alive that all will end in the first 
scenario. It is difficult to give probabilities for the different scenarios. Neither the Russian 
society, nor any other state has an interest in a destabilization. Interests, however, do not 
always determine history. Thus, many look with sorrows to the multiple crises, in which 
Russia is involved. There is only minimal good news from the Russian economy, doubts 
102 
see: M. Stiirmer, Das verwundete Imperium, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Jan 28 1994. 
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'democratic tsarism' is defined, in this meaning, as a 'democracy under a strong leader', with 
a powerful President, who, however, is elected by free vote. 
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about the fulfillment of disarmament treaties, and a Russian military doctrine which gives 
with the idea of a 'near abroad'- more questions than answers. It is therefore not 
astonishing that Western politicians take the situation as 'serious', seeing Russia 'at the 
crossroads'. 104 Russia makes its neighbors, and former Warsaw Pact allies, fear, that their 
newly gained independence is endangered. They look back to the Georgian example where 
President Schweardnadse did not want to join the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) until he saw that Moscow supported anti-governmental troops in his country. Soon 
after Georgia entered the CIS it won the (civil) war. 105 
For Moscow strategists the world has turned by a bit more than ninety degrees. 
After the threats from the North and the West have vanished, it is the South and the 
South-West which destabilizes the country from outside. Russia is interested in stability 
for this region, but it has often acted very undiplomatically, with limited and indecisive 
means. Furthermore it has contributed to an estrangement to the West106 by the war in 
Chechnya. This war has had another effect: Russian society is increasingly divided into 
bitterly opposed groups of 'hawks' and 'doves', with the doves seeming to be an 
increasingly fiustrated minority. ,The almost universal reluctance to use force that was so 
typical of the last years of Soviet rule, has disappeared. . . . Moscow is back and ready to 
stand tall". 107 
Russia has neither the nerve, nor the capabilities to have a clear-cut and active 
global foreign policy. A legitimate question therefore is: Can Russia survive?108 Or do its 
four centrifugal forces - lack of agreement about the legitimacy of Russia's current 
104 see: F. Weckbachmara, B. Schmid, RuBland am Scheideweg - Ruhe warnt vor Katastrophe, 
Interview with V. Ruhe, in: Bild am Sonntag, May 11995. 
105 see: R. Clement, Nichts geht gegen RuBland, in: Das Parlament, Oct 7 1994. 
106 see: U. Engelbrecht, Moskaus strategisches Dilemma, in: Generalanzeiger Bonn, Apr 4 1995. 
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borders; conflicting economic objectives among different regions of the Federation; 
competing claims for legitimacy on the part of federal and regional leaders; and the 
unpredictable allegiance of army units - tear it apart? What should be the West's actions to 
support a 'positive' development? 
One has to look to the internal situation, to Russia's domestic political scene first, 
to answer these questions. State structures still are military. The defense ministry is ruled 
exclusively by generals, military structures from the former Soviet Union, like the Ministry 
for Railroad Troops and the Ministry for Exceptional Situations, make clear that the 
transition to a democracy of 'Western style' is not yet finished. The military has a broad 
power basis and much influence. 109 This would not necessarily be dangerous if the military 
worked under close political and financial control. But this is not the case. Thus, Russian 
officers estimate the general situation as 'extremely negative'. The majority prefers the re-
establishment of an authoritarian and dictatorial regime. Russia, in their view, needs a 
political 'strong hand' .110 Thus, the collapse of old conditions in the beginning of the 
decade by no means guarantees the creation of democracy and of a free market economy. 
The prerequisite for the resolution of the crisis of state, throughout Russian history, has 
always been the restoration of the center of power. 111 Whether the 'coup d'etat of 1993, 
by which Y eltsin eliminated the Soviets, can be taken as such a restoration, and whether 
Y eltsin has the loyalty of his population, which in the past was related to the person of the 
tsar, but not to the institutions of the empire, is not yet clear. This is further blurred by the 
fact that, with the collapse of the world's first atheist state, the historic religion, 
Orthodoxy, has emerged as the central cultural force in the country's new national self-
consciousness.112 Links between the former Soviet Secret Service (KGB) and members of 
109 It is probably not a pure chance that President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Gratschow have a 
residence in the same house in Moscow today. 
110 see: A. Braun, Sehnsucht nach der starken Hand, in: Stuttgarter Zeitung, Nov 18 1994. 
111 see: G. Simon, Political Culture in Russia, in: Aussenpolitik, 111/95, p. 244. 
112 see: J.H. Billington, The Case for Orthodoxy, in: The New Republic, May 30 1994, p. 25. 
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the ruling synod of the Church during the last quarter -century of communism have created 
different views about this trend. 
One sees the role of the Church in society. One sees the Russian Church providing 
a unifying national identity for a rejuvenated traditional state. The other sees the 
Church providing the moral basis for building a responsible society independent of 
state structures .... What kind of Church is Russia's road leading? ... Which East 
shall we become- the East of Xerxes or ofChrist?113 
The internal situation, furthermore, is determined by a still underdeveloped 
mentality of ownership. Under Communism everything had belonged to everyone and no-
one. Gains and losses are thus relatively unimportant. Despite aroused forces of self-
organization and interest groups, it is necessary for a spirit of entrepeneurship to evolve in 
order to bring up a stable middle class which can stabilize the economy. Additionally, ,a 
basic democratic consensus has not materialized which recognizes the status quo as it has 
developed since 1991, which views democratic elections as the only permissible means of 
establishing legitimacy". 114 The attitude that politics is superordinate to law is widespread 
so that tax evasion and corruption are seen as ,illegal but correct". 115 
This attitude can also be found in the military. Russia's financial crisis, furthered by 
the Chechnya operation, which has diverted as much as four billion dollars in defense 
funds away from more needy accounts like housing, social services and routine operations 
and maintenance, led to an enormous erosion. That Moscow bus drivers now earn more 
than trained fighter pilots, speaks for itself. 116 Loyalty to a government 'far away in 
Moscow' under such conditions is decreasing, even among officers~ Poor training 
conditions, education, lack of spare parts and only very few procurements contribute to a 
crisis of which the amount and the outcome is not foreseeable. Since little more than half 
113 Ibid., p. 27. 
114 G. Simon, Political Culture in Russia, p. 250. 
115 Ibid., p. 252. 
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March/April1995, p. 91. 
36 
the combat aircraft of the Soviet air force remained within the boundaries ofRussia, eighty 
percent of all repair facilities for armored fighting vehicles were 'lost', and many units 
have reduced their personnel to about fifty percent117, the overall assessment is that Russia 
today could not mount a large-scale cross-border operation against a well-equipped 
opponent. It is thus even questionable whether Russia's armed forces can fulfill all five 
main tasks and functions that the new military doctrine defines: reconnaissance and 
warning, to maintain strategic nuclear forces, to maintain a military potential for a defense 
against a regional aggression, to guarantee strategic development possibilities of Russian 
armed forces, and to secure the national borders, especially in the air and under water. 
Beneath general deep structural changes, the emphasis lies especially on the extension of 
'mobile troops' and 'internal troops' with the aim of suppressing unrest and stabilizing 
Russia within its borders. Especially in this realm, it is interesting to notice that Russia's 
military leaders have been unwavering in their insistence that their sole mission is to 
defend against external aggression, not to influence political maneuvering or police 
domestic unrest. 118 Thus, prevailing military doctrine grants permission to the Russian 
armed forces to launch an offensive across border to repel aggression; to 'protect national 
interests', human or minority rights; and to prevent a Balkan-like conflagration, an 
upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons119, even in the 
'near abroad' outside Russian territory, might be counterproductive to the wish of 
Russia's defense leaders ,to be accepted into the world community as a normal power". 120 
This fact, together with financial bargaining, may have the effect of a politicizing the 
military. 
While in the July 1990 London Declaration NATO governments agreed to 'reduce 
their reliance on nuclear weapons' and make them 'truly weapons of last resort', nuclear 
117 see: H. Tiller, Russischer Biir aufwackligen Beinen?, in: Information fur die Truppe, IFDT 
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forces in Russia are seen today as ,one of the few ways Russia has left to claim 
superpower status and prestige .... Some Russian discussions of military doctrine display a 
tendency to see nuclear weapons as a substitute for the high-technology conventional 
weapons [of the West which are] beyond Russia's economic grasp for the foreseeable 
future". 121 It is not only the likelihood of irresponsible behavior with nuclear weapons and 
materials that can create worldwide fears, it is also a ,renewed emphasis on nuclear 
weapons among the elements of a new, more aggressive strategic posture toward the West 
by hard-line politicians and military leaders", 122 together with the official renunciation of 
the no-first-use policy. 123 
For Russia, however, the maintenance of a great power status is crucial. Already 
Stalin's intentions had been that the ,Soviet Union would be the only important military 
and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to 
military and political impotence". 124 Having failed to achieve this, Russia's actual analysis 
and perception of the world situation is determined by increasing fears about its 
encirclement by the West, which is, in the opinion of some Russian political and military 
leaders, willing to use military power for creating pressure on other states. NATO's 
expansion is viewed with great suspicion, and creates a reason that Russia searches for 
new strategic partners, for example Iran, and falls into a dangerous isolationism against the 
West. ,The issue is not that committing the East Europeans to NATO creates a threat to 
Russia; it is the fact that Russia is pushed out - excluded". 125 Interestingly, it wants to be 
excluded, however not alone. ,Russia is different, Y eltsin said, the national character of 
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USGPO, 1961, p. 845, cited in: J. Laloy, Western Europe in the Soviet Perspective, in: C. Bertram, ed., 
Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s, London, Maclnillan, 1980, p. 42. 
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the Russian people is not like that of other Europeans". 126 Russia still shares virtually no 
principles of security and few personal values with the West, much less the concerns of a 
NATO or a European Union. 127 It is troubled, however, by the fact that some of its former 
allies do it, especially those with common borders with Western Europe. Thus, one can 
ask the question, whether Russia is still the 'partner of the West'?! 128 Two contrary 
answers are possible. The first is a careful 'no', the second is an enthusiastic 'yes'. Both 
answers have consequences on the future relationship of the Transatlantic Community 
with Russia. 
A 'careful no' is caused by the fact that Russia wants to play an important role in 
world politics, but that it has not yet decided which one. There are tendencies towards a 
restoration of the Soviet Union or even of a monarchy. Others imagine Russia, Ukraine 
and Belorussia as a combined community, or favor the idea of a smaller but fitter, and 
possibly international independent Russia which would be called an 'Eurasian' country 
with a mainly Asian orientation, which could function as a bridge between Europe and 
Asia. 129 After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had tried to connect with the West on 
the basis of international political and economical cooperation. The Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltsin declared friendship, NATO and the European Union opened their doors for a close 
partnership and gave Russia 'credit', in a monetary and political sense. 
Today however, Moscow uses its inner weakness (as the former Soviet Union its 
military strength) to get further concessions. The former demand for an equality has 
become a demand for a 'special partnership' on Russian terms. A right to veto NATO's 
expansion, a free hand in dealing with the 'near abroad', and even the 're-integration of the 
ex-Soviet region' are examples for recent Russian discussion. Otherwise, as President 
Y eltsin announced at the December 1994 Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security 
126 M. Jakobson, Collective Security in Europe Today, in: The Washington Quarterly, Spring 
1995, p. 60. 
127 see: G.A. Geyer, Russia's Security Intentions, p. 14. 
128 see: H. Kremp, 1st RuBland noch der Partner des Westens?, in: Die Welt, Dec 13 1994. 
129 
see: Neue Ztiricher Zeitung, Deutliches Grofimachtstreben Jelzins, Moskaus Aufienpolitik 
wieder in alten Gleisen, Feb 7 1995. · 
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and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a renewed policy of 'blocs' would arise within a 
'Cold Peace'. Moscow tries to re-establish its former power status as far as its own power 
makes it possible and the 'outer world' allows it. 130 It should be considered that ,Russia 
[in recent years] has broken every international human rights commitment by its 
unprecedented brutality .... The war in Chechnya has revived the world's worst fears of 
Russia . . . and has trashed whatever residual potential Russia had for a leadership role in 
the world. Boris Y eltsin has made Russia into a pariah state". 131 The war in Chechnya has 
not only made clear the political structure of the Russian Federation, and shown the lack 
of governmental competence132, but also that Western definitions of 'Internal Matters' and 
'Human Rights' are not shared by Russian politicians and soldiers. The 1975 Helsinki final 
act, on the one hand, reflects the growing recognition that the way states treat their 
citizens is not just the business of that state, but rather it is a factor in each state's relations 
with other states. On the other hand, the Charter for a New Europe, signed at the Paris 
Summit of 1990 by the Soviet Union, rejects the use of force for the resolution of disputes 
and establishes respect for human rights, democratic government and economic liberty as 
the standards for behavior. 
Even tacit Western acceptance of a new Russian domination over its former 
colonies will amount to recognition of a new Yalta dividing line between East and 
West, and it will condemn those countries to a status of limited sovereignty for the 
foreseeable future. Such a situation will encourage aggressive Russian nationalists 
to press for renewed hegemony over other former satellites - and for an expanded 
Russian 'sphere of influence' in Eastern Europe. 133 
It is thus necessary for the West to make clear that it is not prepared to establish a 
close partnership with a country that destabilizes, threatens its neighbors by its actions, 
130 see: L. Riihl, Abwendung von Europa, in: Die Welt, May 2 1995. 
131 J.J. Maresca, Be firm with Russia about Standards of Governance, in: International Hearld 
Tribune, Feb 16 1995. 
132 see: H. Vogel, Optionen westlicher Politik nach der Tschetschenien-Krise, in: Bundesinstitut 
fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Nr. 8/95, Jan 1995, p. 5. 
133 J.J. Maresca, Chechnya is not simply an 'Internal Matter', in: The Wall Street Journal, Dec 27 
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and makes developments within Russia increasingly unpredictable. ,An arm's length 
approach makes sense". 134 It is not acceptable that Russia today goes on in its colonial, 
communist or imperialistic 'tradition'. Russian promises about political should become 
internalized obligation, rather than mere bargaining chips. Otherwise credit arrangements 
must be suspended and NATO cannot proceed with a 'Partnership for Peace' without 
betraying itself Whether economic and financial help should in the future be combined 
with further progress of Russian democratic development can be discussed from different 
perspectives. 135 However, 'business as usual' is obviously the wrong way. Western politics 
should not fall into a renewed 'containment' but should make clear that certain standards 
are the 'indiscussable and non-negotiable prerequisites to become' a partner. 
The 'enthusiastic yes' that Russia is (still) the partner of the West and tries to 
maintain and further this status points out that internal difficulties and problems cause a 
wrong picture to the outer world. Showing strength against the West, thus, is explained by 
the need to weaken nationalistic forces and a Russian attempt to earn as much as possible 
in return for an already no longer preventable NATO expansion. Furthermore Russia's 
dissolution is not seen as a possible ,European Solution"136 to territorial questions in the 
East. From this perspective the intervention in Chechnya is at least explainable. 
Furthermore it is stressed that there is no doubt that Russia, despite its very difficult 
political and economical situation, has managed to conduct free elections under a new 
constitution, has established a free press, has accepted and promoted far-reaching 
disarmament agreements and occasionally contributes to international peace and stability 
as a real Western partner, for example in Yugoslavia. 137 Because a stable and reform-
134 
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oriented Russia is essential for European and worldwide security, it is indispensable to 
support the development, economically, technically, and politically, 138 as a 'transfer of 
stability' to the East. 
The end of the Cold War makes it not only possible but also highly desirable to 
achieve reconciliation and, yes, friendship, around a grand policy of stabilization of 
the entire Eurasian landmass. 139 
International Relations Theory teaches that lack of a partner's predictability often 
can be overcome by more evidence of confidence and decreased suspicion. 140 Thus, it 
might be the right way to connect Russia closely to the West by a political and economical 
partnership with the European Union, a security partnership with NATO, and a secure 
place at the G7, then G8 conferences. When the European Union foreign ministers during 
their March 1995 Carcassonne meeting proposed a non-aggression agreement between 
NATO and Russia to reassure Moscow that the alliance's enlargement to the East poses 
no threat to Russian security, it was a first step towards this goal. The relationship with 
Russia should be characterized, on the one hand, by a close consultation network, for 
example about topics like proliferation, technological cooperation, crisis-management, and 
possibilities of common peace-keeping, 141 and, in general, about sharing of information on 
issues regarding politico-security related matters, especially having a European dimension, 
political consultations on issues of common concern, and co-operation in a range of 
security-related issues. 142 On the other hand, certain basic principles and a strategy for the 
138 
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relationship should be defined, among these especially more support for Russia's political 
parties, bureaucracy, interest groups; media, and the judiciary. 143 
A close transatlantic partnership on the basis of NATO, as well as between the 
nation states, is essential to support a strategy for Russia. Only if the West is on 'common 
track' will it be possible to conduct an effective policy. Neither a 'historic alliance' 
between France and Russia (Foreign Minister Kosyrew during his November 1994 visit in 
Paris144), nor a United States-Russia bilateralism, 145 nor a great and extensive celebration 
of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory over Germany, with the effect of Prime Minister 
Chemomyrdin' s praise for Stalin's wartime leadership, 146 contributes to such a strategy. It 
should lie in Western self-interest to find a common policy to overcome Russian problems 
and to use the still existing chance of a 'Strategic Partnership' with Russia for a 
stabilization of world's peace and welfare. 
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V. EUROPE NEEDS AMERICA 
Is the European Union an oxymoron?147 Is the idea ofEuropean common interests, 
a future 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' and a 'European Security and Defense 
Identity' an unrealizable vision of a post-World War Two generation? Different European 
interests can give this impression. There are Federalists148, Neutrals149, Atlanticists150, 
Nation-State Concentrated151, Undisciplined152, Great153 and Small154 nations. Some, like 
France and Italy, feel connected with the Mediterranean region, some, like Germany and 
Denmark, with Eastern Europe. The reality that for the election of NATO's Secretary 
General almost every country has individual preferences, speaks for itself 155 The 
European idea has changed. With the European Union, Europe has become 
institutionalized, but the 'heart and soul' seem to have vanished. During the last Europe 
elections, a poster of the German Social Democrats showed two hands in handcuffs, to 
demonstrate the threat Europe could bring to the German economy and the state. An 
almost endless strike in France demonstrated the difficulties of taking only little steps 
147 
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towards fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria for the Monetary Union. The estimation is 
that Italy, taking the same 'adjustments' as France, would socially and politically become 
destabilized and would fall into a spiral of hate and resentments, comparable to a Weimar 
situation in the 1932. 156 In summary, one can cite the first German chancellor Bismarck 
with his famous words: ,I have always found the word 'Europe' on the lips of those 
politicians who wanted something from other powers which they dare not demand in their 
own names". 157 
Naturally, beneath this negative view, the European idea has a bright side. German 
monetary compromises and French politico-military changes (for example, its December 
1995 step towards reintegration into NATO's Integrated Military Structure) make it 
possible that both states may become the core of a flourishing European Union. A wave of 
investments, increased research, and education reform might produce great benefits for the 
whole region. Intelligent cooperation contracts would help to stabilize Eastern Europe, 
and maintain the possibility of integration. Europe has a shining scenario too. 
Furthermore, supporters of the European idea, like German Foreign Minister Kinkel, 
point out that the alternative would not be the 'status quo' but disintegration and a re-
emergence of old rivalries. 158 Thus, it is necessary that the European Union become a 
major element in the new global constellation, so that it intensifies people's identification 
with it. A European, visiting South-East Asia or even California, feels very clearly that his 
personality was built by other influences than those of his hosts. European 'identity', 
defined through climate, speech, history, religion, literature, poetry, and so on, becomes 
obvious mostly outside its own cultural circle. This fact is not dependent on the question 
whether every nation 'has' its own values, as Johann Gottfried Herder thought; whether 
there are universal values, as it was declared in the Declaration of Independence and 
156 see: H.P. Oschwald, Lateineuropaische Stinden, p. 333. 
157 A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, London, Random House, Arrow Books, 
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during the French Revolution; whether cultures and values are artificially invented to 
create a feeling of communality, as Eric Hobsbawn proposes; or whether Ernest Renan' s 
idea that ,the existence of every nation is a daily repeated plebiscite" 159 is right. It is 
important to pick up ancient values and to combine them with recent historical and social 
experiences and new ideas, to further develop European culture. A hundred years ago, 
millions ofHungarians, Slovenians, Croatians, Tchechians, and Ukrainians felt as subjects 
of Habsburg-Austria. Why should it not be possible that tomorrow they feel like 
Europeans? It is the 'will' that produces Europe and the ability to compromise. 
One will see whether today' s statesmen are willing and able to create what our 
grandfathers only could dream of As shown above, different countries have different 
views of Europe. While Great Britain's population sees itself as foremost 'British citizens' 
(50 percent), for French citizens this percentage is only half as big (25 percent) while 
especially in Belgium and Germany an extraordinary number of people see themselves as 
'Europeans first' (15-20 percent). 160 What might constitute a European identity is still 
quite unclear although the average man feels some sense of 'dual nationality'. 
It is questionable whether this is enough to be a basis on which, for example, a 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), or a European Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) can be based. The European idea must be seen in historical 
perspective to explain the differences. Plans for the unification of Europe have appeared in 
every century since 'Charlemagne'. During the recent past two ideas have been especially 
important, presented by the French General Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet. ,For 
General de Gaulle the important factor in Europe's evolution· was the state and the nation, 
and their traditional organization, which he thought could be improved. For Jean Monnet, 
Europe conceived as a potential united power was much more attractive, and he did see 
this without a decline in the power of the individual state and nation". 161 Providing more 
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detail, General de Gaulle stressed a Europe of independent states with no supranational 
authority, independent of the United States. On the other hand, Jean Monnet's Europe 
was built on the idea of cosmopolitanism, of concrete European institutions, a European 
Community linked to the United States in a strong partnership, and of a small but open 
community. 162 That plans like the Pleven Plan, presented in 1950, for a West European 
confederation in matters of defense, and the European Defense Community, proposed in 
1952, failed, and European structures were over long times only developed in the 
economic realm, can be explained by the differences in the above concepts. 
Although the sheer magnitude of the Soviet Union threat gave enough reason for a 
true supranational integration of Western Europe, it was not enough to overcome basic 
differences, especially because the United States gave the non-communist states of the 
West, as some thought, a 'free ride' in defense issues. ,Deterring war is cheaper than 
having to fight one" 163 was the American argument, taking into consideration the origins 
of two World Wars. In these days, however, the security landscape has changed. More 
than ever, due to its economic strength, due to the decreased military threat from the 
former Soviet Union, due to political, economical, cultural, and communicational 
worldwide links, and due to new challenges from outside, Europe, and especially the 
European Union, has to take over at least some more responsibilities. What for America 
was true after the Second World War, today is comparably true for Europe: 
Under the conditions of modern nationalism, national self-interest has hitherto been 
the principle followed most often in foreign policy by both the majority of the 
people and their representatives. But the recognition of this fact in the past need 
not mean the acceptance of it as inevitable for the future .... The rejection of 
national egoism does not require the acceptance of national altruism in the sense of 
devotion to welfare of other nations without regard to one's own, but a 
relationship of mutuality between the nations. 164 
161 J.-B. Duroselle, General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe, in: The New 
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The latter means that a deepened and enlarged Europe will probably be based on a 
'Intergovernmental' approach, rather than on a 'Supranational' one. Especially France and 
Great Britain are eager to stress that their national parliaments should participate more 
intensively in European affairs. 165 However, it is also clear for them that the European 
Union must create a planning and information capacity in some areas, for example for 
monetary issues and in the area of foreign and defense policy, which stands above the 
various national agencies, which until now have had a monopoly. The independence of 
European institutions is essential to avoid a resurgence of ,the ghosts of the past, vampire-
like awaiting a fresh draught of balance-of-power politics" 166 and to find solutions for 
trans-national problems and challenges. Unpleasant decisions can only be taken by 
legitimate organs, not by a European parliament whose members are dependent and 
enslaved by their national governments at home. The argument that this parliament is 
generally not able to represent three-hundred and fifty million Europeans and that a 
majority decision there cannot be sufficient to deploy soldiers, 167 is only oflimited value. 
Patriotism, one of our shared values, is bound to blossom as our nations enrich 
each other. Our nations are not being asked to sacrifice their history or their 
traditions. What they are being asked to do is to build on their synergies for 
purposes accepted by all. This is the political pact that must unite us. 168 
There are no doubts, however, about a necessary differentiation among nations on 
their way to a European unity. The idea of a European core with concentric circles of a 
differentiated participation, proposed by the German 'Euro-engineer' Karl Lamers, is an 
164 G.F. Thomas, American Ideals and the Peace, in: J.B. Whitton, The Second Chance, 
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operationalization. With the Schengen agreement, a social contract, the Eurocorps, the 
European economy system, and the monetary union, Europe's core begins to solidify. It is 
this emerging character which attracts the East European states. Today one can see clearly 
that the Maastricht Treaty was not ,a dangerously misguided initiative at a critical moment 
in Europe's history". 169 
The security guarantees of America against the 'threats from the East' gave 
Western Europe in the last fifty years the possibility to concentrate on other issues than its 
own defense. European economic recovery after the Second World War was only possible 
because the United States of America helped to bind wartime adversaries together under 
democratic rules. The 'Pax Americana' was the prerequisite for European cooperation. 
After the fall of Communism the question of burden sharing increased again. Moreover the 
United States' emphasis lay no longer only on financial agreements, material support, and 
the possibility to station American troops on foreign soil with adequate 'Host Nation 
Support', but stressed more and more a 'responsibility sharing'. This means that the 
European Allies, especially those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), shall 
take over more political and military responsibilities of their own. 
A European pillar of NATO became a necessity. On the other hand, responsibility 
sharing is not possible without an idea of a common 'European Security and Defense 
Identity' and, if possible, a 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' in the framework of the 
European Union. For the first time, the June 1991 North Atlantic Council meeting in 
Copenhagen pointed out that ,the creation of a European identity in security and defense 
will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility 
for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity". 170 The link between 
efforts to strengthen the security and the creation of a political union, including the 
development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy were seen quite clearly, in the 
sense that the latter was already under way and had to be brought into a greater 
169 D.T. Stuart, Can Europe survive Maastricht?, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, Feb 4 1994, p. 1. 
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international framework. However, most ofthe steps towards this goal are still to be done. 
There is not yet a clear picture on the horizon, although in 1996 (Maastricht II) the 
European Union wants to define goals, purposes and especially the next initiatives to. be 
taken. 
The 'muddling through' towards a still unknown ground is, of course, not caused 
by inactivity, lack of ideas, or barriers laid down the way by the United States. It is caused 
by different political attitudes and intentions. Germans prefer a European Integration as a 
step towards a more intensive and equal partnership with America. 171 Having other 
elements in mind, a 'collective defense' is also a prerequisite for security and that NATO, 
not Europe, should take the lead by integrating new partners. 172 The French Foreign 
Ministry, on the other hand, puts the European Union in the 'driver's seat'. Its logic is that 
economic integration is more important now than security thinking, so ,Central European 
countries should only become members of NATO through 'evolution', after they have 
been accepted into the EU and joined its defense arm, the Western European Union". 173 
The danger for Washington in this approach is that it will play a secondary role in deciding 
membership but will remain the leader in offering the security guarantee. 
NATO's and EU's enlargement, however, should not be a goal for its own 
purpose. The idea is to spread the blessings of democracy and the market to the East; the 
new democracies want a home and a community, and the West wants to extend it to them. 
On the other hand, there are lots of officials and political scientists174 who argue that Lord 
Ismay, NATO's first secretary general, is still right with his phrase of why having NATO: 
,Keep the Russians out [of Europe], the Americans in, and the Germans down". 175 
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Without doubt, the second argument can be supported. Without America, the stabilization 
of Eastern Europe is not manageable. Europe needs the strategic backing through a 
transatlantic partnership, which includes the whole spectrum of political, economical and 
military questions. These three pillars will be necessary in the future. 176 As the former 
German Defense Minister Georg Leber put it: ,There is neither a political nor a military 
nor a psychological substitute for the American commitment [in Western Europe]". 177 The 
development of a European identity, thus, must not let the United States become a strange 
and alien power. Europe needs America, and America is a European power! ,Any attempt 
to disregard that fact amounts to an invitation to disaster. 178 Only a partnership on such a 
basis, can develop a 'shared responsibility' for international peace and order. 
Transatlantic solidarity is essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and 
for the strengthening of an undivided, free and democratic Europe. The shared 
principle of free trade, broad economic interchange and an ever growing flow of 
goods, services, technologies as well as ideas makes the transatlantic relationship 
an effective framework for cooperation and the development of free economies. A 
broad network ofbilateral relations as well as daily cooperation in international 
organizations and other international gatherings are an indication of the global 
nature of those links. 179 
175 see: J. Joffe, Is there life after Victory?, in: The National Interest, Fall1995, p. 25. 
176 see: V. Riihe, Europa und Amerika - eine Partnerschaft im alten und neuen Geist, speech at 
the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, May 11 1995, p. 17-18. 
177 cited in: J. Joffe, Is there life after Victory?, p. 81. 
178 R. Cohen, Why the Yanks are going. Yet again., in: The New York Times, Nov 26 1995. 
179 Western European Union, Common Reflection on the new European Security Conditions, 
discussed at the May 1995 Council, Lissabon, passage 11.1.2. 
52 
A. EUROPEAN SECURITY 
As Timothy Garton Ash puts it, ,the basic reason we need the EU and NATO is 
not to make our countries richer and more powerful, but to try to save Europe from war -
both the wars that Europe is still capable of generating, and from the wars that threaten 
from the dangerous world around". 180 In today' s world it is necessary to act 'in concert, 
not in chaos'. This is the reason why a new security order based on approaches like 'let 
Europe take care of itself or 'Return to the Balance of Power System' do not work. 181 
The security landscape in Europe presents an inconsistent picture. It is undergoing a 
process of fundamental change, moving towards cooperation and integration. Processes of 
progressive integration, however, are opposed by centrifugal tendencies whose impact is 
· goi~g as far as to cause the fragmentation of state entities in the east and the south-east of 
the continent, as already shown in chapter four. However, there are special trends and 
challenges for Europe. One is, that East European governments may return to former 
Communist structures and behavior, and a close political and military cooperation with 
Russia. In Belorussia, for example, the Soviet 'Day of Revolution' was re-established as a 
national holiday, and there can be found a great disappointment about Western inactivity 
to help the country. 182 In Bulgaria the new ex-Communist government has already 
returned to former closeness and harsh tones, while the military cooperation with Russia 
regains momentum in a quality 'as in the old days' .183 In Russia itself Communists get 
more and more electoral votes so that President Yeltsin in December 1995 proposed the 
building of a presidential council as the only mean to keep the major power centers and 
Russia's foreign policy in their own hands. These are only three examples which show that 
Europe has to deal With new (and old) problems at its own regional surrounding. 
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Furthermore, it is no longer possible to reach stability in Europe without looking to the 
outskirts. One has to take into consideration, for example, unstable regions around the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East, and in the new tension triangle Turkey-Iran-Caucasus. 
The 'clarity of purpose' of the Cold War is vanishing. 
For obvious reasons, the possibility of an extremist regime in North Africa 
acquiring ballistic missiles is something that haunts Spain and Italy far more vividly 
than it troubles Norway .... Non-communist Russia remains an uncomfortable 
neighbor for Norway and a tough regional rival for Turkey, but in the absence of 
any global East-West confrontation, both Oslo and Ankara are finding it much 
harder than before to win understanding of these concerns from their NATO 
partner. 184 
It is therefore not astonishing that even the United States Secretary of Defense 
Perry urges NATO's members to focus on the Mediterranean region. 185 North Africa's 
and the Middle East's supply of oil and gas are crucial to Europe's survival, and as long as 
immigration from these areas into the European Union and weapons proliferation are seen 
as vital dangers to Western security, one has to engage in this region and help it towards a 
political, financial and economic stabilization. The center of European Union's interest 
therefore should be a clear assessment of what it is capable of doing. This assessment has 
different dimensions: regional ones between the European Union's southern area and the 
new partners in Scandinavia; political ones, among the larger states, and between them and 
their smaller partners; and financial ones, between an enormous spiral of debts186 and 
spending necessities, on the one hand, and between national budgetary sovereignty and 
European economic and monetary integration, on the other. 
Interest's of the actual members of the European Union and defense organizations 
in Europe are often articulated by those who want to become members. They want to join 
'Europe' mainly for two simple reasons: ,because it is a rich man's club in which fellow 
184 
see: Financial Times, Allies of Circumstance, Nov 24 1994. 
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Welt, Jan 18 1995. 
54 
members possess huge funds for investment, and because they want to be part of some 
kind of security grouping" 187 which guarantees them a security background in which 
economic development and welfare can grow. In most cases the European Union is seen 
as an organization which provides welfare, and NATO is seen, correctly, as a system of 
collective defense which provides security. However, although politico-military interests 
of the European Union are neither formulated, coordinated nor prioritized between the 
different member states and/or European Union coordination bodies, one can identify 
vital, essential and general interests which are closely linked to security issues. European 
security interests, to be pointed out, are the elimination or reduction of the risks and 
uncertainties that threaten one or more of the following aspects: 188 
p. 67. 
- territorial integrity, political independence and the freedom of the Union and 
each member state, 
- economic stability, probably endangered by conflicts that could have an adverse 
effect on sources of raw materials, overseas markets and lines of communication, 
or which could lead to a massive influx of refugees, 
- ecology, probably endangered by consequences of inadequate security in the 
nuclear domain, and 
- democratic structure, social stability and the cultural and political identity of the 
Union and its member states, probably threatened by massive, uncontrolled 
immigration or by failure to respect demographic principles or human rights 
outside the European Union. 
187 N. Malcolm, The Case against Europe, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.2, Mar/Apr 1995, 
188 see: L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group 
and The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, March 1995, p. 14-16. 
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Common security goals of the Maastricht Treaty (Art. J 1) are thus based on 
common interests. However, new risks and challenges, especially those created by the 
transition of a multipolar world system, are becoming equally important and will have a 
great influence on these interests. Common security interests of the European Union must 
therefore be formulated under the consideration of its political importance as a future 
center of global power. This includes specifically the following elements: 189 
- to strengthen the new world order by providing the United Nations with capable 
regional sub-organizations, 
- to intensify the contacts to Central and Eastern Europe and the Community of 
Independent States (CIS), 
- to promote democratization, the rule of law and human rights, 
- to contain separatism and nationalism, 
- to build regional organizations for crisis prevention and crisis management, 
- to build up capabilities for peace enforcement, peace keeping, and humanitarian 
help, 
- to enforce disarmament, 
- to counter proliferation, crime, and terrorism, and to prevent migration, 
- to guarantee a credible defense and deterrence, and to preserve NATO for 
collective defense issues, with a United States presence in Europe, 
189 
see: Seminar fur Sicherheitspolitik, Die Europaische Union und ihre Stellung in der Welt-
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- to make the Western European Union the European pillar ofNATO as well as 
the defense component of the European Union, and to open those organizations 
for new partners in Europe, 
- to support economic stability, further the access to new markets, resources and 
financial assets, and to further the development of free markets and trade 
worldwide. 
Without going further into detail, it must be pointed· out that this operationalization 
has to be put into the framework of national interests of the European Union members. As 
shown above, there are different views how to prioritize and achieve these goals. This 
depends, not only marginally, on whether the emphasis is laid on 'deepening' or 
'widening' of the European Union. Members like France want to deepen but not widen the 
Community. They favor changing the rules; that is, integrating the structure in a way that 
would make it hard for most aspirant members to become eligible for entry. Britain has 
come to accept the idea that widening, its preference, probably would not prevent some 
deepening. The Germans sound as if they are equally keen on extensive deepening and 
widening, seeing that both elements do not exclude each other. 190 All these attitudes derive 
from questions about how national identity is brought into consideration when European 
security is discussed. 
By signing the· Maastricht treaty, the British government committed the United 
Kingdom to a ,long-term future in which the country's foreign and security policy would 
progressively be merged with that of the European Union". 191 However, despite major 
190 
see: J. Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round - A collective nervous Breakdown, in: The New 
Yorker, Sep 2 199i, p. 90. 
When in the following sometimes only France's, Great Britain's and Germany's attitudes are mentioned, 
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191 J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, in: JES Hayward, Governing 
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changes towards more British influence in European affairs, an undiscussed and 
unchanged element is its close relationship to the United States. Thus, one way forward 
might be, ,if Whitehall elites came to believe that the best way of retaining the 'special 
relationship' with Washington would be for Britain actually to become what the USA has, 
for several decades, wanted her to be: a true European partner, and, as such, the main 
guarantor of continuing harmony between the two sides of the Altantic". 192 
Despite recent changes by its new President Chirac, France's attitude towards 
Europe by far can be still identified with General de Gaulle's. Thus, promoting France and 
Europe, from this perspective can be seen as equal. Defense for France is both ,an object 
of cooperation and an element of sovereignty with which the [European] federal entity, 
which is our [France's] long-term objective, will - or should - be endowed" .193 France 
slowly makes steps towards an adjustment, away from a singular national defense towards 
the building of a strong and reliable West European defense identity. Eduard Balladur had 
described France's vision with three fundamental beliefs: Europe must expand, Europe 
must be reformed, and Europe must go forward, a Europe which is more effective and 
active, but less bureaucratic and interventionist, a more 'democratic' Europe. 194 The policy 
changes are based on France's increasing doubts about a European idea without an 
implementable defense pillar; about West European performance and military capabilities 
(especially after the Gulf War), about the political cohesion of the European Union 
itself; 195 and, last but not least, in the French effort to anchor the Federal Republic of 
Germany in European institutions that make a certain 'control' of the newly reunified 
economic giant possible. Certain fears about Germany's future role thus promote the 
development of the European security and defense identity. However, ,France has taken 
192 Ibid., p. 11. 
193 R. Dumas, cited in: D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. 
XXXIII, No.4, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 334. 
194 E. Balladur, The Presidency of the European Union, in: Presidents & Prime Ministers, Vol. 4, 
Mar/Apr 1995, p. 11-12. 
195 D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No.4, 
Jul/Aug 1991, p. 344-345. 
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care to do nothing irreversible, to not compromise the French holy trinity of uncertainty; 
the foundation of deterrence; of flexibility, the foundation of diplomacy; and of the 
ambiguity of the internal consensus". 196 
Germany focuses its defense policy on five priorities: 197 
- Preservation of the freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and 
the territorial integrity of the German state; 
- Integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for 
democracy, the rule of the law and prosperity in Europe mean peace and security 
for Germany, too; 
- The lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar 
interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the USA 
is indispensable for international stability; 
- The familiarization of our neighbors in Eastern Europe with Western structures 
in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership and the creation of a new cooperative 
security order embracing all the states ofEurope; 
- Worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just world 
economic order based on market principles, for the security of the individual 
states is guaranteed only in a system of global security with peace, justice and 
well-being for everyone. 
Germany's overriding preoccupation in the immediate future has to be with its 
Eastern neighbors. The need to create political, social and demographic stability and 
196 P. Hassner, La cooperation franco-allemande: Achille immobile a grand pas?, in: D.S. Yost, 
Franco-German Defense Cooperation, Chapter from S.F. Szabo, Editor, The Bundeswehr and Western 
Security, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 242. 
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economic prosperity to allow a peaceful transition of the former Warsaw Pact countries is 
vital. This must be interpreted more as a 'Zwang nach Osten' (compulsion) than a 'Drang 
nach Osten' (yearning). 198 Since the German economy actually suffers from structural 
weaknesses and imbalances which make it incapable of coping alone with this large scale 
problem, the European imperative becomes inescapable. ,It is only a politically stable 
Union ... which would be capable of generating a viable stabilization plan for the East. At 
the same time, it is a strong and coherent Union (rather than a weak and aimless one) 
which the former Warsaw Pact countries wish to join".199 
This outline for the basic interests of the three major actors of the European Union 
gives an idea of how different perspectives can be. Additionally, there are a lot of other 
states which have to be taken into account. It would overload the framework of this thesis 
to describe their intentions in detail, but it must be recognized that a common 
understanding of the direction of a European security and defense identity will depend, 
more than marginally, on all of these countries. They are equally important partners, even 
if the burden they share with others is not a 'lion's share'. The Integrated Structure of 
NATO might be a good example of how to integrate partners for future European Union 
qefense and security structures. However, the dominant partners will have to cut an 
unproportional amount of their dominance, share their decisions, and give up the total 
amount of responsibility, what seems to be quite easy, but is not without problems, as seen 
in the GulfWar. Thus, the relationship ofEuropean great powers to their 'junior partners' 
can be compared in some aspects with the one between America and today' s Western 
Europe. 
Trends suggest that in the next ten years the European Union will be widened and 
deepened. It is necessary that the 'deepening' encloses a common framework for dealing 
with defense questions for two reasons: First, the security of each of the member 
countries, and therefore of the European Union as a whole, will depend to a great extent 
on the Union's ability to form a pole of stability, integration and peace. Second, growing 
198 see: J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, p. 14. 
199 Ibid. 
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interdependence and the opening of frontiers leads to the 'natural' and 'logical' acceptance 
of a European frame of reference because politics follows economical, social and 
technological trends already under way. This trend towards a European political entity 
would be incomplete if it would not include the field of security and defense. 200 
- The European Union and NATO as well as the Western European Union (WEU) 
have different members. Their enlargement will probably lead, especially in the 
next years, to a further unequalness of membership. This fact will cause an 
existence of zones of different security which is neither acceptable for new 
partners nor for the United States, which fears 'backdoor commitments'. 
Moreover, any enlargement of the European Union will raise the question of the 
new member's relationship to the WEU. Thus, an answer needs to be found on 
how to coordinate enlargement and whether, if the answer is positive, how to 
create a 'congruence of membership' to avoid different zones of stability. 
- In close relation to the question of different zones of security one can ask, how 
the Western European Union should fit into the security landscape of the future. 
Will it become an organic part of the European Union or will it remain 
autonomous. If the latter development takes place, additionally one has to define 
the relation between NATO, the European Union and the Western European 
Union. 
- Reviewing the actual trends of the defense spending of the European Union 
countries, one can see that they will not be able to create full military 
capabilities to deal autonomously with collective defense of European Union 
territory and/or peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, as well as other 
missions (e.g. humanitarian) in the near future. Thus, the United States will play 
a continuing, probably major role in European security and defense. Trends 
20
° For a more detailed analysis see: L.Martin & J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, 
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towards unilateralism and selective involvements, especially if vital interests of 
the United States are not at stake, lead to the questions of how America will 
participate and how it will be integrated into a European security arrangement. 
- Europe's security is shaped by Russia's instability, the economic difficulties of all 
Central and Eastern European states, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction by the dispersion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and the dissemination 
of knowledge in the field of weapons and the means to deliver these weapons. 
Local conflicts and claims of minorities in search for an identity, and, as shown 
above, an arc of crisis at Europe's southern flank with shaken social structures, 
which could give conflicts an irrational character, have additionally to be taken 
into consideration. In general, it is more or less impossible to make a clear threat 
assessment, as it was during the Cold War. 
Extrapolations of how problems can be solved in the future are more than difficult 
because probabilities of threats have to be multiplied with probabilities of European 
development. Everyone knows that probability calculus in this case leads to a most 
uncertain prognosis. Thus, it is time for the European Union to develop its own security 
and defense identity in the framework of a common foreign and security policy. This 
makes the future less dependent on trends and uncertainties. 
B. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY 
,Once you have economic union, a central bank, and a single currency, you have 
integration". 201 This was the assumption on which the idea of the European Community 
(EC) was based after initial attempts to build a European Defense Community failed in 
1954 when the French National Assembly vetoed the treaty. That, however, a political 
201 J. Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round - A collective nervous Breakdown, in: The New Yorker, 
Sep 2 1991, p. 96. 
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union could not be born as a single-dimensional element became more and more clear. 
Thus, France, for example, accepted community with its ancient rival, Germany, in NATO 
and WEU. It did this not least because ,the United States and Great Britain at last 
extended tangible assurances against the dread consequences of West Germany's 
resurgence . . . and the WEU' s terms bound every member to automatic intervention 
against aggression from any quarter whatsoever".202 Moreover, the economic interests 
were not as homogenous as had been assumed. 203 'Defense' and 'security', independently 
important, were not the only additional topics which must be included. The idea of a 
European defense and security identity was born to strengthen the integrative 'pull' of the 
European Community. 
To a certain extent, the Franco-German 'team' played a leadership role, although 
they tended to agree more on institution building than on hard-core security policies. 
Especially in recent years, there is a demand for cohesiveness because a much broader 
range of issues is at stake. These issues pose a much greater challenge to the decision-
making capacity of the European Union than in the past. The problems are not only with 
the fixed timeframe for a deeper integration as set by the 1996 Maastricht summit, but that 
scarce resources increasingly force states to form coalitions and alliances, and to introduce 
some division of labor which can be best done in an integrative political framework. 204 
Most likely this is why more than eighty percent of the European Union citizens favor a 
common defense policy, and seventy percent a common foreign policy?05 The open 
question, however, is whether the problem of diversity can be solved. From this derives 
the problem that coalitions of the capable and the willing are often much smaller than the 
membership of certain institutions. The development of a common foreign and security 
policy of the European Union will take some time. Less than before can European security 
202 J. Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: Foreign Policy, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 70-71. 
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be defined by military means alone. The multidimensional approach also has to take into 
consideration: human and minority rights, economic security, ecological questions, crime 
and proliferation, as well as a new upcoming nationalism and ethnocentrism. A 
multidimensional equation normally has a multidimensional solution. Modern technology 
and computer-based problem solving, however, uses incrementalism. In the area of 
European security, this seems to be the only way also. The development of a European 
common foreign and security policy, as a 'big picture' and a 'grand strategy' is 
unachievable in the near future. It should, therefore, not be taken as a precondition for the 
creation of a European security and defense identity. 206 The latter should rather be a step 
towards a more intensive political integration which leads, hopefully, to a common foreign 
and security policy. 
Because between life as it is, and life as it should be, lies so enormous a difference 
that everybody who only cares about what 'should be' and not about what happens 
in reality, ruins his existence rather than preserves it.207 
Finally, the probability of whether a European security and defense identity can be 
reached is dependent on multiple dimensions and elements. There are promoting and 
restraining factors which are important to notice:208 
Promoting factors: 
- Although there are no uncertainties about Germany's integration into a Western 
European 'society of states' and although Germany, during the last years after its 
206 This was the proposal of H. Mey in his article: A European Security and Defense Identity-
What Role for the United States?, in: Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, Jul/Sep 1995, p. 315. It would mean 
to prolong a further integration of the European Union, especially in military and security matters, for at 
least some decades. NATO is a good example for a 'security and defense identity' without having a 
common foreign and security policy. However, it was quite easy to create this on the basis of a common 
threat assessment in a bipolar world ... 
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unification, tried most intensively to show that it is a reliable 'Atlantic' and 
'European' partner, there are still some states which regard it as necessary to 
bind and fasten Germany into a network of multinational structures. 
- The future of the United States policy towards Europe seems to be more and 
more unclear. While America underlines its European character (America sees 
itself as a European power209) and engages selectively in the area, as actually 
shown in Yugoslavia, a clearly Pacific orientation economically and a domestic 
orientation generally gain the priority. Such uncertainties raise the question of 
whether the Europeans should play a greater role in their own security affairs. 
- The new threats to modem society are no longer only military threats. Collective 
defense organizations, for example NATO, are limited in their capabilities to deal 
with these threats. Conflict prevention and diplomacy with the aim of peaceful 
solutions are a vital interest to all EU member states. Why not, therefore, 
coordinate all security related issues within a single European framework? 
- Russia, still trusts NATO only marginally, and regards it as a competitor within 
its sphere of influence. A much lesser critical view is taken against the European 
Union. Such preferences facilitate the promotion of a European security and 
defense identity. 
Restraining factors: 
- In recent years, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United Nations 
has played an increased role in international politics. Although the crises in the 
209 
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former Yugoslavia and Somalia have shown that there are also major deficiencies 
with the United Nations, so that some major states have decided to support the 
United Nations only within certain limits,210 established collective security 
arrangements are promoted more than before. 
- It is unlikely that Europe is caught up in a new nationalism. However, domestic 
issues play an increasingly important role. This promotes an introspection and a 
new 'sense' for the country. Thus, it will be difficult to gain majorities when 
national sovereignty must be· transferred to international bodies, or when 
international agreements make compromises necessary. 
- Additionally, inner-European divergences necessitate a continued role for the 
United States as a leader ofthe 'Western world'. Because America sees itself 
linked to Europe by NATO, the buildup of a European security and defense 
identity might be counterproductive, unless other links are established. 
For the tremendous task of holding the free world together, the United 
States needed not only the cement of mutually beneficial trade but also a lot 
of help from its friends. Upon graduating into the world of giants, the 
continental [European] nations were expected to contribute more resources 
and a sense of common purpose to their long time association with the 
United States. 211 
- France's unwillingness to participate in multinational units and its categorical 
rejection of force deployments on its soil, even after it made first steps towards a 
reintegration ofNATO in December 1995, jeopardizes European security and 
defense integration?12 France's attitude not only complicates the European 
210 
see: United States Presidential Directive No. 25 and similar documents of other countries, 
developed in the same years. 
211 P. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 193,p.171. 
212 
see: D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No.4, 
Jul/Aug 1991, p. 329. 
66 
development, but undermines efforts to retain significant United States military 
and nuclear presence in Europe, prevents continuing practical interactions 
between French forces and those of the Allies, and thus, delays the whole 
process of making practical steps forward towards a European security and 
defense identity. 
In this situation the handling of the political process becomes more and more 
dependent on decisive major actors. 'Statesmanship' will be necessary to promote the 
process and to reach the goal of a European security and defense identity. This 
statesmanship must be based on the fundamental view that foreign policy must be value-
oriented and probably guided less by national interests, 213 although the defense of citizens 
remains the first and foremost responsibility of a national government. The question is, 
whether the 'state' is still capable of fulfilling this task. It is doubtful that today anyone 
alone can manage the problems which affect his state, not to speak about 'world 
problems'. Therefore, the nation state remains a fundamental entity, but one ,for 
cooperation in the field of defense". 214 Only a coordinated policy can create a 'European 
Partner' for the United States, can guarantee that the interests of the partners in the 
European Union and in the Atlantic Alliance largely coincide, 215 and that discussion about 
a European security and defense identity becomes less a 'theological dispute' and more a 
practical discussion about security policy. 
213 
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... the European Union [has to] stop behaving in ways which Hedley Bull 
characterized during the early 1980s as 'civilian power Europe' - a tendency to 
finesse, defer or disregard uncomfortable issues of national and regional security . 
. . . The extent to which West European governments risk to the challenges of the 
post-cold war world ... will help to determine not only Europe's place in the world, 
but also Europe's location between what Stanley Hoffmann has referred to as the 
'Hobbesian floor' of perpetual warfare and the 'Kantian ceiling' of perpetual 
peace.Z16 
The situation in Bosnia is not a proof of the failing of the Maastricht Treaty, but 
has created evidence for the urgent necessity of a coordinated foreign, security, and 
defense policy. 
There were some notable attempts at real progress in the field of 'high politics', 
including the 1976 Tindemans Report, which called for enhanced foreign policy 
coordination, the 1984 reactivation of the Western European Union, which has become 
the focal point of the debate about the European Union's defense identity, the 1987 Single 
European Act, which brought European Political Cooperation (EPC) within the 
Community's institutional and legal purview, and those portions of the Maastricht Treaty 
which committed the European Union to a Common Foreign and Security Policy. ,These 
positive developments have nonetheless been eclipsed by the campaign for EU economic 
integration".Z17 It was in the fear of a new Weimar and historical experience of how 
quickly inflation destroys confidence in the reliability of political institutions and ends up 
endangering democracy, that let the German chancellor Kohl press for European 
Integration 'at all costs' and 'under no circumstances open for discussion'. 218 However, 
also from a 'security standpoint' it is not less important that the European Union is 
pursuing the prospect of real unity. It has no alternative if it wishes to have a word in 
matters relating to its own security. The European security and defense identity as a 
216 D.T. Stuart, Can Europe Survive Maastricht?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Feb 4 1994, p. 8. 
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prerequisite for a common foreign and security policy is the next logical step along this 
path. 
Europeans should not get too accustomed to ,living with contradictions such as 
that between declaring European integration a goal and then hesitating to make it 
reality". 219 Therefore it is necessary, only to mention a few states, that Germany no longer 
uses its past as an alibi, France, due to the fact that, militarily, it has always depended on 
NATO with only a negligible independence, integrates further, and Great Britain no longer 
keeps its mixed attitudes, becoming a European partner but arguing that ,British soldiers 
would fight for Britain, but never for Brussels, the European Union's executive 
headquarters". 220 The slowest cannot determine the speed of integration; everyone should 
bring in his strengths, as it is in a real partnership: defense security for monetary security, 
economic capabilities for military capabilities, diplomatic advantages for geographic 
advantages, bureaucratic channels for personal ones. Thus it is counterproductive, for 
example on the side of Sweden, Finland and Austria, to announce officially that, as new 
European Union members, they do not have any interests in a common security policy.221 
In the same inadequate way, Germany with its monetary strength, could insist on 
not becoming part of the monetary union, just as Britain could take over the American 
argument that all decisions concerning European security policy should be made in, and 
implemented through, NATO only.Z22 The mentality that Europe should 'add foreign and 
security policies together' without regard to what they look like, is like mixing all the 
colors of a paint box. ,The result, inevitably, is a muddy shade ofbrown".223 A 'common' 
way has to be found! ,Therefore, the political integration has to be first, the military 
219 The Wall Street Journal, Germany's Vision of Europe, Mar 15 1995. 
220 A. Cowell, Kohl Presses Case for European Integration. 
221 The announcements were made in combination with a protest against French nuclear testing 
in autumn 1995. See: E. Bonse, Der zweite Versuch- Der neue EU-Vertrag soli die Union effizienter und 
demokratischer machen- aber beides nur ein billchen, in: Das Sonntagsblatt, Nr. 44, Nov 3 1995, p. 22. 
222 
see: W.T. Johnsen, T.D. Young, French Policy toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice 
Rapprochement, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sep 9 1994, p. 18. 
223 N. Malcolm, The Failings of a Federal Europe, in: The Wall Street Journal, Apr 13 1995. 
69 
cannot and must not make the pace, but contribute with no reservations to this process. 
To avoid disturbances and irritations in regard to the responsibilities of the different 
alliances and communities, the harmonization of the organizations has to become a first 
prerequisite". 224 Thus, one key question to be raised at the Intergovernmental Conference 
in 1996 is whether the member states are prepared to coordinate political will and translate 
the result into action. Two debates circumscribe the actual discussions. The first is 
between those who rely on strengthening the multilateral institutions, like UN and OSCE, 
and those for whom 'defense', i.e. the capability to use a military option to defend oneself 
or one's community, and its values and interests is still a necessity. The second debate is 
between those who believe that concentrating on 'European defense' is a myth, since 
defense should remain a matter for nations, and those who support a European defense as 
both a long-term objective and the inescapable result of foreseeable international 
developments. 225 
There is no doubt that the development of the European Union has created an area 
of stability. Since Europe's security is indivisible it should preserve its inner stability and 
become a global actor with the aim to guarantee peace and freedom for its members and 
the whole Europe. From a German point of view, a common European defense thus 
consequently leads to a European Union wide security guaranty, which can be described 
by NATO's article 5 or WEU' s article V guarantee.226 What kind of community would we 
have if there was a cohesion fund for expressing financial solidarity, but no one would 
come to the aid of another member state if it fell victim to aggression? In other scenarios, 
no state should be made to deploy its armed forces against its will, as well as individual 
member states should not prevent a majority from acting jointly.Z27 Whatever the outcome 
of ongoing discussions will be, several principles should be respected: 
224 K. Wiesmann, What kind of military would serve Europe at the best?, speech at Centre 
d'Etude et de Prospective Strategique, Paris, Apr 11 1995, p. 6. 
225 
see: R. Bussiere, A Europe of Security and Defence, in: NATO Review, Sep 1995, p. 31. 
226 
see: V. Rube, speech at the Sicherheitspolitische Informationstagung der Clausewitz-
Gesellschaft at the Ffihrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Aug 18 1995, in: Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 9, Sep 1995, p. 46. 
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- European states have common historical and cultural roots. From these roots 
common values, interests and intentions can be derived. Politics of the European 
Union states should increasingly concentrate on these common basics to make 
participation in any action, whether military or non-military, easier and more 
probable. All taken steps must strengthen international cooperation, human 
rights, and democracy, as well as the rule of the law. 
- European security and defense identity's main goal is to preserve peace and 
stability. This goal can only be fulfilled when preserving a close transatlantic 
relationship. Solidarity especially with the United States, is essential and 
indispensable to achieve an overall strategic balance on the European continent. 
,The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a 
fundamental important aspect"?28 However, a de facto United States right of 
veto on the European capacity to act should not be accepted, nor a limit on the 
role of the United States in Europe to ,intervention in a hypothetical generalized 
conflict like that envisaged in Article 5 of the Washington treaty".229 Europe has 
to become an equal partner ofthe United States. 
- Structures and decision-making processes should not complicate a European 
security and defense identity. The danger that the European Union might become 
a complicated and unfathomable network with uncertain political outcomes has 
to be countered by structural adjustments and the creation of new competent 
decision bodies. 
227 
see: K. Kinkel, speech to the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik (DGAP), Berlin, 
Oct 12 1995, in: Bonn Bulletin, No. 82, Oct 16 1995, p. 802. 
228 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council, Brussels, Jan 10-111994, para. 2. 
229 L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and 
The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Mar 1995, p. 14-16. 
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- European Union's capabilities should compliment and not replace those of 
NATO. From this derives the principle that both, NATO and European Union, 
should use basically the same security structures and avoid duplications. The 
difficulty is, how this can be implemented without drawing unwilling states into 
military operations, and without making the European Union incapable of 
conducting any military operations on its own. As a principle, however, non-
duplication is essential, due to the unwillingness of all European Union and 
NATO states to spend a great amount of money on the same purpose in both 
organizations. 
A European security and defense identity is only understandable when it is able to 
explain the tasks for EU/WEU forces and capabilities230 in imaginable scenarios. It must be 
remarked that opinions differ among European Union states. France, for example, tries to 
keep NATO mostly out ofEuropean Union security, while for Great Britain a scenario is 
hardly imaginable in which NATO, or at least the United States, is not involved. Proposed 
solutions for the following scenarios are therefore derived from the personal subjective 
view of the German author. 
1. Massive attack against Western Europe or attack on a single NATO 
country 
This scenario is the least likely. It would clearly fall under Article Five of the North 
Atlantic treaty and would cause collective defense together with the North American 
allies. The European Union and the Western European Union should not involve 
themselves in such a case, even not in the prewar crises, because crisis prevention and 
collective defense would only be successful if NATO speaks 'with one voice', without a 
division between American and European NATO partners. In the background, however, 
the Western European Union could coordinate actions and adapt non-NATO partners to 
the Alliance, which would participate on the side ofNATO. 
230 In the following scenarios it is assumed that the WEU will be the subcontractor of the EU in 
military operations. Forces and capabilities are thus nominated as 'EU/WEU' forces/capabilities. 
72 
2. Attack on a European Union country which is not a NATO member 
Although formal commitments for NATO members do not exist in this case, at 
least the European countries, but most likely also the United States, would have a moral 
obligation for help and support. However, in the event of a military conflict, these moral 
obligations do not give complete security for the possibly attacked states. Also a Western 
European Union membership, after an enlargement, for example, would not really help 
because the WEU is not capable of guaranteeing a collective defense in more than minor 
conflicts. Today such a collective defense would be only possible by NATO. There are 
two possibilities to solve this problem: first, one should strive for a final congruence of 
membership, so that all EU and WEU members are also NATO members. This is 
obviously not reachable in the near future because former neutral states are not yet willing 
to join organizations of collective defense. Second, the Combined Joint Task Force 
Concept (CJTF) could enable the European Union and the Western European Union to 
fulfill their own collective defense with NATO assets and capabilities. Then, however, 
Combined Joint Task Forces could not only be earmarked for peacekeeping operations. 
Furthermore, a concept of command and control must be agreed upon between the 
different partners. This is still a major obstacle in today' s discussion. 
3. Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Operations 
In cases when NATO's area of responsibility is not involved or non-EU NATO 
members have no interests in such operations, the European Union and/or Western 
European Union should have the capability to act alone. Besides humanitarian help and 
'Search and Rescue' (SAR), these operations will mostly conduct such UN or OSCE 
measures which are in the range of the Petersberg duties and for which no NATO assets 
probably will be necessary. 
4. Threat from extreme or fundamentalist countries to European Union 
non-NATO countries 
Especially states in Southern Europe lie in the range to be threatened by radical 
states. If weapons of mass destruction are involved, it is very likely that NATO and the 
73 
United States will engage because the use, or threatening use, of these weapons has not 
only a great military but also an enormous political impact. However, nuclear deterrence 
and protection against small scale attacks, even with weapons of mass destruction, is the 
prerequisite for a credible European security and defense identity. From this, it follows 
that France and Great Britain, the only European Union nuclear states today, have to 
'europeanize' their weapons, despite the fact that nuclear weapons ,touch the very core of 
national sovereignty . . . and protect only their possessors". 231 That means that they would 
give security guarantees to the other European Union states in the same way as the United 
States has done during the Cold War (also for France and Great Britain). If countries 
cannot rely on others for nuclear deterrence, then it is probable that they will try to build 
their own weapons or, at least, get the capabilities for a rapid build-up. This should be 
avoided. 
,To a certain extent, the creation of a European nuclear deterrence posture lies in 
the logic of the process of the European political integration". 232 Thus, although the 
nuclear question still remains on the backburner, this question must be addressed sooner 
or later, ,if the politico-strategic entity of a true European Union is ever to be 
achieved". 233 If the challenge is a limited conventional threat, European Union should be 
capable of withstanding such attacks and responding on the same level. 
This analysis is, of course, far from exhaustive, but gives an idea of the range of 
actions that the European Union or, until they merge, the Western European Union could 
and should execute by themselves. However, such forces could not be effectively and 
autonomously operating ,unless the West Europeans substantially improve capabilities 
that are currently inadequate for major conflicts".234 
231 J. Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: Foreign Policy, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 78. 
232 K.-H. Kamp, Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, in: Security Dialogue, 
Vol. 26, No. 3, Sep 1995, p. 284. 
233 1bid., p. 284. 
234 D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No.4, 
JuVAug 1991, p. 340. 
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Thus, EU member states would have to commit themselves to providing the 
necessary military means that would enable the EU/WEU to act in such a manner, 
by assigning their existing forces (including their nuclear deterrents, operating in a 
common European framework) to such tasks, and by creating new capabilities 
such as transport, command structures, and satellite systems. 235 
In regard to the transatlantic link, it is thought that Europe should manage the 
'lion's share' of its conventional defense if America guarantees its nuclear umbrella over 
an extended member-territory and fulfills its obligations for help in case deterrence failed. 
However, European multidimensional weaknesses are major obstacles to overcome: 
Western societies today simply have no 'stomach' for large-scale military interventions. 
,Whether this is due to a general weakening of loyalty to the state, hedonistic 
individualism, or simply the small size offamilies",236 remains to be analyzed. Furthermore, 
besides missing military capabilities and a still un-operationalized Combined Joint Task 
Force Concept, it is questionable whether Europe would make use of available 
capabilities. Internal problems of consensus, a recent concentration on politico-diplomatic 
interventions or economical sticks-and-carrots policies, and a lacking security identity are 
the reasons for this.237 Despite all these weaknesses, however, the aim should not be 
simply to limit European military tasks to those operations which can be accomplished 
with today' s European military assets. This would mean a 'further free ride' and no real 
partnership to 'the' security guarantor America could be established. Efforts must be 
made! Whether the existing structures still fit into the security landscape has to be 
examined. It is a correct concept to provide European security ,during the present 
turbulent period . . . by optimizing the elements of the existing network and improve their 
cooperation and interoperability". 238 But for the foreseeable future, this structure is not a 
235 K. Kaiser, Challenges and Contingencies for European Defence Policy, Forschungsinstitut der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, Jan 30 1995, p. 4. 
236 M. Jakobson, Collective Security in Europe today, in: The Washington Quarterly, Spring 
1995, p. 63. 
237 For a detailed analysis see: M. Jopp, Langer Weg- kiihnes Ziel: Gemeinsame 
Verteidigungspolitik, in: Europa Archiv, Vol. 13-14, 1994, p. 398-99. 
238 D. Genschel, Transatlantic Relations and International Security, The Evolution of Civilian 
and Military Structures, UNIDIR conference, Caen, Sep 22-23 1994, Second Session, p. 10. 
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God made axiom. 239 It should be self-explaining that unrealistic visions do not help make 
progress towards a European security and defense identity. But to declare every step onto 
new ground as not manageable would mean, for example, that today' s Eurocorps 
demonstrates the limits for multinational units, that the WEU member states are, and will 
be, unable to fulfill any of their military tasks, approved in the Brussels treaty240, and that a 
common foreign and security policy will never be developed. In the near future, there 
should be answers to basic questions like these: Whether and how to merge EU and WEU, 
how to regulate the future cooperation between NATO and EU/WEU, how to include the 
United States and Canada into European crisis management and defense, whether it would 
be desirable to have a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe and an American 
NATO Secretary General,241 and which relations to NATO and/or EU/WEU non-member 
states should be established. In the near future, priority should be given to draw up an 
inventory of the forces and equipment actually available to the European Union, including 
constitutional or legal limitations on their use, as done with the Forces Answerable to 
WEU (FA WEU) list for the Peters berg task spectrum. Furthermore a body for proposing 
military options to the Councils of EU and WEU before deciding on any common action 
that has a defense element should be established. This body could be the contact point for 
America. Additionally, a form of interface between the military command and the politico-
military authority has to be found. This interface needs to define the actual chain of 
command and coordinate possible ad hoc coalitions with non-member states. 242 The ability 
to pursue an independent defense policy depends on European Union's capacity to meet 
239 For example, a realistic option for a future European defense is to merge WEU and EU. 
240 Especially Article V of the WEU treaty: ,If any of the member states should be the object of an 
armed attack in Europe, the other member states will, in accordance with the provision of Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in 
their power" would mean nothing to any member state, unless 'power' is more than a 'goodwill of the 
non-capable'. 
241 There are some very good arguments for this proposal, especially in regard to the development 
of a ESDI while preserving a strong transatlantic relationship. See: D. Law, Ein Amerikaner als NATO-
Generalsekretar, in: Rheinischer Merkur, Sep 9 1994. 
242 L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and 
The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Mar 1995, p. 83. 
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its equipment and supply requirements from a European defense industry. Maintaining an 
effective, competitive defense industry will therefore help to establish a credible European 
security and defense identity.243 Last, but not least, is multinational-task-sharing a way to 
avoid gaps in essential military capabilities. It implies a pooling of forces and capabilities 
from different nations, so that, for example, a combined air transport capability can be 
build up, while, at the same time and when necessities arise, a national access to these 
assets will still be possible. It will depend on the further development of the EU-WED-
NATO relationship in which areas these proposals are to be increased. Furthermore, new 
partners will have an influence on European Union's threat assessment, and therefore 
necessary capabilities, as well as on the political sphere of a European security and defense 
identity. 
The European Union has to solve political, organizational, and military problems, 
as shown above, for reaching the goal of a European security and defense identity. The 
European context with its trends and challenges, as well as the fundamental opportunity to 
go forward towards new, modern structures, gives the framework for solutions. It is 
unlikely that established organizations will be dissolved in the very near future. However, 
transitional arrangements eventually can also produce an outcome in which a radically new 
security framework across the continent of Europe is established. Futuristic thoughts of a 
'United States ofEurope', which will be able to allow itself an independence from another 
big power, underline this approach. In the future years, however, nothing radical like this 
will occur. One can with some probability predict that NATO will remain the most 
important forum for defense of European countries, the European Union will, 
incrementally, develop a European identity in which security and defense have their place, 
the Western European Union will be further torn between the two functions 'European 
pillar ofNATO' and 'Defense component of the European Union' until it probably merges 
with the European Union, and the United States will, hopefully, be preserved as a strategic 
partner. A conclusion for the European security and defense identity, thus, can only be 
243 see: Ibid., p. 22. 
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that its development will take some time because the goal is not yet clearly, and most 
important, not yet mutually defined. 
C. FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE STRUCTURES 
America's answer, when the idea of a revitalization of the Western European 
Union as the European pillar ofNATO came up in the mid eighties, can only be described 
as 'indescreef, 'heavy-handed', and ·'hysterica1'. 244 Its fear was that the credibility of 
NATO's deterrence against the Warsaw Pact would be undermined. After the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, the danger was clearly assessed that those European powers got the 
majority who wanted to have since long the United States in a more minor role in Europe. 
Especially France ,trailblazed the notion of WEU as the principle (and increasingly 
autonomous) military instrument of the European Community/Union ... thereby implicitly 
leaving a relatively secondary role for NATO in the affairs ofEurope".245 From 1990 to 
1992, Germany reacted with 'Genscherism', promoting, at one and the same time, the 
restructuring ofNATO, the creation ofthe North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 
the upgrading of the Western European Union, and the launch of the Franco-German 
Eurocorps. Although it included elements with which nearly everybody could be pleased, 
this approach helped in no way to define a future European policy. A comparison between 
European key partners demonstrates that there are widely divergent conceptions of 
political ambitions and positions. Great Britain, for example, strives for a limitation of 
WEU operations on those which can be fulfilled with actual European forces and insists on 
further independence ofEU and WEU. Others fear that a development of Article J 4 of the 
EU treaty would lead finally to a European system of collective defense, at the same time 
undermining NATO and the transatlantic security partnership. The group of former 
244 see: J. Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round - A collective nervous Breakdown, in: The New 
Yorker, Sep 2 1991, p. 92. (ylp15) 
245 J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, in: JES Hayward, Governing 
the New Europe, Oxford Polity Press, 1994, p. 24. 
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'neutral' states, like Finland, Ireland, Austria, and Sweden, will make it more difficult to 
formulate a European defense perspective, in which EU, WEU, NATO, and probably the 
OSCE have their defined places. 246 Thus, all in all one can paint a very negative picture of 
'coordinated' future European defense structures. 
We sent many good people off to serve on international committees. The cost bore 
little relation to the return. In contrast, [even] the network of bilateral relations has 
been weakened, although the instructions to the national delegations in the EU, 
NATO, UNO etc. come directly from the respective capitals.247 
Although NATO's member states at the 1991 Rome summit propagated a 
'framework of interlocking institutions', today neither a system based on the division of 
labor nor a indivisible network are present. It took until 1992, when the Petersberg 
Declaration gave the basic outline for the development of a common European defense 
identity through cooperation in the security field and through strengthening the European 
pillar of NATO. In the declaration ,Western European Union members pledged their 
support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts [by forces answerable to WEU 
(FA WEU)] in cooperation with the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) and with the United Nations Security Council".248 The decision to set up the 
WEU Planning Cell and to establish a 'Forum of Consultation' as a first step towards a 
possible enlargement of the WEU supported the goal to conduct a more military capable 
role than in the past and to become a major player in the realm of security and defense in 
Europe. The Kirchberg Declaration offered the opportunity for members of the 
Consultation Forum to become 'Associated Partners', a further step to bind East 
European countries while preserving the privileged status of 'Members' and 'Associated 
Members' (Iceland, Norway, Turkey). This development was, in general, estimated as a 
positive one, interestingly resembling the vision of a European security articulated by 
246 Participation of these states in NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative will not solve this 
problem. 
247 G. Diehl, Safeguarding German Interests, in: German Comments, No. 36, Oct 1994, p. ll. 
248 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 1995, p. 199. 
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George Kennan in 1948.249 While the European Council already in 1991 in Maastricht had 
defined the Western European Union as the defense component of the European Union 
and, thus, given the objectives of building up the organization and strengthening its 
operational role, NATO gave full support to the development at its summit in January 
1994. Since then, it sees the WEU as the defense component of the EU and the European 
security and defense identity as a strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance. In 
addition, NATO endorsed the concept of 'Combined Joint Task Forces' (CJTF) as a 
means of facilitating contingency operations. ,This concept is to be implemented in a 
manner that provides 'separable ·but not separate' military capabilities that could be 
employed by NATO or the WEU, in situations affecting European security in which 
NATO itself is not involved"?50 However, although this concept has been agreed upon at 
NATO's June 1996 meeting, the practical modalities remain to be determined. It points to 
a greater amount of still uncleared questions: Will the WEU merge with the EU in the 
future? How will Western European links with NAT0251 be affected by this eventual 
merge? Should the task sharing between NATO and EUIWEU then be in a way that 
NATO guarantees 'collective defense' while EU/WEU conducts all other operations, so 
far as it is capable to do? And generally, will the transatlantic relationship evolve, to forge 
249 Kennan had the idea of a three-tier security system. At its core would be the five nations of the 
1948 Brussels treaty plus the US, Canada, Norway and Denmark. He envisioned a second ring of 
'associated members', comprised of certain govemements (e.g. Protugal, Sweden) which would be 
accorded security guarantees in exchange for basing priviledges. A third 'affiliate' category would be 
established for various nations and territories which the Western governments considered to be of special 
strategic inportance. 
For further details see: D.T. Stuart, Can Europe survive Maastricht?, U.S. Army War College, 
Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 4 1994, p. 38. 
250 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, p. 201-202. 
251 According to Article IV of the Brussels Treaty that established the WEU, as amended in 1954, 
the signatories and 'any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation' 
with NATO .... When the political union of the Twelve is at this faltering intial stage, is it advisable to 
reduce the Community's autonomy in relationship to NATO and to involve Washington in the very 
process of elaborating the political union? 
see: D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No.4, Jul/Aug 
1991, p. 338. 
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a new, stronger, and wider transatlantic bargain252 and will this eventually lead to a 
completely new security and defense structure for Europe? 
These questions have to be answered in the near future. It is quite clear that this 
cannot be done 'between breakfast and lunch'. However not every answer is probably 
possible because there are some fixed key points which are to be taken into consideration: 
,A European defense identity cannot be built unless NATO in effect withdraws from some 
of its responsibilities, because NATO has been such a completely dominant framework 
that it discourages the emergence of a real military defense role for the WEU or EC 
political union in Europe; it would be politically absurd to build a West European defense 
entity that has no autonomous military role in Europe".253 In the January 1994 NATO 
summit's decisions it is clearly expressed that NATO ,stands ready to make collective 
assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, 
for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common 
Foreign and Security Policy"?54 However, the WEU i~ in no position either politically or 
militarily to rival NATO as an organization capable of power projection, of major 
peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations or of waging war. Thus in the overseeable 
future, the WEU will concentrate on its support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping 
efforts, as laid down in the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration. 
The discussion about how to develop future European defense structures depends 
on the reason for it. One can distinguish between three different grounds: the first one is 
the 'evolutionary approach' which stresses the parallel development of NATO, EU, and 
WEU in a coordinated process, fulfilling the main task to avoid zones of different security 
in Europe and with the aim of having a 'congruence of membership' in all organizations in 
the long run. The second approach stresses the historical chance which has evolved 
through the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This gives the possibility of 
252 
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transferring stability and democracy to East Europe, which should be flanked by defense-
oriented actions, so that these states could become members of the Western 'zone of 
stability'. The third approach is based on a threat assessment which sees Russia as a still 
aggressive, or at least uncalculatable state, so that Western security has to be based on 
'collective defense' organizations with security guarantees. Although the first approach 
tends to stress the development 'of a European security system, the second one 
concentrates on 'collective security' systems, and the third one seems to point out the 
overwhelming importance of NATO, it is not possible to combine each of these 
approaches with an established organization. Recent developments and political course 
settings in the near future, especially in 1996, make forecasts difficult. However, 'as a 
model' one can define 'probability zones' of possible organizations' responsibilities which 
are defined by 'forms of engagement' and 'participating states'. In general, contributions, 
whatever they look like, should be complementary and mutually supportive to the 
settlements of problems, and ways and means should be sought for reducing unnecessary 
duplications to a minimum. 255 
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Judgments about NATO's development and importance are very different. On the 
one hand, it is seen as being in bad shape, ,unable to resolve its identity crisis, brought on 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union",256 on the other hand, as indispensable to the security 
of Europe and as the only functioning defense organization. The purpose of NATO is 
mostly seen in having two possible functions: The first is its classic role: to defend its 
members against military threats, from wherever they arise. The other function is ,to 
guarantee the security of its internal as well as external frontiers, assuring the peaceful 
conduct of its own members", 257 which became especially important because of new 
255 For more detailed criteria see: European Union, The Council, Mutually Reinforcing 
Institutions, Note from the Secretariat, Political Committee, Brussels, Apr 12 1994. 
256 
see: E. Mortimer, In search of an En:emy, in: Financial Times, Dec 7 1994. 
257 W. Pfaff, The new Job for NATO should be Security Eastward, in: International Herald 
Tribune, Dec 8 1994. 
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instabilities born of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism. NATO's involvement 
in former Yugoslavia made clear that an additional peacekeeping function under United 
Nations command, with a dual-key mechanism, cannot exclusively define its future. ,If 
NATO cooperates with the UN [or the OSCE], it must simply be given a task that its 
members accept and then it must have a free hand militarily to fulfill that task". 258 
NATO's character can be derived from its origin. The signature of the Washington 
Treaty in April 1949 was a reaction to the declared ideological aims of the Soviet 
Communist Party. The democratic states of the post-World War Two world saw that their 
national sovereignty and independence faced a threat from outside aggression and internal 
subversion. The development of undemocratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe 
and a series of dramatic political events, e.g. the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, 
forced them to develop a common defense system and to strengthen ties between them in 
a manner that would enable them to resist ideological, political, and military threats. 
[The Parties to this Treaty] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well being 
in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective 
defense and for the preservation of peace and security. 259 
NATO thus was founded on the basis of collective defense, risk- and responsibility 
sharing and, last but not least, on a mutual agreement on common values of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. The equality of security among the members of the 
Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances contributed to an overall stability 
within Europe. Furthermore a transatlantic link was built. The United States and Canada 
committed themselves to be part of the European security and common value system. Of 
vital issue was the United States' nuclear umbrella which participated in a credible 
deterrence against a conventional overwhelming enemy from the East. After the Cold War 
258 F. Kempe, A reeling NATO gambles its Future, in: The Wall Street Journal, Nov 30 1994. 
259 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 04/04/1949, Preamble, in: NATO Handbook, 
1995, p. 231. 
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NATO had to be adapted to the changed threat, environment and upcoming wishes of the 
Central and Eastern European states to participate in Western security. Thus, NATO 
cannot restrict itself to the task of collective defense. The most important challenge is the 
multitude of crises and conflict potentials. Therefore the force structures are being adapted 
to the new requirements, multinational reaction forces are formed and a NATO Long 
Term Study is initiated with the aim to adapt military structures to the new advanced task 
spectrum. Also political measures were taken to meet the new environment. The 
November 1991 Rome summit developed a new strategic concept which stresses the 
elements of dialogue, cooperation, collective defense and crisis management. The military 
dimension of the alliance remains thereby an essential factor. It continues to reflect a 
number of fundamental principles: 
- The alliance is purely defensive in purpose 
- Security is indivisible. An attack on one partner is an attack upon all. 
- NATO's security policy is based on collective defense. 
- The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based 
in Europe will be required for the foreseeable future. 
The January 1994 Brussels summit was the 'reform summit' which achieved decisions 
about new initiatives of NATO: 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP), which invited the reform 
states of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and other CSCE states to participate in a 
program for political and military cooperation, 'Combined Joint Task Force' (CJTF), with 
the aim of adapting NATO's structures and procedures for a more flexible and efficient 
conduct of new tasks and the possibility of strengthening WEU' s operational freedom of 
action by providing elements from NATO's integrated command structure, and, last not 
least, 'Non-Proliferation', being an approach to develop an overall strategy to meet the 
threat of increasing sale of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. In May 
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1995, the alliance offered Russia a 'strategic partnership', which guarantees Russia to 
play, due to its size and importance, an adequate role in European security. 
Taking into consideration the development of a beginning cooperative security 
network and the general preparedness to take over 'out of area' tasks, the Atlantic alliance 
had been capable to adapt to new challenges and political constellations, so that officials 
already 260speak of a 'new NATO'. NATO's adaptability is caused by daily politico-
military cooperation, reliable partnership, material and procedural standardization, well-
adjusted consultation mechanisms, and its integrated military structure. Thus, France, 
having taken first steps towards a deeper integration into NATO in December 1995, will 
further this development. However, future tasks will be more challenging than the 
successful 'being present' of the past. NAJ'O has to act now. This takes as a prerequisite 
the agreement of member nations to participate in actions, although normally they loath to 
be dragged into conflicts not their own. ,And peripheral arenas, where interests by 
definition are not alike, are tailor-made for the entrapment syndrome, which is as corrosive 
of coalitions as is the fear of abandonment".Z61 Thus, the danger of increased nationalized 
arguments is very acute. The continuing community of basic political values is not in 
question; but this does not immediately generate an obvious community for specific tasks, 
a shared practical agenda. In attempts to avoid tensions, ,an articulate minority argued for 
a closely-defined role ... an article-5-only view".262 However, most member states 
regarded this as much too narrow a concept. They decided to create a new force structure 
within the integrated military structure which aims at establishing Rapid Reaction, Main 
Defense, and Augmentation Forces without giving strategic priority to any. But ,in fact 
nations are concentrating on Reaction Forces in view of drastically decreasing funds and a 
sometimes freefall reduction of military forces".Z63 Nevertheless, this was a reaction to 
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shifting probabilities: Crisis management with non-article 5 missions will be the most likely 
future scenarios. It is, however, necessary that NATO's coherence is still guaranteed, so 
that the Atlantic alliance will be further the central element of the European security 
architecture, the heart of the transatlantic relationship and the permanent bond between 
North America and Europe. This is especially essential if the organization enlarges. The 
'widening' process can only be done safely when it is clearly defined and supported by the 
surrounding member states. It is not the colorful wrapping of NATO that attracts new 
partners but the core ideals, mutual solidarity, and the security partnership that no other 
organization has yet established. The alliance has taken on the task of stabilizing Central 
and Eastern Europe with the Partnership for Peace initiative. A balanced approach of 
integration and cooperation is operationalized to accomplish this task. This new kind of 
partnership is the logical continuation of the concept of partnership, dialogue and 
cooperation with non-NATO states which was defined and endorsed at the 1991 Rome 
summit and subsequently led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council. Internationality is one of the vital foundations of the alliance, with no privileges, 
only equal rights, irrespectively of the political weight of the members. It is this fact that 
entitles NATO to feel confident and legitimized in devoting itself to new partners and new 
tasks, and in projecting security to the East. In fact, another dominant view in Europe is 
that the European Union, not NATO, is the right instrument for the promotion of stability 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 264 In fact there is an element of institutional rivalry in this, 
increased by the fact that security can no longer be defined unidirectionally (i.e. militarily), 
but has other implications (e.g. economical). Thus, it would be unrealistic_if a collective 
defense organization should organize Europe's future security alone. The 'concert of 
organizations' has to fulfill this task, mutually reinforcing each other.265 However, only 
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NATO can build the military backbone of a security system in Europe. It is seen as an 
'anchor of stability'. Any measures that leads to a bifurcation of NATO into one 
organization for collective defense and another for peacekeeping would considerably 
weaken it in the exercise of both functions. Due to the changed security landscape and 
public opinion, there is not a single ally today who can afford to support an alliance which 
is oriented completely on defense against a major aggression what is now most unlikely. 
But on the other hand, if the allies are no longer prepared for and capable of collective 
defense, then the most important foundation of the alliance is gone. The main task of 
NATO as a defense alliance is and must continue to be to protect NATO territory and the 
political freedom of its member states. 
2. European Union I Western European Union 
The European Union takes responsibilities for the complete field of politics, also 
for security and defense. The 1991 'Treaty on European Union' formulates in its articles 
J.4(1) and J.4(2): 
, The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defense". 
,The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral 
part ofthe development ofthe Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and . 
actions of the Union which have defense implications. The Council shall, in 
agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements". 
The implementation through the WEU is underlined by its member state 
declaration that the role ofthe WEU is, in the long run, to be strengthened, with the goal 
of a coordinated common defense policy between NATO and European Union. The WEU 
is seen, at the same time, as the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance and as the defense 
component of the European Union,266 as an organization which strengthens NATO's 
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cohesion and, at the same time, articulates European Union's politico-military goals. This 
means that a European common defense policy, as part of a common foreign and security 
policy, defines as its core part mutual assistance and protection. Security and freedom, 
beyond the European territory, is included by pointing to the United Nations Charter, as 
well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter.Z67 
However, it is clear, that the main emphasis is laid on the security of EU member states. 
Despite Art V of the Brussels Treaty, which defines mutual help in case of a military 
attack, collective defense shall be, by far, guaranteed through NATO which is seen, in a 
substantial part, as a European pact. A 'congruence of membership' between NATO, EU, 
and WEU is, to some degree, necessary to avoid irritations and 'backdoor commitments'. 
A growing gap in European membership of NATO and EU/WEU would have a corrosive 
effect on the effectiveness of all the institutions concerned because it would send 
inconsistent signals to neighbor states like Russia. Such a 'disconnected' arrangement is 
not 'resilient' in a crisis, when common understandings and an effective development of 
policies is essential; it works only in a benign environment. Furthermore, by ,devaluing the 
notion of mutually reinforcing institutions, it would couch NATO's enlargement in far 
more antagonistic terms than would a broader process of comprehensive political, 
economic and military integration".Z68 It is necessary that, due to a EU/WEU-NATO 
membership linkage, a situation is avoided in which the EU/WEU would take on de facto 
security commitments towards Central and Eastern European states, while relegating the 
United States to 'counterbalance' this through a close bilateral partnership with Russia. 
,Such a division of labor is likely to overtax both European capabilities to defend Russia's 
neighbors and US capabilities of engaging Russia alone". 269 A congruence of membership, 
however, does not necessarily imply a rigid synchronization. There are good reasons why, 
for example, a NATO member like Turkey is not actually a member of the European 
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Union. It does not fulfill democratic, economic or juristical standards on which the 
organization is based. The Western European Union's Associated Partnership and 
Associated Membership, the recently concluded Customs Union between the EU and 
Turkey, as well as NATO's Partnership for Peace program are ways of cooperation which 
can lead to a membership of an important country after some time, while avoiding 
instability of the organizations due to newly introduced problems. This is no 'fatal 
compromise' which endangers European integration, 270 but a possibility of political 
stabilization of a country, and eventually a region, before the 'carrot' of a membership is 
reached. 
Principles of NATO and WEU co-operation should be complementarity, 
compatibility, and transparency.271 Moreover, the Petersberg agreement defines tasks like 
humanitarian help, peacekeeping missions, crisis management, and peace enforcement, to 
be conducted by 'forces answerable to WEU', without the transatlantic partners, if 
necessary. Parallel command and control structures, as well as force structures with 
NATO are, however, not planned. During its January 1994 and June 1996 summits, 
NATO agreed to endorse the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept with which 
NATO's integrated assets and capabilities can be made available for EU/WEU operations. 
This enables the WEU to conduct its own missions, as the defense arm ofNATO or as the 
European Unions defense component. The CJTF concept underlines that Euro-Atlantic 
consultations and pragmatic strategies are necessary to realize complementary, compatible 
and transparent cooperation. It avoids duplications and parallel structures by using a 
flexible, multinational, mobile and economical approach for using scarce resources. It 
seems to be the only way in which NATO's capabilities, standardizations, and procedures 
can be used effectively also within WEU. 272 The CJTF concept is the key to the 
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development of a European strategic ability to act militarily and, at the same time, the 
initialization of NATO's force structure adaptation. It should be one of the means that 
prepares, guides and controls operations for preserving peace, including the possibility 
that the Western European Union might use part ofNATO's integrated military structure. 
Thus, the WEU has to find a way between the necessity to build up a certain autonomy for 
European military operations and the avoidance of a costly development of duplicated 
structures. A fusion ofNATO's and WED's organizational elements would, however, not 
fulfill this task because it would endanger the European operational autonomy, which was 
the aim of the Petersberg and Kirchberg agreements. Beyond facilitating the dual use of 
NATO forces and command structures for NATO and/or WEU operations, the CJTF 
concept furthermore had the goal of permitting non-NATO partners to join NATO 
countries in operations, exercises and training as envisioned in the Partnership for Peace, 
and of giving NATO's force and command structure sufficient flexibility to respond to 
Alliance security requirements and new missions beyond article 5 contingencies, including 
requests from the UN or the OSCE to provide military intervention capabilities.273 This 
spectrum of goals made operationalization in detail difficult. France, for example, initially 
tried to implement the CJTF concept with the premise to make the WEU as autonomous 
as possible while, at the same time, insisting in a separate political and military structure 
for non-article 5 operations inside NATO. This would mean, that CJTF headquarters 
could no longer be applicable for collective defense. NATO's military structure would be 
used, but had no influence on the conduct of missions, and the transfer of assets and 
capabilities to the WEU were nearly automatic. This, of course, raised discussions, 
disagreements and unresolved problems among NATO and WEU member states that have 
not been resolved today, despite NATO's June 1996 summit's agreements. 
NATO and nearly all Europeans neither need nor want two military organizations 
dealing with collective defense and out-of-area operations. Basic requirements for an 
ingenious adaptation of structures and procedures are to save the integrated command 
structure, to use it for collective defense and all other operations as far as possible, to use 
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the experience and skill of the Military Committee and its subordinated headquarters and 
to avoid ad-hoc structures. CJTF on the other hand makes it possible that every nation can 
visibly participate, for example in peacekeeping missions, if the nation agrees to the basic 
considerations above. This, especially, strengthens the European pillar of the Atlantic 
alliance and makes the Europeans capable of conducting crisis management on their own 
by using NATO's 'separable but not separate' assets. However, an autonomous European 
defense, existing side by side with the collective defense of NATO, would jeopardize the 
transatlantic relationship. 
,The CJTF approach will not work without continued U.S. leadership and force 
contributions"?74 A European mission request which NATO turned down because of 
American objections would undermine the very coupling presupposed by 'separability', 
and, possibly undermine the Alliance's very survival. 275 Because in the near future, the 
EUIWEU has to stem the decline in defense spending of recent years and reorient and 
equip at least some of their forces to be able to contribute to the varied coalition-style task 
force missions envisioned in a 'European security and defense identity' (which, as a 
prerequisite, has political consensus, financial expenditures, · and a certain amount of 
standardization and interoperability, until today not yet agreed), it will be necessary to 
preserve America's contribution, militarily, politically, and ideologically. 
If French policy reverted to more nationalistic ways or the United States qualified 
its support for the European Security and Defense Identity, progress in establishing 
CJTF capabilities would be seriously hampered .... [Then however] NATO will 
appear increasingly irrelevant to security requirements, at least as seen from the 
United States. In such circumstances, the U.S. commitment to participate in 
European defense arrangements would continue to weaken. 276 
Although dealing with the European Union and the Western European Union, 
NATO's contributions to enable the former organizations to act, is difficult to discuss. 
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France, having made steps towards a more active participation in NATO in December 
1995, finally seems to recognize this. For a long time it had argued that the WEU's 
variable geometry (i.e. engaging on different levels with different states, without a 
superimposed NATO structure) is its most important strength. The WEU should create its 
own permanent structures, favor co-operation before integration, and its development 
should be of prime importance. 277 The political leadership in France since 1966 tried to 
create an autonomous European defense, with U.S. troops as only a supportive element. 
French leaders who envisioned the dissolution of NATO with the WEU taking its place, 
neglected cooperative European security arrangements, for example with NATO, 
EUIWEU, and OSCE, and conducted, more or less, a nationalistic security policy. 278 
Initiatives like the European Corps with. France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
Spain as participating nations, the European Maritime Force (EURMARFOR) and the 
Operational Rapid Euroforce (EUROFOR) between France, Spain and Italy underlined 
this. France tried to build up structures as a 'fait accompli', only hesitatingly accepting, for 
example, that the Eurocorps not only is an element in the process of the construction of a 
European Union common defense (fulfilling Petersberg tasks) but also is a contribution to 
strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. As a NATO component, the 
Eurocorps takes part in the common defense of the allies and in crisis management on the 
basis of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty under the responsibility of the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR). 279 
The November 1994 Franco-British summit was a further turning point. Born of 
their intimate military co-operation in Bosnia, the two countries announced the creation of 
a Franco-British European Air Group, to help run joint peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations within and outside the NATO area. While the British stress that the Air Group 
would in no way weaken Britain's commitment to NATO, ,the French think that the 
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group, the first permanent joint military set-up between the two countries, indicates a 
genuine British acceptance of the need for a separate European defense identity"?80 
Having military cooperation 'on land' with the Eurocorps, 'at sea' with the 
EUROMARFOR, and 'in the air' with the Air Group, France has created bilateral and 
multilateral military co-operation outside established organizations, although always with 
additional links to them. This was only a logical step, if one wants a strong Europe 
through which one can continue to influence world affairs, preferably on one's own terms 
and, on the other hand, one tries to avoid the constraints that will inevitably entail, 
'pooling' of sovereignty included, particularly in a Union with many more members. 
Whether the new French president Jacques Chirac can or will consolidate a new course is 
to be seen. It will be essential for the European Union's and the Western European 
Union's future politico-military abilities and for NATO's cohesiveness to guarantee 
France's active and constructive participation, to consolidate a new Franco-American 
partnership without reservations, and to overcome case-by-case participation, nationalistic 
unilateral policies, and mere governmental co-operation in politics, economy, and society. 
3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
In the WED's May 1995 Lisbon Declaration the role of the OSCE as a 
comprehensive security structure based on shared values is underlined. 
Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the place of the OSCE in the 
European security architecture and noted in particular its potential as a primary 
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as 
in promoting the rule oflaw, democracy and respect for human rights. 281 
Unlike NATO, the WEU, and the EU, the CSCE-OSCE has always been a 'whole-
European' institution. Although the 1975 Helsinki agreement puts the obligation on all 
member states to follow and implement ten basic principles (for example, territory 
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integrity, peaceful conflict solution, and non-aggression), the OSCE was not able to build 
a solid foundation for a European security architecture because its treaties and agreements 
are political declarations of intention, which do not fall under international law. Making 
the CSCE282 a regional agreement under chapter eight of the UN charter in the July 1992 
Helsinki summit, did not alter this situation. Politically, however, the importance of the 
OSCE had increased. The November 1992 Charter of Paris and its additional political 
Common Declaration of Twenty-Two States was a first step towards a process of 
developing a new, intensified quality of co-operation with timely fixed governmental 
meetings, an OSCE secretariat and a war-prevention center. Recently, an 'Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights', a Forum for Security Cooperation and other 
mechanisms for specific problems like consultation and co-operation or peaceful 
settlement of disputes, has been established. Furthermore, for peacekeeping missions, the 
OSCE can use resources ofNATO, EU, WEU, and also CIS. The question, however, of 
whether all these new elements make OSCE more capable must be regarded skeptically. 
There is no doubt that its strengths are to observe and pick out the central theme of 
problems, to settle conflicts peacefully by preventive diplomacy, and to protect human or 
minority rights. But whenever action has to be taken, conflicts are to be settled militarily, 
peacekeeping measures have to be conducted and 'means' have to be used, OSCE lacks 
financial, personnel, and military resources, as well as political agreements on established 
legal platforms. 283 
This can be explained by basic disagreements, especially between Russia and the 
West over how a new security system in Europe is be developed. While the Western 
World stresses the need for Collective Defense (like NATO), Russia emphasizes Systems 
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of Collective Security (like OSCE), where member states have the 'obligation' to settle 
conflicts peacefully and are mutual guarantors of their partner's security. 284 It is especially 
Russia's membership itself and thus its ability to play an active part in Europe's security 
landscape, including an OSCE partnership with the United States, probably the avoidance 
of NATO's expansion to the East and its subordination under a OSCE system,285 that 
makes such a model so attractive for Russia. In contrast with a positive scenario of a 
capable and empowered OSCE, Russia poses the negative alternative of a European 
division between a relatively stable north-western part, eventually enlarged by EU-
associated partners and a highly instable south-east arc of crises, and a more or less 
cohesive CIS under Russian dominance.Z86 Thus, the Russian side has consistently 
promoted the idea of the central role of the OSCE in ensuring European security and 
stability. 
The CSCE [today OSCE] is seen to be a prospective instrument to form relations 
between States and peoples on the basis of democratic values system. We move to 
the community offree democratic States. Though with delays and failures but we 
move. On this way the CSCE will have to meet, very likely, the major challenge of 
the modern times - to assist in establishing such patterns of political and social 
structure that could open up the creative potential of the people, give way to the 
dri~e for cooperation instead ofleading mankind to a vicious circle of inability, 
poverty and selfishness. 287 
The significance and importance of the OSCE is neither suppressed nor neglected 
by the West. The organization is seen as one of the main players in overcoming the Cold 
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War, having had an important role in restoring the common system of values in Europe, in 
codifying common norms of political conduct, and in making fundamental principles of 
international law in Europe effective. In contrast to the above argument, for example, 
NATO views itself as an instrument of the United Nations Organization and the OSCE, on 
the basis of internationally passed resolutions, and is willing to conduct peace-keeping 
missions under their auspices, on a case-by-case basis. There is no doubt that the OSCE 
will play a decisive role in the future European security structure. However, it cannot be 
responsible for European defense, especially not as Europe's policeman. It must be clearly 
stressed that ,the international organization of armed power . . . can be done only by 
countries that know each other, trust each other, and have a clear idea of what they want 
to do". 288 This, however, is not the fact today. Putting all OSCE member states together 
creates an ,amorphous body"289, that is probably capable of a consultative role, preventive 
diplomacy and ensuring member states observe basic principles, but not able to create 
stability through defense and military guarantees. The OSCE is not a security structure 
competing with NATO. 290 Therefore, to realize the full potential of the Helsinki Charter, 
one should concentrate more on new challenges (such as economic and environmental 
issues), increase crisis prevention and crisis management capabilities with dedicated 
instruments, and make the OSCE the most important instrument for early warning and 
preventive diplomacy,291 and maintain its function of one of the most important forums for 
multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements and their supervision. The CSCE 
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could also play a future role in conflicts which are lesser international disputes but rather 
have an internal, domestic character. 
The expectations and hopes pinned on the international organizations concern 
primarily various forms of intervention in the matters which in the past were 
considered as those falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states (human rights, 
legislation, minorities, domestic conflicts, etc.) In this regard, the CSCE is, by 
definition, much more flexible than other security structures, since for more than 
20 years it has dealt with problems that belong to the discretional power of 
states. 292 
The fact that Russia has accepted OSCE monitors m its 'internal' conflict in 
Chechnya seems to underline that this 'internal' function is already, at least by definition 
and theoretically, accepted. The decisive strength of the OSCE lies in its long-term 
problem-solving approach, based on common values and consensus of the member 
states.293 
Today the security landscape in Europe presents an inconsistent picture. Europe is 
undergoing a process of fundamental change, moving towards cooperation and 
integration. Processes of progressive integration, however, are opposed by centrifugal 
tendencies whose impact may cause- the fragmentation of state entities in the east and 
south-east of the continent and problems and challenges, shown in the penultimate 
chapter. In this situation, it is necessary to stabilize European peace, democracy and 
welfare by pragmatic steps, without losing the positive development already achieved and, 
at the same time, without losing sight of the main goal: a European security and defense 
identity with close transatlantic links. Thus in the near future despite recent competitions 
of all for a 'place in the sun', all organizations, dealing with European security like NATO, 
EU, WEU, OSCE, but also the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) have to co-operate and to avoid new dividing lines. Otherwise, the 'chance of 
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the century could be gambled away'. 294 Developing an idea for the organization of 
European security in the very near future is affected by limitations; one can only give 
probable basic ideas. However, the following model outlines one such idea and shall be the 
basis for further discussions: 
The European Union, as a decisive force in the process ofEurope's unification and 
the central element of future European security structure, can slowly take over security 
responsibilities, not only in Europe but also on a global scale, in close partnership with the 
United States. The EU has to expand to offer former Warsaw Pact states a possibility to 
develop themselves into prosperous and strong partners. At the same time structural 
adjustments have to make the EU capable to deal with security and defense issues, 
especially during crises. If there is even a slight chance that European involvement in any 
crisis could at some stage lead to a situation that would require United States' support, the 
European Union would be well advised to consult the United States right from the 
beginning. 295 Thus, a liaison office, an observer status, or some other form of participation 
should guarantee that the United States is not only informed about developments and 
decisions, but is also involved in political and/or military planning and preparation of the 
EU activities. As long as there is no perspective for a merging ofEU and WEU, America's 
participation would be necessary and desirable in both organizations. 
The WEU, for its part, could be given a threefold role: 296 first, the role of politico-
military adviser to the EU on defense matters, second, the role to introduce common 
positions during discussions with NATO, in line with WEU's vocation as the European 
pillar of the Alliance; and third, WEU could organize common military actions requested 
by the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and eventually also on its own initiative. The WEU should 
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thereby not weaken the strong transatlantic ties, but rather reinforce them. Mutual 
transparency and complementarity are the key words. 297 
All new members of the EU are entitled to WEU membership. 298 The WEU, 
however as shown above, cannot guarantee the security of its members on its own, and 
there is an inherent link between the Brussels and the Washington Treaty. Thus, NATO 
should have the priority in the sphere of collective defense, in which Americans and 
Europeans, on an increasingly balanced basis, would specify security guarantees in terms 
of what is required and who should benefit from them. NATO could also intervene for 
missions outside the territory of its member states, as long as there was American 
participation.299 In these cases non-NATO states could participate outside the integrated 
military structure but within a Combined Joint Task Force NATO-led operation. Due to 
its integrated military structure and its Partnership for Peace program NATO has a forum 
for the creation of compatibility, interoperability, and the habit of working together, 
among its members and with potential partners. To avoid duplication, this should be 
maintained. 
The OSCE, additionally, should use its strengths, dealing with cooperative security 
by establishing ,the closest cooperative ties with the UN and with European and Trans-
Atlantic organizations while avoiding duplication of effort". 300 Despite the fact that the 
OSCE still has to cope with ,the problems . of potentially highly diverse national 
perceptions about sources and remedies of conflicts",301 and thus often is seen only as a 
,waiting hall for states going to join, on the longer term, existing European/Europe-
297 
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related organizations", 302 it is not without function. In the near future it should provide 
mechanisms ,not so much of coercion 'against' another participating state but for 
cooperation 'with' another participating state in order to allow states to extricate 
themselves from situations which otherwise were likely to escalate into confrontation or 
even armed conflict", 303 in order to coordinate peacekeeping efforts, and, in general, to 
connect America, Russia, and other East European states to European security. In the 
case that Europe's differentiation into a Western and a Eastern Group is not avoidable, 
with Russia eventually declaring the CIS a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter as the consequence ofNATO's expansion, it is necessary today to develop 
the basis for a future cooperative relation between both groups. The OSCE could take the 
lead in this 'bridge function', beyond bilateral arrangements, already in force. 
The organizational framework for the near future could be as outlined above, with 
the long term goal of a European Union-Western European Union unity. As a long-term 
purpose future members of the EU should have a security status equal to that of the 'old' 
members, who are also members ofNATO. Thus, the key word, as shown above is 'final 
congruence of membership'. A prerequisite for the next steps is a compromise on how to 
conduct, command, and control Combined Joint Task Force missions. To avoid 
duplication, the development of a EU/WEU command and control capability, however, 
should not be taken into consideration. A real sharing of burdens and responsibilities 
between the EU and the United States is, so far, only possible, if a 'modus vivendi' could 
.be found in which NATO's and especially American assets and capabilities could be made 
capable for non-NATO operations. A new transatlantic economy and security community 
could be a basis for such agreements. 
302 Ibid., p. 53. 
303 Ibid., p. 55. 
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D. NEW SECURITY PARTNERS 
Russia has good reason to support NATO's extending the zone of political stability 
into Central Europe. After all, twice in this century Russia, in the two world wars, 
has suffered greatly because of that region's instability.304 
It is possible that especially this argument contributed to a change of the Clinton 
administration's initial 'Russia first' policy. After President Clinton's 1994 visit to Poland, 
America became. the primary supporter of a NATO enlargement, taking over the British 
opinion, which is ,in favor of a wid~r, rather than a deeper Europe". 305 United States' 
intentions are to achieve the initiative in the enlargement discussion, to maintain its weight 
and importance in the European security discussion, to avoid European solo efforts and, at 
the same time, to avoid an exclusion of Russia and Ukraine. The implementation of the 
Yugoslav-Dayton agreement through NATO has led France to rely more on traditional, 
established security organizations, taking into account that 'participation' gives it more 
influence than 'opposition'. In combination with economic interests in Central and Eastern 
Europe France overcame its fears of 'Atlanticism' and 'Germany, in case of enlargement 
being the new center ofEurope',306 so that it is 'inevitably' promoting an enlargement of 
European security organizations.307 Additionally with Germany, after its unification being 
a promoter of' deepening and widening', one should assume that there could be no doubt 
about the future track: an enlargement of the EU and the WEU, to strengthen the 
European security and defense identity and economic competition with the 'outer world', 
and an enlargement of NATO, to be addressed head-on as the main pillar of collective 
defense. 
304 S. Talbott, Why NATO should grow, in: The Economist, Aug 10 1995, p. 27. 
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However, despite the fact that Russia no longer sees Western security 
organizations308 as a direct threat, its former foreign minister Kosyrev stressed that they 
are still 'strange organizations', whose enlargement would mean a 'nightmare' to the 
establishment of a partnership between Russia and the West. 309 Personnel changes in the 
Y eltsin administration point to the fact that Russia's foreign policy, in this realm, will 
become even more assertive and iess geared toward the West. Therefore it is not easy to 
assess whether the short-term advantage of calming Russia by not offering membership to 
former Warsaw Pact states, would not be overwhelmed by long-term disadvantages of 
missing a chance to stabilize a region, in which Russia anyway would develop itself 
'inevitably' towards becoming a Western nation. Or, in a negative scenario, Russia would 
anyway fail to become a democratic state, and that then an early enlargement would be 
even more necessary for the protection of its neighbors. ,Yet, while an aggressive Russian 
revanchism cannot be ruled out, Eastern Europe's leaders concede that this extreme 
scenario is not their primary concern .... More broadly, the East-Central European do not 
want to be left out in the cold".310 It is a climate of confidence which attracts them, despite 
many disappointments of the quality of Western support in the last years. And, most 
important, ,East Central political elites have staked their legitimacy on their countries' 
gradual but steady adherence to the West, . . . [having] essentially two institutional 
meanings: the EU and NAT0".311 Therefore stepping back from enlargement of these 
organizations would probably mean a political, psychological, economical, and ethical 
shock, which could lead to undesired developments. 
Behind all these 'primary' reasons for including new partners in European security 
organizations, there are some 'secondary' ones. The 1996 Presidential elections in the 
308 
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United States and Russia, the EU Intergovernmental Conference, ethnic lobbies, European 
fears about American isolationism, and, last but not least, a ,sheer force of bureaucratic 
inertia and interest politics"312 will influence the political process and the enlargement 
issue. Thus, it is important that the discussion remains objective and unemotional. Many of 
these issues are already addressed in the treaties (e.g. Article 10 of the Washington 
Treaty) and many of the problems will be solved if only actual members can find a 
consensus. Instead of passive contemplation about the 'ifs' of an enlargement, active 
policies toward a stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe, especially of Russia, should 
begin today. 
There are five different kinds of rationales and intentions of new partners toward 
Western security organizations: first, those who want to become a member immediately 
and have a 'good' prospect due to their internal democratic development, the settlement of 
disputes with neighbors, and their geographical position;313 second, those who lay their 
main emphasis on economic cooperation and are militarily prepared for multilateral crisis 
management and peacekeeping measures, however which do not yet want to abandon 
their status as militarily independent states;314 third, states which try to cooperate with 
Western security organizations but still need some time to overcome their former 
antagonist opinions or just want to see Western development before they make a 
decision;315 fourth, countries which try to become members, but are not already prepared 
or, due to their geographical and historical situation, are not (yet?) able to become 
members, 316 and finally those who try to influence European security and build special 
links but are sure that they do not want to join NATO, the EU and/or the WEU, unless 
these organizations are changed completely.317 While these rationales quite easily point out 
312 A. Lieven, A new Iron Curtain, in: The Atlantic Monthly, Jan 1996, pp. 24-25. 
313 
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the attitudes of single states towards Western European organizations, it is more difficult 
to assess the objectives of these organizations in the process of enlargement. While 
redefining their missions and 'deepening' their connections and cooperation, 'largening' is 
not always 'just a parallel process'. It has to be adapted to new structures, tasks and 
missions (or the reverse). 
It may sound somewhat harsh, but I will admit my feeling that unless NATO finds 
soon the courage to clearly redefine its mission, and to expand in keeping with this 
new definition, it may within a few years become largely ineffectual.318 
The prospect of membership provides nations of Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union with additional incentives ,to strengthen their democratic and legal 
institutions, ensure civilian command of their armed forces, liberalize their economies, and 
respect human rights, including the rights of national minorities".319 The process of 
expansion, thus, shall help to promote regional stability and peace, even including nations 
which are not members. Beneath these political and military reforms, it aims at economic 
integration, so that no aspect of security is excluded. For Germany, it is furthermore 
crucial that it loses its frontier state status. This is not pushing a danger zone further to. the 
East but a stabilizing of the whole region so that new front lines are not established while 
old ones are dissolved. All European security institutions therefore stress that their 
enlargement has to be accommodated by an increase in partnership and cooperation 
especially with non-member states. Nevertheless, although most politicians try to avoid 
mentioning this reality, it should be clear that Russia and some of its former Soviet Union 
allies are still on an unpredictable path. NATO's enlargement, but also the EU's and the 
WEU' s, thus have a clear military aspect. Those who assume that the 'Russian bear will 
rise again', stress that ,the time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia 
is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be 
an insufferable provocation to a superpower". 320 Others see an expansion of membership 
318 Vaclav Havel, cited in: C. Goldsmith, NATO needs a Raison d'Etre before Enlarging, Havel 
says, in: The Wass Street Journal, Apr 28 1995. 
319 S. Talbott, Why NATO should grow, in: The New York Review, Aug 10 1995. p. 27. 
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as a possibility for retaliation. Any of the following should trigger NATO's expansion into 
Central and Eastern Europe: a clear violation of treaties or international borders, if 
Moscow withdraws from arms reduction talks, discontinues the denuclearization process 
or even absorbs Belarus and Ukraine. 321 In the same way the EU should enlarge as a 
preventive measure, if Moscow tries to re-establish a sphere of influence in Eastern and 
Central Europe. However, it will be difficult to assess when exactly such attitudes and 
actions start and the triggering point for NATO's or the EU's enlargement has come. So 
far and because new partners would disagree with becoming part of this 'game', it cannot 
be a real rational or intention of European security institutions to use enlargement as a 
method for deterrence or even blackmailing. Another question is whether Russia should 
become member in NATO, the EU or the WEU. While as a long term goal for the East-
West development can be envisaged, in which Russia is fully integrated politically and 
economically into European affairs, and thus as a worthwhile long-term objective is 
eligible for an EU membership,322 there are doubts about a NATO and probably a WEU 
membership. Despite arguments, that a NATO membership of Russia would destroy the 
strategic balance in Europe and that two big and probably · competing powers would 
destroy the character of the alliance, the United States are still insisting that there should 
be no exclusion. Washington has two reasons for this attitude: ,some in the administration 
view Russian membership as a realistic way to enhance security. Others are reluctant to 
rule out Russian membership out of fear doing so would drive this already chaotic country 
into aggressive isolationism".323 May it as it be, it is important to notice that 'the' Western 
rational for enlargement is the spreading of peace, freedom and to extend the zone of 
prosperity. Furthermore it should be pointed out that a policy of taking Russia as a 
320 W. Satire, The Bear will rise again, so build the Alliance now, in: International Herald 
Tribune, Dec 11 1994. 
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candidate implies a certain amount of negotiations, which not necessarily but eventually 
could lead to a bargaining between NATO and Russia over the price of enlargement 'in 
the near future', in which Russia will be 'surely' excluded. Therefore, it would be in 
general better to aim at a parallel process of enlarging the alliance and the EU, and at the 
same time establishing strategic partnerships with those states which are not available in 
the near future from the Western perspective. 
As a final rational for enlargement it is stressed that new members must not only be 
democratic, have market economies, and be committed to responsible security policies, 
but that they also should support the organizations' functioning, being not only 
'consumers' but also 'contributers'. From this perspective, new members can and shall 
even strengthen the inner stability and further the 'deepening' process. From this 
perspective, an evolutionary way towards new members would be counterproductive. To 
extend the waiting time until a complete harmonization is established between new 
partners and enlarging organizations, would mean to miss the qualities, ideas, and 
contributions of these partners for the internal development. In the same way it would be 
counterproductive to establish 'partial memberships', 'memberships outside the integrated 
military structure', or other extraordinary forms of status aside from a 'full membership'. 
New members therefore should strengthen NATO's potential to fulfill its twofold function 
of 'military protection' and 'stability projection', without any limitations. For the EU it is 
equally necessary that Central and Eastern European economic systems be stabilized in a 
way that they, at least in the long run, will support the EU' s cohesiveness, strength, 
political stability, and capability to cooperate in all matters of today' s political landscape 
with other organizations and institutions. It is therefore necessary to find a common basis, 
on which policy may be founded and developed. The main rationale for an enlargement is 
therefore to combine internal cohesion with organizational widening. 
In June 1993 the European Council announced that the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe which had signed 'Europe Agreements' with the Union would eventually 
be invited to become EU members. The 1994 Essen Council decided on a strategy aimed 
at preparing the eligible countries for accession to the EU. 324 The possible membership is 
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for most of the eligible countries a major step toward access to the EU' s expanding 
markets, which also enhances political stability. 325 If political stabilization of Central and 
Eastern Europe and spreading the blessings of democracy and the market to the East is the 
objective of the West, so that the new democracies get a home and a community,326 then 
surely the EU is the right organization to join. Because the main disillusionment in post-
Communist Europe stems from ,the trauma of an uncertain economic transformation",327 
the form of Western integration that can best cope with this trauma is the opening of 
Western markets through new EU membership. However, the EU's demands for a 
membership are high, so that some of the new partners feel like being set into a 'waiting 
room'. This raises the danger that popular frustration about this can intensify regional 
instability by fanning the flames of particularism, nationalism or ethnic conflicts and, on the 
other hand, give the impression that a 'quick' NATO membership would better serve the 
integration into the West. 328 Additionally, new partners sometimes see it as an unnecessary 
burden for membership that they must combine a certain amount of economic prosperity 
with the democratic development at home. However, the EU has to maintain a 
'community of values'. Otherwise a dilemma would occur if, due to the applicant 
countries' failure to meet economic targets, the whole value of the EU and probably 
further Western European security organizations is no longer considered valid. 329 
Nevertheless, without a doubt, membership of the EU would give Central Europeans rapid 
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326 see: J. Joffe, Is there Life after Victory?, in: The National Interest, Fall1995, p. 24. 
327 D.H. Allin, Can Containment work again?, in: Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 60. 
328 Especially the proposal of the former French President Mitterand to ,devise a holding 
structure, the 'Confederation' [which] intended to offer the CEE countries a temporary framework while 
negotiations took place on association with and then membership of the [European] Community" 
contributed to such attitudes. 
see: J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, in: JES Hayward, Governing the New 
Europe, Oxford Polity Press, 1994, p. 10. 
329 H. Magenheimer, Sicherheitspolitik und Machtgestaltung in Europa, in: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, Feb 3 1995, p. 7. 
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access to one of the 'reliable' forms of security: higher living standards and a break with 
antiquated economic methods. This will stabilize those countries and spread stability to 
neighbors and other partners, if the EU is not only a 'feel good club' without prerequisites 
for the membership but maintains its challenging but also mutual benefiting character and 
its cohesiveness. 
The question of how an EU enlargement will contribute to spreading a 'zone of 
stability' has to be answered by taking into account that the new membership of Finland 
has created an EU-Russian border of 1,300 kilometers. This might put security and 
defense questions into the center of EU' s policy more than in the past. The Russian 
government welcomed Finland's entry into the EU; had it joined NATO, the Russian 
reaction would have been different. This is the reason why eventually the EU can develop 
a much closer relationship and economic ties with Moscow than NATO, despite the 
Partnership for Peace program and the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council. Whether a 'partial membership of the WEU', in which the ,Article V security 
guarantee in the WEU Treaty ofBrussels ... would be temporarily frozen", 330 would help 
Russia to accept the EU' s overall security commitment to new Central and East European 
members, with the WEU as the EU' s defense component, has to be figured out in the near 
future. In general, however, such a 'soft security' would probably undermine the WEU 
itself and new partners' participation in a common foreign and security policy. In general it 
should be clear that every step toward a greater diversity and towards greater constraints 
on the future decision-making process should be avoided, because enlargement would 
make the EU' s work more difficult due to the increased number of participants. 
NATO enjoys great prestige and influence in many Central and East European 
countries, especially in those which want to become members. They point out that 
NATO's advantage is ,that it commits the United States and Canada to maintaining 
stability in Europe". 331 At the same time it is the only organization that possesses the 
330 J. Palmers, EU: Kohl wants East Europe in WEU, in: The Guardian, Oct 9 1995. 
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necessary military bases, communications, equipment, armed forces, command structures, 
and political coordination processes to accomplish this task. Thus, the possibility that new 
countries will join, must not be viewed on the basis of solely military considerations, but 
on the basis of common political, economic, and even cultural dimensions. The prospect of 
becoming eligible for membership will not only be an argument for domestic reform, bring 
together different parts of countries' political groups, and yield progress in resolving 
questions of ethnic multipolarity, but will also support the progress in resolving disputes 
with neighbors. Nevertheless, it is generally felt by new partners that achieving NATO 
membership is ,an easier and speedier affair than membership in the . . . European 
Union".332 From this perspective of new members, parallelism of enlargement between 
different European security organizations is often assessed negatively. As a result, 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program is seen by Central and Eastern European critics as 
an 'avoidance of an early NATO enlargement'. Examining the Final Communique of the 
December 1995 North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, one can easily see how small 
the actual steps towards enlargement have become.333 If the goal of NATO expansion is 
not to die completely, one should keep a certain amount of pace. At its January 1994 
summit NATO decided to expand, a decision reaffirmed by President Clinton's Europe 
visit in the same year, ,when he stated that the question was no longer whether NATO 
would expand but how and when".334 While at the December 1994 North Atlantic Council 
meeting, Foreign Ministers stated that enlargement, when it comes, would be a part of a 
broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of 
Europe.335 In September 1995 a 'Study on NATO Enlargement' explained the 'why' of 
NATO's expansion. It is important to stress that with Article 10 ofthe Washington Treaty 
332 G. Wettig, Post-Soviet Central Europe in International Security, in: European Security, Vol. 3, 
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an official and legal mechanism to enlarge the organization already exists.336 To set the 
hurdle higher than this would mean potential new members are being treated worse than in 
previous cases.337 On the other hand, the Partnership for Peace agreement was 'offered' 
and 'signed' because its fulfillment was seen as a good preparation and, albeit not 
officially, a prerequisite for NATO membership. From this perspective, NATO is actively 
supporting its enlargement by presenting a ,vehicle to draw the Central and Eastern 
European states into a closer relationship with NAT0".338 Although in some cases, 
Partnership for Peace and bilateral contacts have encouraged competition rather than 
cooperation among new partners, 339 it is clear that countries are quite intensively preparing 
themselves for membership and that this is 'sponsored' by at least some NATO members. 
All in all, one can say that NATO should only be enlarged if its internal stability, cohesion, 
and its military effectiveness are guaranteed, if not increased by the addition of new 
partners. If this can be guaranteed and the Article 1 0 criteria are fulfilled there should be 
no hesitation to answer, not only 'why' and 'how', but also the questions 'who' and 
'when'. 
NATO's enlargement has implications on stationing of troops and headquarters, 
the defense planning process, investments in infrastructure and military (including nuclear) 
doctrine. Although under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty NATO members are only 
'obligated to employ such means as they deem necessary', and thus there is after all 
,nothing in the NATO treaty prohibiting a refusal to act",340 most members and even most 
aspirants see this as an obligation to act, in case a NATO country is attacked, which 
336 
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makes NATO membership unique and attractive. Therefore it is necessary to be able to 
answer questions like: 'How can we credibly defend a bigger territory with probably 
decreased forces?' This not only implies financial sacrifices from everybody, probably 
nullifying the often-cited 'peace-dividend', but also the political preparedness for the 
members to underline the idea of' all for one, and one for all'. Therefore, it is a step in the 
wrong direction, to muse whether one country would really want to go to war for 
another,341 or, like Germany during the Gulf War, to hesitate sending troops for the 
defense of Turkey from a potential Iraqi attack. In every state one must realize that the 
costs of a NATO expansion are 'certainly impressive', because, despite all theories and 
wishful thinking, ,NATO will be [probably] taking in security consumers rather than 
producers". 342 Furthermore, NATO should be cautious that its enlargement does not make 
its structure and functioning so complicated that the synergistic effect of an increased 
membership is destroyed by a complex net of self-hindering 'knots and holes'. The nuclear 
powers, and most importantly the United States, have to make clear whether they are 
further prepared to 'risk their capital to save, for example, Warsaw or Prague'. A dilemma 
follows such an assertion: ,If the answer is yes, the [U.S.] Senate is unlikely to ratify 
enlargement. If the answer is no, the credibility of America's security guarantees to its 
existing allies in Western Europe would have been wiped away at a stroke". 343 Thus, it is 
not enough that NATO's enlargement study points out that ,NATO's current nuclear 
posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged 
Alliance". 344 
The main question is: 'how?'. It depends on the choice of future defense concepts 
about what the roles and missions, responsibilities, and functions of the military services in 
the different countries are. Especially the question of 'forward presence' of troops on 
341 
... as did, for example, the Czech ambassador at a meeting in Washington, thinking about 
Turkey, 
see: J. Joffe, Is there Life after Victory?, in: The National Interest, Fall1995, p. 23. 
3421bid. 
343 1. Davidson, NATO looks East, in: Financial Times, Apr 12 1995. 
344 Study on NATO Enlargement, Sep 1995, p. 20. 
ll1 
foreign soil is part of this discussion. While it is sometimes pointed out that Alliance forces 
should not be deployed on new members' territory and this ,qualified NATO membership 
would extend defensive guarantees without exacerbating Russian security concerns", 345 
NATO's enlargement study clearly shows the importance ,that other Allies' forces can be 
deployed, when and if appropriate, on the territory of new members". 346 As these 
examinations show, this is a necessity if the dangerous elements of an uncertain political or 
defense credibility or an unfair burden sharing are to be avoided.347 Beside practical 
aspects about financing, adaptation of armed forces, military infrastructure, common 
training and exercises, language requirements, and the revision of national doctrines, 
tactics, force structures and compositions, it is essential that the 'costs' of clear political 
decisions about defense concepts are paid, albeit by all. Only this can guarantee a high 
probability for a mutual security increase in the future. 
It is essential that NATO's enlargement lies in the American interest, if it 
enlargement is not to be without value. For the United States each new NATO member 
constitutes for the United States ,the most solemn of all commitments: a bilateral defense 
treaty that extends the U.S. security umbrella to a new nation".348 From this perspective it 
is clear that the United States Congress plays an important role in the enlargement debate, 
having to ratify the agreement with a two-thirds majority. This implies two relevant factors 
for new candidates: it will be impossible, first, to increase the number of new members 
over a certain limit, and second, to choose new partners which do not fulfill certain 
prerequisites. 349 Different oppositions must be overcome: neo-isolationists which are 
against spreading America's security guarantees over an incalculable and restless Central 
and Eastern Europe, those who are not willing to newly engage in Europe after the Cold 
345 H. Kissinger, cited in: M.E. Brown, The flawed Logic of NATO Expansion, in: Survival, Vol. 
37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 43. 
346 Study on NATO Enlargement, Sep 1995, p. 16. 
347 
see overview over alternative defense concepts for the alliance in: R.D. Asmus, R.L. Kugler, 
F.S. Larrabee, NATO Expansion, the next Steps, in: Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 16. 
348 R. Holbrooke, America, a European Power, in: Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 1995, p. 63. 
349 The U.S. Congress will, for example, surely not (yet?) agree to choose Bulgaria as a candidate. 
112 
War has been won, Senators who propose a 'Russia-first' policy and would not accept 
negative consequences for this approach, and finally those who point out that NATO 
enlargement will cost a lot of money which could be used for internal American affairs. 
Beside these discussions it is not easy to figure out what in the future will make 
NATO especially attractive for the United States. There are those who express that ,an 
evolution of NATO's role to encompass crisis management and conflict prevention 
beyond the traditional geographical limits should considerably increase NATO's value to 
the United States and make the latter more willing to assume further obligations". 35° From 
this perspective, the future United States role in Europe depends heavily on NATO 
expansion, because the task of 'stabilizing the East' gives NATO a future task and 
prevents it from the ,risk ofbecoming irrelevant .... [Otherwisdt would have] no future in 
American politics".351 The polls, however, suggest that there is more support for 
defending Western Europe than there is for giving NATO new responsibilities. 352 Because 
the Alliance is not only dominated by the United States, but also depends on U.S. 
resources, it will be impossible to extend NATO's area of responsibility and its span of 
tasks if such an opinion gains the majority. Enlargement of European security 
organizations therefore makes it necessary that the transatlantic link is more than only a 
NATO Article 5 guarantee, the security partnership should have political, economic, and 
other strategic facets as well. Although political -stabilization of Eastern Europe is often 
seen as a task for the EU,353 and thus not so much as an American responsibility, it would 
be a chance for the United States to cooperate in this task through a future active 
membership in an enlarged and deepened NATO with new tasks. It should be seen as such 
a 'chance' because only if America overcomes its recent isolationist and unilateralist 
350 K.-H. Kamp, The Folly of rapid NATO Expansion, in: Foreign Policy, Spring 1995, p. 127. 
351 R.D. Asmus, Washington is right to prepare Expansion of NATO, in: International Herald 
Tribune, Dec 30 1994. 
352 The public's commitment toward NATO remains largely unchanged, with 56% in favor of 
keeping it the same, 5% in favor of increasing it, and a quarter favoring a decrease. See: J.E. Rielly, The 
Public Mood at Mid-Decade, in: Foreign Policy, No. 98, Spring 1995, p. 89. 
353 
see: I. Davidson, NATO looks East, in: Financial Times, Apr 12 1995. 
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tendencies it will be able to gain access to new markets in Central and Eastern Europe, 
maintain good relations with its trading partners, gain influence on the EU' s and the 
WEU' s developments, and (with some probability) not be 'called another time to re-
establish security, peace, and order in Europe'. It is therefore the wrong approach to 
sacrifice a possible NATO enlargement, for example, on the altar of good United States-
Russian relations, only to prevent a wrecking of future cooperation in the Far East, at a 
time when China's future is looking so uncertain. China would anyway ,join Russia in 
enlisting world support against American export of democracy as 'destabilizing'". 354 It is 
therefore more important to concentrate on destroying Russia's fears and complaints, 
pointing out that NATO's enlargement is not directed against anyone but ,a consolidation 
of the post-1989 status quo: ... free, sovereign countries exercising their free, sovereign 
choice to associate with us [NAT0]".355 
Europe's security organizations' enlargement will be on the back burner for the 
very next future; a decision will be delayed until after the 1996 Russian and United States 
Presidential elections and, eventually, until after the Intergovernmental Conference of the 
EU. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that freezing the organizations in their old 
configuration would be a major setback for the American idea of spreading democracy, 
free markets, and the rule of the law. 
By contrast, enlarging NATO in a way that encourages European integration and 
enhances European stability- the policy the [Clinton] administration is [hopefully] 
determined to pursue - will benefit all the peoples of the continent, and the larger 
transatlantic community as well. 356 
354 W. Safire, Russian and China to remarry, in: Monterey Herald, Jan 18 1996, p. 7A. 
355 P.W. Rodman, Yalta in the Balkans, in: National Review, Dec 25 1995, p. 23. 
356 S. Talbott, Why NATO should grow, in: The New York Review, Jull3 1995, p. 30. 
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E. TRANSATLANTIC DEPENDENCIES 
Chapter V has shown that in many cases the transatlantic link plays a major role. 
Thus, it is necessary to explain 'why' this link between Europe and America has to be 
maintained and further developed from the European perspective. The very basic reason 
can be taken from the origin ofWestem Europe's integration after the Second World War. 
Its normative references: 'democracy', 'free markets', and 'opposition to aggressive forms 
of nationalism' were transatlantic rather than European. ,This helps to explain why it was 
so easy for Washington to accept the European integration"/57 and why, besides other 
reasons, the development of a European security and defense identity was not only 
accepted, but also promoted by the Clinton administration. However, the end of the Cold 
War and with it the vanishing of a clear threat perception of many politicians have altered 
America's views towards their involvement and their responsibilities in Europe. 
Two examples show how deep these 'transformations' have been (or still are) and 
how important it is to show that a transatlantic link is a real 'necessity' to counter these 
trends. First, it was a not only secretly cited idea that ,a stronger Russia could be a useful 
counterbalance to the strength of ... [a unified] Germany".358 From this perspective, 
irritations of Russia should be avoided, even at the cost of not enlarging NATO in the near 
future and of taking into consideration the still insecure and unpredictable Russian 
political, military and economic development. Provocatively one could say that the 
security ofthe NATO ally Germany, ifnot of all Europeans, was sacrificed on the altar of 
an 'en vogue Russia first' policy. Fortunately the Clinton administration changed its mind 
and, ultimately, regained interest in European security affairs. The new approach is that 
that the three historical challenges - America's role in Europe, the political development of 
Europe, and the future of Russia - should be combined within a strategy that links, instead 
357 D.T. Stuart, Can Europe survive Maastricht?, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, Feb 4 1994, p. 17. 
358 B.Beedham, Russia gains, Germany loses, America should stay, in: International Herald 
Tribune, Dec 15 1994. 
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of splits, America and Europe. 359 Secondly, it is important to point out that this is no 
longer self-evident. The president of the RAND Corporation, Jim Thomson, for example, 
recently expressed his opinion that the United States today would no longer be willing to 
build a NATO, except for the reason to guarantee Europe's participation in the worldwide 
interests and obligations of America. Obviously for him, European security is no longer 
one of the most important strategic issues for the biggest NATO partner. 360 
To counter Thomson's opinions, any doubts about the necessity of efforts to 
underline the importance of strategic alliances in and/or with Europe, even after the Cold 
War is over and even in a situation of internal problems and challenges of nearly every 
state, should disappear. For Europe, only America's authority and participation can allow 
progress towards a resolution of questions about how to find a sensible future for NATO, 
how to bind Central and East European states in a new European security order, and how 
to help Russia on its way towards stability.361 A worsening ofEuropean security would be 
dangerous for both sides of the Atlantic. This must be clear in future discussions between 
the American President and Congress on the role of the United States in Europe. Since the 
Yugoslav debacle, Western Europe has come to believe that there is no question that 
European security can only be ensured by a proven, reliable transatlantic partnership with 
the North American allies, United States and Canada. It should be pointed out that 
NATO, the organization which the mostly binds America to Europe, does not constitute a 
'bloc' with an antagonistic strategy, but is a political organization of nations sharing 
common basic values, an instrument for cooperative crisis management to serve peace, 
and a military alliance for collective defense against any possible potential threat. The 
United States is also committed to these objectives, as demonstrated by continued 
willingness to station a· significant amount of troops in Europe. This commitment allows 
Europe to participate in the stabilization of the East, and not be forced to 'exclusively' 
359 see: W. Stiitzle, Zum Schutz der Partner wiirde Amerika keine NATO griinden, in: Der 
Tagesspiegel, Jan 25 1995. 
360 Ibid. 
361 see: RD. Blackwill, Wanun Europa und Amerika zusammenstehen miissen, in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, Feb 20 1995. 
116 
concentrate politically, militarily, and financially on its own defense. A 'division of labor' 
would overtax European capabilities to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe and United 
States capabilities of engaging Russia alone.362 The link between America and its 
European partners therefore shows that the 'transatlantic community' is clearly more than 
the sum of its parts. It is this special 'combination' of American and European security 
potential that attracts Central and East European states. Extending NATO rapidly, for 
example, without the United States' guarantees would lead to ,commitments for Eastern 
Europe as empty as the hollow guarantees that France and Great Britain gave Poland on 
the eve of World War II".363 
Even in a situation in which relations between the Russian federation and the rest 
of Europe continue to improve, the case for maintaining a defensive alliance with 
significant United States forces in Europe does not diminish?64 Fire assurances normally 
are not terminated if the probability for fire decreases. Security must not be self-defeating! 
This argument is underlined by the fact that the gain of America's contribution in and for 
Europe was not only military security but also that, as the Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
pointed out already in 1967, ,the presence of our forces in Europe under NATO ... 
contributed to the development of intra-European cooperation".365 The United States thus 
helped to create a strong partner over the years. It is worthless to discuss whether this has 
been a 'European free ride'. Rather the question should be whether the pay-off of the 
American investment over the last decades should not be consumed, only because the 
maintenance costs of the transatlantic partnership seem to be too high. Decreased 
American interests in Europe would furthermore force traditional 'transatlantic-oriented' 
nations, like Great Britain, to make a choice between ,an outpost of a fictitious Atlantic 
362 
see: M. Ruhle, N. Williams, NATO Enlargement and the European Union, in: The World 
Today, May 1995, p. 86. 
363 K.-H. Kamp, The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion, in: Foreign Policy, Spring 1995, p. 129. 
364 The opposite opinion is published by J. Roper, Transatlantic Relations and International 
Security, Conference organized by UNIDIR, Memorial, un musee pour Ia paix, Caen, Sep 22-23 1994, 
p. 9. 
365 Cited in: J.Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: Foreign Policy, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 81. 
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civilization and ... [its] destiny as a European nation".366 Europe thus needs the United 
States to avoid being drawn into a real test, which might lead to a fundamental division 
instead of an enhanced community. 
This real test would have to be faced especially if Europe's defense had to become 
autonomous even in the nuclear realm. Despite the fact that the 1994 French White Paper 
suggests that ,with nuclear capabilities ... Europe's defense autonomy is possible"/67 it 
must be pointed out that ,the old nuclear risk and burden-sharing arrangements ... 
represented, if only in institutional terms, a significant part of the Alliance's transatlantic 
glue". 368 The traditional rationales for the United States nuclear presence in Western 
Europe in the past have been ,(i) promoting the political cohesion of the Alliance through 
arrangements for fairer nuclear risk- and responsibility sharing; (ii) providing more 
credible extended deterrence guarantees, on the assumption that US nuclear commitments 
would be less credible to adversaries and allies if they depended solely on forces at sea and 
in North America; and (iii) increasing the political influence of the non-nuclear European 
allies regarding US nuclear policy, given the judgment that their influence depends in part 
on accepting roles in nuclear delivery and support operations". 369 All this has not changed 
up to today; on the contrary: it is more true. Substrategic weapon systems. therefore, even 
if reduced to a limited number of free-fall nuclear bombs, further establish the political and 
military coupling between conventional and strategic weapons, on the one hand, and 
between European and American allies,. on the other. They spread the American nuclear 
umbrella over Europe and, at the same time, bind the United States conventionally to their 
partners. Fortunately the time is over, in which ,some observers suspected that US nuclear 
weapons might be used to execute limited nuclear options against the Warsaw Pact, with 
366 J. Gray, The great Atlantic Drift, in: The Guardian, Dec 12 1994. 
367 
cited in: D.S. Yost, Nuclear Debates in France, in: Survival, Vol. 36, No.4, Winter 1994-95, 
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368 N.K.J. Witney, British nuclear Policy after the Cold War, in: Survival, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 
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the possible result of a limited Soviet nuclear retaliation confined to Europe",370 and thus, 
United States' nuclear weapons have probably de-coupled American and European 
security by making Germany the 'nuclear playground' for a superpower conflict. Because 
nuclear weapons are more than ever371 political weapons, the discussion about a European 
nuclear identity is reduced to the question of whether an independent nuclear European 
potential can prevent war. If the answer is 'yes', it makes sense that Britain and France, 
the only European nuclear powers, put together their arsenals and develop a common, co-
ordinated doctrine. If however the answer is 'no', and one can have massive doubts 
whether two 'mini-atomic powers' like France and Great Britain would be able to create 
at least a certain amount of 'credibility', there is no need for any European efforts, if the 
transatlantic link remains firm. 
This is the background for questions like: 'what can France offer Germany, that 
Germany, due to the American deterrence, does not already have?'. The answer can be 
given just by the assessment that the little French nuclear umbrella only prevents from 
'becoming wet' because the big American one is stretched over it.372 This, however, does 
not mean that Europe's participation373 in nuclear deterrence is worthless for the common 
security. The contributions of many nations show that responsibilities and burdens are to 
be shared in a true partnership. Thus especially after the break-down of the Warsaw Pact, 
Europe should not create the impression that it is a 'civilian power' - ,a tendency to 
finesse, defer or disregard uncomfortable issues of national and regional security". 374 Only 
370 K.-H. Kamp, Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, in: Security Dialogue, 
Vo. 26(3), 1995, p. 279. 
371 Nuclear weapons, by definition in the last decades, have always been 'political weapons'. 
Despite the new danger of nuclear proliferation and uncertainties about Russia's development, it is mostly 
agreed today that the probability of a 'use' of weapons of mass destructions has decreased. In so far the 
political role, relatively to the military role, has increased. 
372 see: J. Joffe, Atomschirm fur Bonn?- ,Wir wiirden liigen", in: Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Sep 9-10 
1995. 
373 Participation, in a wider sense, means not only 'possessing nuclear weapons', like France and 
Great Britain, but also in a way as Germany did it in the last decades. Therefore one can speak of a 
'European nuclear participation', although there are only two 'hardware' nuclear powers. 
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signs that Europe is shouldering a major share of the burden of stabilizing its own security 
will increase Congressional support for an ongoing United States engagement in European 
security affairs. Therefore, it is no longer possible for the community ofWestern European 
nations to simply accept American leadership; it has to ,develop the mechanisms and the 
concepts to take a strategic lead", 375 in order to retain a right to have a say in decisive 
security matters of the future. The ball is now in the European court. Europe needs 
America, but it has to show that it is not a donation that is needed, but rather, in addition 
to Europe's own contribution, the maintenance of the transatlantic partnership, as a 
further investment in the common future. It is worth to point out a second time, that it is 
the combination of American and European military and political 'forces' that provides an 
irreplaceable stabilizing function, radiating to all-Europe and beyond. It is unimaginable 
that an 'equal' partnership can be established in the next future, because Europe and its 
defense and security organizations are 'deepening' and 'widening', and this needs a great 
amount of time and coordination. However, if the Europeans demonstrate willingness and 
substantial achievements, the Americans, who are realists, will stick to their commitment: 
"The United States is a European power .... We are here and will stay here, whichever 
President or party is in power, because it is in our interests". 376 
374 D.T. Stuart, Can Europe Survive Maastricht?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Feb 4 1994, p. 8. (See also Chapter 5.2.). 
375 L. Freedman, Even hobbled, NATO is still key organization, in: The Stars and Stripes, Dec 9 
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376 Statement of the American Representative at the Colloquium ,A Europe of Security and 
Defence", Centre d'Etude et de Prospective Strategique, in cooperation with the Brussels Centre d'Etudes 
des Relations Internationales, Sep 1995, cited in: R. Bussiere, A Europe of Security and Defence, in: 
NATO Review, Sep 1995, p. 33. 
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VI. AMERICA NEEDS EUROPE 
Why does a country like the United States of America, in these days the only 
superpower in the world, 'need' a number of countries which try to become a unit under 
the synonym 'Europe', which however are obviously far from a 'United States ofEurope' 
and thus far from being an 'equal' partner? The United States Security Strategy for 
Europe and NATO gives an answer: 
The United States has vital interests in a Europe that is democratic, undivided, 
stable and prosperous, open to trade and investment opportunities, and supportive 
of political, economic, and military cooperation with the United States in Europe 
and other important parts of the world. Transatlantic cooperation is the key not 
only to advancing our mutual interests in Europe, but also to solving global 
problems. 377 
If one looks to this passage, one can find out that the reasons are multidimensional 
and cannot always be understood 'at first sight'. However, it is important to point out that 
there are 'vital' interests in Europe. The definition of the United States National Security 
Strategy states that the 'vital interests' are ,of broad, overriding importance to the 
survival, security and vitality of our national entity ... [and the United States] will do 
whatever it takes to defend these interests, including - when necessary - the unilateral and 
decisive use of military power".378 Europe's great importance for the United States is 
based on four important pillars. First, is the necessity for partners in general. Being the 
biggest power in the world does not automatically mean that America can rely on its self 
International commitments, responsibilities, multilateral interconnections and dependencies 
build up the network in which every state and nation lives in today. Economically, for 
example, Europe is of great importance to America. Numbers speak for themselves: direct 
investments between the two continents exceed five-hundred billion dollars. These 
377 Department of Defense, Office oflntemational Security Affairs, United States Security 
Strategy for Europe and NATO, Jun 1995, p. 3. 
378 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 12. 
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investments are composed of American exports to Europe and on activities of the four-
thousand European companies in the United States which provide more than twelve 
million jobs. 379 The transatlantic economy shows how important both world regions are to 
each other and the well-being of the whole world. No 'partner' could stand solely on his 
own. ,What is new about the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United 
States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it". 380 The second pillar is 
'historical experience'. America's participation in two World Wars is reason enough to be 
careful and make sure that Europe is democratic, undivided and stable. The recurrence of 
ancient fault lines - reminiscent of European politics before 1914 - with a return to 
traditional nation-state diplomacy, tempered by bilateral or trilateral co-operation of the 
most pragmatic kind, would set America on the alert. Despite the further development of 
the European Union and the deepening ofNATO, dangers in this direction are real. 
No western country wants to be the first to forfeit the opportunities- political and 
commercial - which relations with Russia still promise in the medium term. This 
has been evident in recent days as each country formulates its own mild rebukes to 
Moscow in a spirit of jostling competitiveness as opposed to collective 
indignation. 381 
If the United States disengages from Western Europe, there could be a wholesale 
renationalization of defense policies, with each ally going its own way, causing 
international institutions and organizations to collapse. Thus, a positive United States' 
attitude towards the United Nations, for example, is very essential. Whether the stakes are 
,nothing less than avoiding World War III", 382 is doubtful. Furthermore, it does not 'hit 
379 
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for a balance of power. That is how the United States has conducted its foreign policy". The logical result 
should be a policy beyond 'isolationism' or 'unilateralism'. Interestingly, as the next chapter will show, 
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the target' if one speaks of America as being Europe's 'lion-tamer'. But, on the other 
hand, the United States needs Europe as a 'partner', not as someone indifferent. This can 
be seen in relation to the third pillar ofEurope's importance to the United States. Actually 
four dangers are seen for America: (i) nuclear dangers, (ii) regional, ethnical and religious 
conflicts, (iii) dangers from a failure of the democratic reforms in the former Soviet Union 
with a rise of a (new) dictatorship, and (iv) an economical stagnation in the United 
States. 383 All of these dangers are not solvable unilaterally, especially the first three, which 
have a military impact. 
... when asked on NBC's 'Meet the Press' last week, ,What's ·so sacred about 
NATO?" Mr. Perry found himself in the peculiar situation ofusing the arguments 
of war- the cold war, to be exact... ,There are still20,000 nuclear weapons in the 
former Soviet Union," Mr. Perry said. ,And the political and the economic 
recovery going on in those countries is extremely fragile. Extremely fragile. So we 
have a very strong interest in the security and stability ofEurope.384 
Europe, and within it especially the former USSR, is of vital importance to the 
United States, because without a secure development towards democracy and economic 
well-being in this area great dangers for the United States might arise. This pillar between 
America and Europe, however, has an additional important aspect. While on the one hand, 
the United States perceives a special responsibility to maintain certain global ideals such as 
human rights and the rule of the law, on the other hand it is not able and willing to 
intervene in all areas and cases when these ideals are disregarded. Furthermore, the 
missionary approach has its limits, politically by concentration on internal problems, 
economically by financial restraints, and militarily by a tendency towards a 'no-dead 
war'. 385 It is however not always possible to act decisively in today' s crises if the own 
383 Les Aspin in a hearing of the U.S. Senat's Armed Forces Committee, Jan 7 1993, citied in: 
Institut fur Strategische Anlaysen e.V., Die USA und Deutschland, Study for the German MOD, Bonn, 
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people are not put at risk and if the 'Vietmalia syndrome'386 gets the upper hand. It is not 
enough to have the means of a world power, but it is necessary to 'conduct' leadership, 
with instincts and instruments of a great nation. Participation of European partners, mutual 
aid and co-ordination, on the other hand, facilitate United States' leadership and produce 
consensus externally, in the international community of states, and internally, among the 
American population. Finally, the forth important pillar, why America needs Europe, deals 
with the common origin and belief system of the Western World, already mentioned in 
chapter 3. Although the number is declining, it is not negligible that about fifty-seven 
percent of all Americans have European roots. 387 There are ,a myriad of deep historical 
and political-philosophical ties between the United States and Europe",388 which are the 
basis for shared common attitudes, for example on human rights and other basic values. 
History shows what happened to Germany when it left the community of Western peoples 
in this century. Although history does not repeat itself, and is thus not predictable, one can 
say with some probability that the United States would have equally major troubles if it 
would isolate itselffrom its original mother continent. Asia, for example, surely cannot be 
a substitute. It has neither a common history or an actual common belief system with the 
United States, nor does it try to hide its differences. When Kishore Mahbubani, the top 
civil servant at the Singaporean foreign ministry, declared that·, the American society is 
breaking down and falling apart",389 he wanted to publicly point out the differences and, at 
the same time, to delimit his country and continent from America. ,As for Western 
Europe", he goes on, ,its socioeconomic policies are fundamentally untenable and its 
foreign policy is blind to the 'ring of fire' surrounding the continent. ... East Asia, 
meanwhile, is having an explosion of confidence based on the realization that Asians can 
386 This expression was used by R. Holbrooke, meaning: the placing of constraints on policies by 
the memories of the worst cases rather than the successes. See: E. Sciolino, Soldiering on, without an 
Enemy, in: The New York Times, Oct 29 1995. 
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do anything as well as, if not better than, other cultures or societies". 390 Many Asians see 
an 'excess of democracy' and an 'overdose of freedom' as the West's greatest problems ... 
Deeper can the differences not be! America should think twice about changing its partner, 
,. 
although economic advantages may probably seem to give a good pay off. Europe, on the 
other hand, has the same sense of history. Christianity and Enlightenment have produced a 
mix of culture and civilization, from which the models ofWestern society are derived. The 
identification with the Occident stabilizes the Western civilization. 391 Though these are 
mostly mental elements and probably less seen in the United States, one should stress that 
this is the basis on which all other co-operation grows, be it culture, economy, or military . 
. . . without its Atlantic ties, America would find itself in a world of nations with 
which - except in the Western Hemisphere - it has few moral bounds or common 
traditions. In these circumstances, America would be obliged to conduct a pure 
Realpolitik, which is essentially incompatible with the American tradition.392 
In responding to new problems under new circumstances, all national governments 
will almost certainly have to create far more effective and more consequential patterns of 
collaboration. This is even more true as internal problems of states today cannot be solved 
without an exchange of experiences and an international burden of responsibility sharing. 
Internal problems like reform of health care and education, minority rights, family 
planning, and the prevention of environmental pollution are examples that point to the 
need for multilateral approaches. External challenges are equally important. However, to 
find a partner or to be a partner is not enough. Common learning and problem solving 
makes it necessary that both parts have the same fundamental belief system, equal political 
and moral concepts, and, if possible, the same historical roots. Only such societies can be a 
true reference to each other. America does not need to search for such a partner since it is 
already on hand. 393 Europe is and will remain the natural partner and ally for America. 
390 Ibid. 
391 
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Europe and America should have the goal to become equal partners. This means, on the 
one hand, that Europe will in the future no longer be only the protected ally, but that the 
link between the two continents will be defined by a 'Partnership of Equals'. However, 
•. 
symmetry and equality are neither 'necessary' nor 'sufficient' conditions for stability and 
effectiveness. They might, in a negative way, promote transatlantic competitorship and a 
battle for influence. 394 This must be avoided by a communal outlook, compatible style and 
behavior, and complementary function. 395 If this can be fulfilled, probably a paradigmatic 
shift may happen, a shift towards a strengthening of the national security of the United 
States of America and, eventually, of the United States of Europe. 
A. AMERICAN SECURITY ISSUES AND TRENDS 
After 1990 America's identification a.) as the adversary of the Communist threat, 
b.) as the major guarantor of peace, freedom and stability of the Western world, and c.) 
the 'owner' of the mission of democracy and free markets, was no longer self-explanatory. 
The United States slid into an identity crisis. Economical frustrations and political doubts 
about the framework of policy contributed to an overall assessment that America's 
troubles were overwhelming and had to be solved soon. Since the West was no longer 
mobilized on the front lines of a grand ideological crusade, it seems to be only logical that 
the nations turn inward to solve domestic problems. The twofold danger is clear: A 
paradigm shift from being the Western leading power, or more, 'the' world power, 
towards an isolationism and a concentration on domestic politics will challenge not only 
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the outside world, American allies, Western ideology, and economic identity, but also the 
United States' national security itself The raised question is not only about the 
appropriate balance between domestic and foreign policies, the obligation of the United 
States' government to its own citizens and to the maintenance of global order, but also 
about how the link between American politics and American people stabilizes or 
destabilizes recent developments. Never before has the distance between 'citizens' and 
'state' been greater in America. 396 Although most Americans agree that a shared history 
and a shared understanding of that history are vital to their identity as a nation, most of 
them do not care about politics, do not take part in elections, and do not follow the 
advertisement contaminated news. 397 The state, in classical literature seen as the powerful 
and terrifying 'leviathan', has degenerat~d in these days to a milk cow or a massive 
Gulliver, who got tangled up in the net of his overall responsibilities?98 On the other hand, 
a second paradigmatic shift derives from a dissolving society. 'Every man for himself is a 
recipe for chaos, that is well known. But 'every man for his group' is seen as an adequate 
solution of decreased state reliance and leadership, internationally and to its own internal 
society. The melting pot 'America' does not melt any longer. 
A cult of ethnicity has arisen both among non-Anglo whites and among non-white 
minorities to denounce the idea of a melting pot, to challenge the concept of 'one 
people', and to protect, promote, and perpetuate separate ethnic and racial 
communities. 399 
396 The latest report of the United States Department of Education shows that only fourty-seven 
percent of all American students can identify the principle goals of the United States Foreign Policy 
between 1945 and 1990, not to speak from the one of 1990 until today. See: The Sunday Monterey Herald, 
Americans can't agree on history, Nov 5 1995, p. 14A. 
397 Official questions about the voting behaviour in a Naval Postgraduate School class (National 
Security Affairs Curriculum) in January 1996 showed interestingly that, with two exceptions, every 
foreign but 'no' American officer had participated in the last elections (plural!). 
398 
see: W. Schauble, Und der Zukunft zugewandt, Siedler Verlag, 1994, p. 98. 
399 A.M. Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America- Reflections on a multicultural Society, 
Norton & Company, 1993, p. 15. 
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The underlying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals at all but a 
nation of groups. Ethnicity seems to be the defining experience for most Americans. No 
longer the language, laws, institutions, political ideas, literature, customs, precepts, and 
prayers, which were primarily derived from white Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition, 
count. 400 If this trend gets the upper hand the American state will become isolated from 
inside and out. The splits inside the American society are not only racial or ethnical. 
Religion, ideology, social status, regional origin and education play additional roles. 
Among these lines, groups of interest, of common values and ideas are developing, 
showing to the 'outside' common strength. These lines are giving the 'inside' a feeling of 
invulnerability, protection, and untoucheability from others, even from the state. Since 
neither the state nor the family are any longer primary places of identification and a 
functional social environment, the 'group' becomes the 'one and only' place to identify 
with. It is more likely that groups cooperate when having common ideas and ideologies to 
fight for, than groups being contact points for the government or the state, which become 
isolated from below. The 'fin-de-siecle-mood' of the United States' society, thus, is 
handed over to the state, with an implied obligation to change life, to give perspective, to 
show leadership and greatness, however, not to count on its members while fulfilling this 
duty. It is not astonishing, under this consideration, that political rights, more and more, 
come to be seen as 'group benefits' rather than as universal rights,401 and that the actual 
agenda of politics is determined by America's inner disposition and problems. 
Groups are, however, sometimes necessary to spread humanity, to make life joyful, 
and to underline the moral connection between human beings. In some occasions they are 
also directing to the state itself In 1963, for example, Martin Luther King Jr. led a march 
on Washington with three specific goals: the opening of public accommodations to all, the 
passage of a voting rights act and equal employment opportunity. Although his movement 
was very powerful and the state, thus, had a strong 'discussion' partner, Martin Luther 
King Jr. had a unique message for 'all' American people, leading to a general increase of 
400 Ibid., p. 28. 
401 B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: Commentary, Nov. 1993, p. 38. 
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democracy in the United States, unlike Louis Farrakhan's march in October 1995.402 It 
was not an ethnic march on Washington. Its ultimate purpose exceeded individual and 
group interests. The differences can be seen quite clearly: Movements and groups today 
are searching for their own identities while no longer identifying with the United States. 
The search for an identification implies the search for a substitute of the state. The 
vigorous assertion of subnationalloyalties above a common, unifying bond, is a centrifugal 
force leading to a crisis of the United States' identity, a crisis that may lead to state 
isolationism. The task for the American state is to conduct an active policy of promoting 
elites regardless of their origin and skin and to integrate people by motivation and support 
to take over a certain amount ofresponsibility. 403 Work for society must pay offi 'Help for 
self-help' is a concept of non-governmental organizations, dealing with problems in 
underdeveloped countries. One should not be shy to take it as an idea for the interior of 
the American society also. 
Never before has everybody been so dependent upon one another, individually and 
internationally. Thus, mutual help and responsibility sharing is a necessity in modem 
society, as Martin Buber, a German philosopher of Jewish faith once said: ,Love your 
neighbor, for he is as you".404 Loving one's neighbor, however, has the prerequisit-e to 
love oneself How to make this possible and how to avoid a further paradigmatic shift in 
America's society, should be the answer to this basic question. The moral argument is that 
accepting weaknesses, unequalness and unjustice of the society, imperfectionism of the 
state, and even of the international community can be more easily done, with the 
obligation to improve the situation. Therefore, the lack of Christian values, moral 
relativism and an isolation from any religious or moral judgment of one's personal life is a 
402 
see: C. Thomas, Why the Leadership of a March matters, in: The Monterey Herald, Oct 9 
1995,p. lOA 
403 
see: W. Weidenfeld, Schreiben wir eine deutsch-amerikanische Erfolgsstory, in: D. Weirich, 
Auftrag Deutschland, Mainz-Miinchen, 1993, p. 88. 
404 R. v.Weizsacker, Speech of the German Bundesprasident at Georgetown University, 
Washington, May 23 1993, in: W. Weidenfeld, Vor neuen Herausforderungen, Tatigkeitsbericht des 
Koordinators fur die deutsch-amerikanische zwischengesellschaftliche, kultur- und informationspolitische 
Zusammenarbeit, Auswartiges Amt, 1992/93, p. 106. 
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danger which is able to spread from the internal American society to the outside. On the 
other hand it is interesting, that it was not the discovery of some mystical set of new 
principles, but its ,faithful adherence to the old verities: hard work, enterprise, family, 
thrift, responsibility",405 that brought Asia its newfound wealth. Today these values may be 
called 'Asian', but they are essential Protestant work ethics that helped to build the West. 
Thus, state isolationism 'from below' can only be stopped if people's probable behavior at 
the polls does not always determine politics (this is a task for politicians) and if people find 
themselves more and more on safe moral grounds (and this is foremost a task for those 
who educate and teach). 406 
Bill Clinton won his Presidency by announcing an 'America First' Policy. Because 
without conducting a strong foreign policy no country can be successful when dealing 
with domestic problems, a complete isolationism of the United States will neither happen 
nor be taken into consideration. However, the framework of American policy has 
changed. As the President envisaged it, ,the U.S. role should be to tip the balance, ... not 
to bear every burden".407 Erosions are not visible even though official declarations and 
speeches confirm a strong partnership and alliance with America's friends. , The 
isolationist impulse has risen from the grave, and it has taken the new form of 
unilateralism".408 It is very clear that only punctual attention to foreign policy with 
catchword phrases are not enough to overcome a ,compassion fatigue". 409 Lack of 
interest, dissolution of personal networks, change of generations, focus on domestic 
politics, inconcrete definitions of positions, and surprising jumps from one foreign policy 
405 Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia's Welfare- Learning from the West's forgotten values, 
Jun 23 1994, p. 5. 
406 A tall order, indeed. 
407 Bill Clinton's Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, Apr 1 1992, in: M. 
Brenner, W.F. Schlor, P. Williams, German and American Foreign and Security Policies: Strategic 
Convergence or Divergence?, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne Studien, Nr. 98/1994, Dec 1994, p. 27. 
408 A. Schlesinger, Jr., Back to the Womb?, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, p. 5. 
409 T. Sommer, Die Supermacht zieht den Kopf ein, in: Die Zeit, Nov 25 1994. 
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position to another gives the United States a 'vanishing image' for their partners.410 
Considering absolute numbers, and mentioning America's participation in former 
Yugoslavia, this perception seems not completely correct. Relatively to America's former 
strong position and picture, it is however obvious. The United States 'seems' at least to 
isolate itself. This attitude becomes especially dangerous if it refuses to do what is 
necessary to lead, but proves unwilling to support a neo-intemationalism, i.e. a foreign 
policy that seeks to build institutions that are capable of coping with the wide range of 
global problems. The result would be a drift411 . The fact that the United States is still a 
global power, requires that it behaves as such, despite the fact that it was ,never very 
comfortable with the power it accumulated".412 
Yet for most oftheir history, Americans had taken peace for granted; defining 
peace as the absence of war was both too passive and too uninspiring to serve as a 
permanent theme of American policy.413 
American foreign policy has to define, more than ever, what are 'vital interests' of 
the nation and how this affects allies, friends and other countries. Especially the former 
hope that this new definition will not lead to a general isolationism or minimalism, which 
today is often seen in the American refusal to embrace any set of foreign policy goals, 
despite an annually published 'National Security Strategy'. More and more it is seen that, 
,the nation wants to retreat from some forms of involvement, but, when it does become 
involved, wants to fulfill its tasks quickly in order to be able to tum away from them again, 
... [which gives] American policy its frustratingly unpredictable character".414 The reasons 
for it are threefold: First, the 'bipartisanship' agreement of all American parties about 
410 
see: W. Weidenfeld, Erosionen sind nicht mehr zu tibersehen, in: FOCUS, 39/1995, p. 156. 
411 
see: R.N. Haass, Paradigm lost, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, Jan/Feb 1995, p. 58. 
412 J.L. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 1992, 
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foreign policy, initiated after the Second World War by Senator Vandenberg, is gone. 415 
The Republican National Security Restoration Act, intending to ,cut U.S. participation in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations and restrict the President from placing U.S. 
troops under. foreign command",416 as well as the Peace Powers Act, modifying the 1973 
War Powers Act by putting more restraints on the President's ability to deploy United 
States' troops, underline that parts of the Congress have a deep mistrust of international 
security organizations and even of their own government. This makes it difficult to create 
,a 'grand design' for imposing own ideology or way of life upon the international 
system". 417 On the other hand, a cold-blooded Realpolitik will not have the support of the 
American people. A value-based approach is still the only way of conducting policy. 
Second, the United States is going through a loss of sight process. Because it cannot 
'handle' all upcoming worldwide challenges, its ability to distinguish between 'necessity' 
and 'non-necessity', between problems that can be solved and those which must be 
endured, is decreasing. The long hesitation to take action in the former Yugoslavia shows 
that it has unfortunately already made much progress in that direction. 
Richer inhabitants of the poorest countries learn from youngest childhood how to 
politely step over the quadruple-amputee beggar in their path without looking at 
him, as they enter a restaurant or a bank. Blindness, too, can be learned, and we 
have to learn how to passively ignore avoidable tragedies and horrific atrocities.418 
A further aspect of this is the stressing of 'global' interests, instead of regional 
commitments. It is cleatly seen that the division of the world into spheres of influence will 
415 It died in 1968 or so. 
see: T. Sommer, Die Supermacht zieht ihren Kopf ein, in: Die Zeit, Nov 25 1994. 
416 G. Graham, Contract with America is on target at halfway mark, in: Financial Times, Feb 20 
1995. 
417 C. v.Crabb, Jr., Postwar American Diplomacy Doctrines and National Security Policy, in: U. 
Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 
1985, p. 35. 
418 E.N. Luttwak, Now that great Powers are gone, in: International Herald Tribune, Nov 23 
1994. 
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give others the possibility to act 'in their sphere' without regard to international norms419 
and in non-acceptable ways, which thus might be ,the formula for disaster". 420 On the 
other hand, however, under the present financial, economical and political constraints,. an 
American lock, stock and barrel 'global' commitment means 'no' commitment. 
Third and finally, vast differences between the American public opinion and 
leadership exist. The future of United States foreign policy is especially strongly discussed. 
While the 'public opinion' overwhelmingly favors a strong transatlantic link, economic 
leaders see the Asian region equally important and politicians ,clearly prefer Asia"421 these 
days. It is therefore necessary, that an intellectual structure, a domestic and international 
discussion, and a broad interaction between all interest groups is conducted on which 
foreign policy can be based on. Unwillingness to speak out regularly to American people 
about such issues is surely the wrong policy for a president. Moreover, case-by-caseism, 
even if done competently, is simply inadequate. The choice is however, which of the 'ends' 
(Wilsonianism, Economism, Realism, Humanitarianism, or Minimalism) should be chosen 
and which of the 'means' (Unilateralism, Neo-Internationalism, or United States' 
Leadership) is most practicable. 422 The paradigmatic shift towards state isolationism seems 
419 
see: A. Lake, American Power and American Diplomacy, in: U.S. Policy and Texts, Oct 26 
1994, p. 13. 
420 A.M. Haig, Jr., U.S. Commitments and Capabilities: In the Service of a Balanced Foreign 
Policy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, 
Massachusetts, 1985, p. 9. 
421 Frankfurter Allgemeine, Das Virus des Neoisolationismus hat Amerika nicht erfa.Bt, Mar 16 
1995. Americans make some more unexpected distinctions, beside others: a strong support for the United 
Nations, a willingness to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea, support for an independent 
Palestinian state, belief that Japan should have a place on the U.N. Security Council, and prefer ,that the 
United States play an 'active' role in world affairs". Thus, arguments are mostly based on the view of 
politicians and other leaders which, of course, will determine the politics of the future. See: J.E. Rielly, 
The Public Mood at Mid-Decade, in: Foreign Policy, No. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 76-77. 
422 R.N. Haass article: Paradigm lost, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, Jan/Feb 1995, gives 
advantages and disadvantages to all these proposals. They shortly are defined by: 
Wilsonianism: desire to see other countries adopt a form of democratic governance and civil 
society 
Economism: a sense that traditional interests have receded and that economic concerns need 
Realism: 
to be paramount 
focus on order among rather than within states, mostly emphasized by a 
balance-of-power 
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inherently to predict a future unilateral economism for the United States. There are some 
indications even though this clearly cannot be purely fulfilled. This trend alarms all those 
who see that this probably will threaten America's national security. The world longs for 
America's leadership despite intellectual and political differences. How to handle 
international crises and how to structure international alliances or security systems, might 
be seen from different perspectives. However, it is equally true, that the goal is the same 
for all: the increase of international security. Small nations have to contribute to this goal 
because they also get their piece of the security cake. The American piece, however, will 
probably be the biggest and the most important. It is thus unthinkable, that the United 
States try to conduct a minimalist or an only economist approach. Because America is 
economically not able to prefer exclusive humanitarianism and politically not willing to 
accept a pure Wilsonianism, probably foreign policy will be determined in the future by a 
realism which inherently has some humanitarian, Wilsonian, economic impacts. It is 
impossible for the United States to act alone and isolated due to the size of the problems 
to be solved and the intensity of international interconnections. In doing so they would 
risk fulfilling the task only marginally. Since the nation state will further be the major 
player on the international field, nobody wants to give others a de facto veto over its 
proposed foreign policy. A nee-internationalism will make only little steps forward. Thus, 
United States' leadership will be the only solution in the near future. Because this is so 
obvious for most of the states, the danger of America's 'isolation from outside' is much 
bigger if it does not fit into this matrix. A zigzag foreign policy over the full range of 
'ends' and 'means', often described as 'Genscherism', will confuse and minimize the 
followers who are needed for a leading country. The United States should avoid 
isolationism. Essential to be able to build a necessary consensus around its policy 
preferences is to have allies and friends willing to act, and to make its mark on 
Humanitarianism: 
Minimalism: 
the world is seen less in terms of nation states per se than as peoples, focus on 
the alleviation of poverty, disease, hunger, overcrowding, environmental 
degradateion etc. 
refusal to embrace a set offoreign policy goals, sees only modest U.S. interests 
in the world 
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international organizations. This should be the foremost task for American foreign policy 
in the near future. 
Along with the implications on social and cultural aspects, values and foreign 
policy, finally economic aspects have to be mentioned. These days, Europeans fear that the 
United States will turn their back on the 'old' continent Europe and open new markets in 
Asia to stabilize its economy. It is not a surprise that America is paying particular attention 
to the changing international and economical power and is even subordinating its 
diplomacy under this goal. 423 
In the 1950s and 1960s the American public was concerned with 'bomber gaps' 
and 'missile gaps' with the Soviet Union. It is now, with much greater justification, 
d . h . ..c. . h J 424 concerne w1t econom1c peuormance gaps Wit apan. 
The real implications of the problem are politico-economical. The deficit affects all 
facets of American government, curtailing the policy options available to national leaders. 
Looking from the outside it is more than strange, for example, that political clashes on 
further budgets cause a governmental shutdown over weeks and months. It is clear to 
everybody that these political clashes effectively cost more money than prolonging the old 
budget's spending, while considering future political and financial directions. ,America 
will politically withdraw from the world as much for want of money as for want of will". 425 
From a national economy view this means that profit making, decreasing the international 
budget deficit, getting access to new markets, creating jobs, and competition with 'friends 
and foes', regardless what will be the political effect, will determine America's economic 
politics in the future. Despite the effect that international turmoil and problems always 
force the United States to spend money helping, for example, Russia and Ukraine to 
dismantle their atomic weapons or North Korea to build light water reactors in exchange 
423 see: A. Lake, American Power and American Diplomacy, in: U.S. Policy and Texts, Oct 26 
1994, p. 12. 
424 S.P. Huntington;,America's chan~ng strategic interests, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, 
Jan/Feb 1991, p. 9. 
425 B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: Commentary, Nov. 1993, p. 39. 
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of a risky nuclear program, the general trend towards a more 'robust', ruthless, and 
mercantilist economic politics can be clearly seen. Underlying the American tectonic shift 
are irritations about German and Japanese economic strength and feelings of competition 
rather than partnership. Why has the European Union reduced or abandoned trade-barriers 
with more than a few states, but not with the United States of America? Why does the 
United States promote a free trade zone with countries of Latin America and the Pacific 
region while acting 'indifferent to the idea of a Trans Atlantic Free Trade Area'426, thus 
neglecting the zone in which the common ideas of free trade and market economy had 
their origins?427 The realization that the purpose of foreign policy must be by far to serve 
domestic economic considerations leads very quickly to isolationism. This is dangerous in 
three ways: First, a foreign policy based on economics can all too easily be overwhelmed. 
Instability can interrupt the emergence of markets and a great deal more. Similarly, the 
desire to sell for economic reasons can conflict with the need to sanction or isolate a 
country for political or strategic purposes. Second, economism can easily come to 
resemble neo-merkantilism. A foreign policy based on export promotion runs the risk of 
degenerating into a search for specified, quantifiable results that will only increase the role 
of domestic political, often protectionist, forces in economic relationships. 428 Failure to 
meet short-term goals tends to lead to retaliation and protectionism. This can harm the 
overall bilateral relationships. Third, ,unless the globalizing economy can extend its reach 
to people in the lower economic strata, where population is growing most rapidly, the 
coherence of many if not all political systems is likely to come into question".429 This 
might put in danger the national security of the United States more than actual military 
threats. In the long run, it makes the access to resources much more difficult and furthers 
426 
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1995, p. 11. 
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political turmoil worldwide. Furthermore, open markets should be supported on purely 
humanitarian grounds. Specifically, the post-World War II German history shows that 
open markets and free trade are the best bases for economic increase and employment. 430 
As President Clinton announced, when declaring his economic program, America should 
no longer ask: 'does it have a pay off for me?' but 'does it have a pay off for us?'. 
Otherwise will the 'mixed signals' coming from the United States help those in Europe, 
Asia and worldwide who say: 'we have to define our own interests' and that means 'a 
bloc' or, even worse it leads to the fact that ,Europeans may, however slowly and 
painfully, resign themselves to the inevitability of war ... if economic recession deepens to 
the point of threatening the stability of democratic regimes". 431 The threat is that the 
United States economic nationalism will give rise to similar policies in other industrial or 
industrializing democracies (e.g. Russia). As President Clinton cites the German Defense 
Minister Ruehe, ,if our new friends are not able to export their goods, they may instead 
export instability". 432 In general, there is no need fo~ an American political isolationism 
caused by a vision of 'necessary economic security'. The fundamental difference between 
power and prosperity is that power mostly is a zero-sum game and can only be gained at 
the expense of others. Prosperity can be shared by will. A system in which companies are 
competing on their quality and reputation, not on the subsidized financing they get, 
prevents the United States from being isolated due to a virulent nationalism. 
The United States is going through a tectonic shift, internally and as a state itself 
It is entering a season of sharpening internal strains, during which it may be as badly 
divided along partisan, class, gender, and ideological lines as it was along sectional lines in 
the 1850s. If the above trends continue, they will probably lead to the destabilization of 
the political system and its replacement either by an anarchy of groups or a more 
430 
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authoritarian form of rule. The biggest mistake would be resignation. Politicians should 
show courage and solidarity, domestically and internationally, especially when ,miracles of 
leadership as great as any we [America] had witnessed. in the past to keep the miracle of 
this venerable democracy alive"433 are needed. A turbulent political storm lies ahead. 
B. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT 
American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our 
powerful ideals and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference 
through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve 
our interests and priorities. 434 
This is one of the key messages from the 1995 United States National Security 
Strategy. It expresses, on the one hand, a tendency against isolationism and against fears 
that America will disengage from the world, as it is feared even by those who for a long 
time have tried to avoid United States domination. 435 The message that America is neither 
'too good for the world', nor 'not good enough'436 but 'unique', underlines that it will be 
able to act decisively when the decision to act has been taken. On the other hand, 
however, the diversity of assets points out that it is not always the military which could do 
the best to reach national goals, obviously not internally, but also not internationally. 
Although President Clinton ,is determined to maintain our [United States'] military as the 
best trained, the best equipped and the best prepared fighting force in the world", 437 and 
433 
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members of the American Congress want ,to maintain the largest, most powerful military 
force on the earth", 438 it is not envisaged to employ these forces in every case. American 
national strategy proposes, in the opposite, to substitute over the long run the marketplace 
for the battlefield as the dominant area in which nations interact, and in which international 
conflicts work themselves out. In the short run, however, the problem remains of how this 
transition can be advanced, and of what part military force can play in the process.439 
Additionally, it has to be answered which effect the 'Primacy ofEconomics' will have on 
the cooperation of states and militaries. 
In general, the development of the modern world shows clearly that only few aims 
can be reached by one state or group alone. The United States of America, thus, is more 
than ever dependent on cooperative management of world-politics. Allies, friends, neutral 
states and adversaries play an important role. This tendency, on the one hand, can be 
judged positively because interdependencies on a cooperative basis lead to more stability 
in world politics. On the other hand, United States leadership cannot any longer be seen in 
the light of a relation between a 'world power' against all other powers. The United States 
of America needs 'Partners in Leadership' if it wants to implement its mission to spread 
democracy all over the world, to secure the economic world-market and to sustain its 
security. The National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement is a first try to 
combine these tasks. The special relationship to this global responsibility is derived mainly 
from the United States great power status, the ,common underlying faith that the United 
States possesses the world's best system of government, .... that the rest of mankind could 
attain peace and prosperity by ... adopting America's reverence for international law and 
democracy", 440 as well as from its global interests. Therefore it is not astonishing that the 
main chapter of the National Security Strategy, dealing with economy, has the headline 
437 Ibid., p. 7. 
438 A. Lewis, More than Bosnia is at stake, in: Monterey Herald, Dec 3 1995, p. 15A. 
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,Promoting Prosperity at Home". The different topics on which the strategy puts emphasis 
on are bilateral and multilateral economic treaties or partnership in economic coordination. 
Thus, it was quite natural that at the December 1995 United States - European Union 
summit in Madrid the 'New Transatlantic Marketplace' became the ,key component of 
[all] efforts ... to build a strong transatlantic community among democratic market 
economies".441 The National Security Strategy stresses four key-elements: broad-based 
economic growth, the environment, population and health, and democracy. 442 These 
elements give the tendency of the United States government of 'engaging abroad' as their 
economic mission. It is furthermore clearly seen that the range of environmental risks 
jeopardizes international stability. In short, it can be discovered that a clear division 
between security, economy and the spread of democracy cannot be made, despite the clear 
division of the topics into chapters. This leads to the (right) assumption that military 
means are quite obvious part of an economic mission. However, first the strategy 
considers several critical questions before a military commitment should be done which 
emphasize the use of non-military means, a clear definement of a mission, a risk and cost 
assessment as well as a reasonable assurance of support from the American people. 443 This 
is the result of what today often is called the 'Vietnam-Syndrom'. 
To some former doves, the fundamental lesson was never to get involved in a land 
war in Asia; to others, it was to avoid intervention in international trouble spots 
unless the nation's vital interests were clearly at stake. Some commentators 
warned that policy makers must be wary of the sort of simplistic reasoning that 
produced the domino theory and the Munich analogy. Others pointed to the 
weakness of South Vietnam and admonished that even a superpower could not 
save allies who were unable or unwilling to save themselves. For still others, the 
key lessons were that American power had distinct limits and that to be effective, 
American foreign policy had to be true to the nation's historic ideals.444 
441 NTA Fact Sheet, White House release, U.S.-EU Economic Relationship; the NTA 
Marketplace, in: U.S. Information & Texts, Dec 7 1995, p. 9. 
442 The White House, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, Feb 1995, 
p. 22. 
443 Ibid., p. 13. 
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There are three categories of National Interests defined: Only when vital national 
interests are at stake, it is sure that military power is involved, if necessary. For the second 
and third category, important and humanitarian interests, United States military forces 
should only be used if they advance interests and if they are the best tool to address certain 
problems. 445 Thus it is quite unsure that military means will be involved in economic 
questions, even if they are of worldwide interest. Secondly, one has to see whether 
military means are capable to support economic goals, if they are adequate to the 
operationalization of the strategic goals and if they fit into an approach toward a greater 
emphasis on coalitions between the leader United States and probable followers. 446 
It is self-explanatory that foreign investment is discouraged by anarchical, unstable, 
and fundamentalistic religious, ethnic or n~:~.tionalistic situations. In the contrary, 'zones of 
peace, wealth and democracy' can extend themselves, if they are free of political 
pressures. They can become an attraction point. Though these zones cannot prevent the 
,zones of turmoil and development from having coups and revolutions, civil and 
international wars, and internal massacres and bloody repressions", 447 there are reasonable 
arguments that nothing can threaten the zones of peace because they are economically and 
military powerful. They will not go to war with each other because it would bring no gain 
to them, while the destruction of a war causes such damage at home and abroad that even 
a great victory could not balance the costs. On the other hand, military means are still 
needed, because national security problems will continue, especially for conflicts with 
states from outside the zone of peace.448 For the actual international situation this means 
444 G. C. Herring, America's longest War, Me Graw-Hill, Inc., University of Kentucky, 1996, 
p. 310. 
445 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Feb 1995, 
p. 12 .. 
446 
, .•. willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance 
and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more 
general and the problems are best addressed by the international community". In: The White House, A 
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Feb 1995, p. 7. 
447 M. Singer, A. Wildavsky, The Real World Order, Chatham House Publishers Inc., Chatham, 
New Jersey, 1993, p. 7. 
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that a 'zone of peace' is established by North America and Western Europe, actually 
enlarging to the East, a region which is not already immune to setbacks. Thus, at first sight 
one has to point out, that military capabilities have a wide range of tasks in the future, 
which will link allies together. However, there are important differences on what should be 
their quantities and qualities and for which missions they should be capable. While NATO, 
for example, sees principles of peacekeeping missions which ,guarantee firm and durable 
settlements to crises, . . . directed at supporting peace efforts and at moderating conflicts, 
as the situation requires",449 others think that ,U.S. armed forces are being turned away 
from their historic role and toward a new, thankless and open-ended task of administering 
global social welfare",450 and that these missions 'beyond collective defense' will 
undermine public support, American credibility abroad and the readiness of the armed 
forces. 
The military dimensions of 'Enlargement and Engagement' are combined with two 
questions: (i) What are the capabilities of the armed forces in relation to the spread of 
Western economy? and (ii) What are the scenarios and aims, armed forces should or could 
be involved in/for? An answer to the first question can be found in the United States 
Military Strategy. It points out that the achievement of the national military objectives is 
based on two pillars: 
- Thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting 
capabilities. 
- Promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction. 
448 Ibid., p. 23. 
449 NATO Press Service, Follow-on to the 1993 Athens Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Dec 6 1995, p. 2. 
450 M. House, The wrong Mission, in: Financial Times, Sep 9-10 1994. 
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These two pillars include a fight-and-win capability, deterrence and conflict prevention and 
a peacetime engagement.451 While the first ofthese capabilities is mainly the backbone of 
the defense of the United States and its allies' homeland, it implies the capability of major 
warfighting abroad, like the Gulf War. Sticking to the first question, one can say that the 
capabilities to fight a major war is the prerequisite for the United States to act as a world 
power with its special mission of spreading democracy and free markets. Its membership 
in NATO underlines the ability and the will to fight against any aggressive adversary 
combined with the allies. Furthermore, a credible deterrence and conflict prevention 
capability, reaching from nuclear deterrence over confidence building measures to peace 
enforcement, is necessary to counter any upcoming state and peer competitor. These 
necessities are based on the assumption that ,in international politics, the appetite often 
comes with eating: and there really may be no way to check an aspiring rival except by the 
mobilization of stronger military power". 452 The national objectives only can be achieved if 
it is possible to hold back all kind of aggressors which can threaten the United States and 
its allies by more than a certain degree. This global approach gives, in general, the 
possibility to act regional and abroad, i.e. away from the homeland or that of the allies. If 
one assumes, that the National Security Strategy aims not only at stabilizing and 
broadening today' s 'zone of peace', i.e. the zone of America with its allies and perhaps 
additionally its major trade partners, but also at creating 'new' zones of peace and free 
trade, which is presumably a key goal, one should generally demand a military capability to 
stabilize regions, support confidence building measures and peacekeeping capabilities with 
an overseas power projection possibility. Finally, military capabilities for humanitarian 
help, security assistance, as well as counterdrug and counterterrorism are needed to 
establish basic prerequisites for a region of peaceful trade. 453 All these capabilities, 
451 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America, Feb 1995, p. 4. 
452 M. Howard, The Causes of Wars, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, 
p. 21. 
453 This implies above all disaster relief missions and operations-other-than-war, such as 
restoring civil order. See: Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed 
Forces, Directions for Defense, May 24 1995, pp. 2-17. 
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whether they are achieved or planned, show that the military is in principle expected to be 
able to conduct a variety of missions which support a secure environment as a base for 
economic trade and as a promotion of those countries which want to be stabilized for a 
normal economic exchange among trade partners or which could become members of a 
secure economy zone. As seen in the close links between the EU, WEU, and NATO, a 
certain security, i.e. the absence of armed fighting and the guaranty to have the freedom of 
unspoiled trade, is the minimum basic prerequisite for every economical system. 
Therefore, the engagement, leading to an enlargement of a zone of peace, does have a 
significant military dimension. The role of armed forces, and in Western Europe especially 
also the role of United States armed forces, thus is not only helpful but indispensable. 
Furthermore, ,only by leading abroad, by meeting the obligations of engagement and 
seizing its opportunities, can America stay prosperous and secure 'at home'":454 It is a 
totally different question whether the military 'should' be brought into action in a certain 
situation. A deployment of America's forces is always a question of the operationalization 
of the National Security Strategy. 
As shown above, a certain degree of security has to be guaranteed if one strives for 
economic increases. It is obvious that this is much easier in a settled 'zone of peace', as 
the European-American link of countries, than in certain other regions where free markets 
grow up. A country under siege of its neighbor's troubles, terrorism or civil war is one, in 
which the norms of peaceful conflict resolution simply is not working well. Thus for 
example, Russia and Ukraine play such an important role for NATO, although none of 
these countries will become member in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the 
permeability ofborders for refugees and migration is so critical that no country can choose 
isolation and at the same time be connected economically with prosperous but far away 
economic partner countries. , 'Zones of Peace' thus means a contiguous territory within 
which the countries are necessarily concerned with each other, whether they like it or 
not"_4ss 
454 A. Lake, The Need for Engagement, Speech at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton 
University, Nov 30 1994, p. 3. 
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The military implications of this starting point are fundamental. If only a settled 
zone has to be secured as the basis for a very slow and secure expansion, the needed 
assets are limited, perhaps not by their quality but surely by their quantity. Economic, 
cultural or civil relations with upcoming countries outside the zone are ways to aid in the 
stabilization of certain countries, but military security is only possible if some states of the 
region achieve wealth and mutual relations. In short, low-level military peacetime 
engagement, mainly in the form of humanitarian actions, would be needed. The question 
is, whether the stabilization of a country can be reached without a certain military presence 
from outside. On the other hand, these nations, taking their first steps into a new and 
uncertain world, have to concentrate on stepping up their own military preparations rather 
than seeking new ways of economic development. Thus, it is doubtful that their progress 
towards peace, economic wealth and democracy will move quickly. This insecurity of 
further development surely can be seen as counterproductive to the United States National 
Security Strategy's expression of ,,Promoting sustainable Development Abroad" .456 
American power surely is not able to secure the whole world, but it can be ,the linchpin" 
457 that holds states in place, gives them time to develop and gain strength. American 
presence in regions abroad causes the development and deployment of adequate military 
forces. A 'mission' to strive for worldwide democracy, economic well-being, and the 
realization that Western culture and economy ,belongs to the whole world ... [and] the 
present Westernization of the world is not an imposition but a unifying process",458 
therefore has its military dimension and price. 
The main question of how a transition from 'battlefield to marketplace' can be 
advanced, is whether to support established regimes, even if they are not completely 
democratic, to underline security as a basis for further economic development through a 
455 M. Singer, A Wildavsky, The Real World Order, Chatham House Publishers, Inc., Chatham, 
New Jersey, 1993, p. 32. 
456 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 21. 
457 A.L. Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry, in: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, 
p. 32. 
458 M. Nicola, Western Culture belongs to the World, in: Monterey Herald, Jul5 1995. 
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'bolstering approach' or further reforms mainly by intervention in the fields of democracy 
and social affairs as a 'reformist approach'. Promoting the latter, one could argue that the 
United States' ideals cannot prop up reactionary regimes by bolstering their economy. To 
,tie the developing nation to the capitalist 'metropolis' on the basis of military, economic 
and political relations of permanent dependency"459 only to settle overseas markets, cannot 
be a fundamental goal. The belief system of the 'reformist approach' is based on the 
assumption that a world of democratic nations would be much more just, peaceful and 
therefore able to enter a society of economic dependencies. However, it can be criticized 
by pointing out the success in reformist interventions in non-democratic states and, on the 
other hand, the limitations of the capacity to foster change and reforms in such countries 
without backing the governments. Modernizing or transitional societies are always 
relatively unstable. Whether more order through changes in a broadened area· could be 
produced, can be doubted. 'Order over change' seems to be more successful than 'order 
through change'. Beside this, there are many examples in history which show that a 
combination of both is possible. 'Order and change' is an attainable compromise. Stability 
can be reached, as a prerequisite for economic development, 'among' states as well as 
'within' states. However, sometimes, when dealing with the enforcement of a secure 
environment for economic growth and well-being, two steps on the ladder from 
'democracy' over 'governmental stability' to 'regional security' must be taken at once. 
A significant military dimension is needed for a basic stabilization of certain regions 
as a prerequisite for their economic participation in the world market, for the support and 
protection of developing states and, last but not least, for the creation and enlargement of 
regions of free economy and trade which promote stability, wealth and peace on their 
own. ,In a political framework that aims at solving crises and conflicts by tackling their 
roots and causes, it may also be necessary to employ military means to prevent, confine or 
terminate violence or war". 46° For the near future the United States and its allies have to 
459 D. Me Donald, American Policy toward the Third World, in: America and the Third World, 
p. 22. 
460 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994, No. 256, p. 37. 
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deal with some key determinants of the future security environment. These are the 
prerequisite for the National Security Strategy proposal to substitute the 'marketplace' for 
the 'battlefield'. Some of these key determinants are:461 the continued development of 
shared global values; the continued primacy of the state in the global system; the pace and 
extent of economic, political, and cultural integration among developed states and regions; 
and the continued relevance of military missions. These key determinants point to a 
continuously developing world. In spite of increasing problems there is a possibility to 
raise the comfort level of all people, to spread democracy and welfare and, at the same 
time, to secure the desired status. However there are several prerequisites, which point to 
a strong transatlantic link between America and Europe. On the one hand, timely and 
decisive actions by multilateral bodies are ,utterly dependent upon the determined 
leadership of a great power that has the resolution and audacity to move out front, to pull 
the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry the lion's share of the burden while 
tolerating free riders, and to live with the inevitable criticism .... Multilateralism is not the 
antithesis of unilateralism. . .. Multilateralism is unilateralism plus". 462 On the other hand, it 
is clear that, beside the leading world power, there must be 'followers' and 'partners', to 
build a ,coalition of the center". 463 The Europeans, especially the Western Europeans with 
their new Central and Eastern Partners, can be (or become) 'real' partners of the United 
States. As the U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement expresses 
it, ,Our goal is an integrated, democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to 
keep the peace and promote prosperity".464 Beside others, the prerequisites for this are: 
461 
see: see: E.H. Tilford, Jr., World View: The 1995 Strategic Assessment, Strategic Studies 
Institut, U.S. Army War College, Feb 10 1995, p. 9. 
462 I.L. Claude, Jr., Collective Security after the Cold War, in: G.L. Guertner, Collective Security 
in Europe and Asia, Strategic Studies Institut, U.S. Army War College, Mar 2 1992, p. 21. 
463 This allegorie is often used in United States' internal political discussions. (See: A. Lake, The 
Need for Engagement, Speech at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Nov 30 1994, p. 1.) 
However, it fits to the external, international situation as well. 
464 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 25. 
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- that America and Europe understand each other as 'one' zone of security and 
welfare, not divided but linked by the Atlantic ocean, 
- that both understand that the exploration of new markets cannot be done 
competitively, but is only manageable in a multilateral and multidimensional 
approach, 
- that both develop the same sense of responsibility for areas of common interest, 
like Russia, Asian countries and probably the Middle East and Northern Africa, 
- that the transatlantic link maintains a strong military element, 
- that military cohesiveness, adaptability, interoperability and compatibility are 
made strong enough that real task and responsibility sharing is possible, 
- and most importantly, that 'Engagement and Enlargement' not only remains a 
general idealistic guide for the United States policy, but becomes a strategic 
concept which can be used when dealing with actual problems in world policy. 
C. POWER PROJECTION AND FORWARD PRESENCE 
Beside the fact that military power as an important part of the transatlantic 
relation, plays a further role in United States Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement 'how' this could and should be operationalized must be examined. Will the 
Americans prefer to station troops in Europe, not at least to maintain and support regional 
alliances (in this case NATO), even if it is very costly, or will they keep flexible, mobile 
and easily transportable assets in their homeland? The discussions about 'Forward 
Presence' or 'Power Projection' have been around since the end of the First World War. 
Despite the fact that the overall force levels overseas remained remarkably consistent 
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through the 1980s, since the end of the Cold War discussions about these levels have 
begun anew. 465 How far opinions differ can be seen from two statements: 
Partnership with and presence in Europe, also from the United States strategic 
viewpoint, is indispensable. 466 
The American government thinks not so much in terms of territorial defense as in 
terms of power projection, and it has equipped its forces for that purpose.467 
There are those who see United States presence in Europe, not only as the 
backbone of the defense, but also as supporting neighbor countries in their efforts towards 
stability and democracy. Others ask whether America is getting a fairteturn on its defense 
investment abroad. In general, it is not affordable nor desirable for the United States to 
station military forces all over the world. Lack of money and imperial implications of a 
'Pax Americana' are two reasons for this. Global interests as well as responsibilities of the 
United States can therefore only, in case of necessary military interventions, be preserved · 
by the additional ability of 'Power Projection'. The National Military Strategy underlines, 
as its central strategic elements, 'Forward Presence' and 'Power Projection'. But both 
elements are only taken into consideration when the United States interests and values are 
sufficiently at stake.468 Thus, it has to be explained 'why' these two elements should be 
preserved side by side, and what effects this will have for both partners of the transatlantic 
community, America and Europe. During the Cold War the main focus of almost all 
Western strategies lay on containment and deterrence. In a world of 'turmoil and 
insecurity' these elements are even more important. 
465 
see: D.S. Yost, The Future of U.S. overseas Presence, in: JFQ, Summer 1995, pp. 72, 74. 
,Especially the debate in the debate in the House of Representatives in 1994 on the Frank Amendment 
was noteworthy. It called for reducing authorized end strength for NATO Europe unless host nations paid 
75 percent ofnonpersonnel costs (on the model ofthe agreement with Tokyo)". 
466 V. Riihe, Europa und Amerika - eine neue Partnerschaft fiir die Zukunft, Speech at the 
Sicherheitskonferenz, Miinchen, Feb 4 1995, p. 3. (translated by the author). 
467 W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Giitersloh, 1995, 
p. 18. 
468 See: The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, 
p. iii. 
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In the new environment, a continuing U.S. ,Forward Presence", albeit at a lower 
level, provides reassurance in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Central 
America that regional stability remains important to the United States. A U.S. 
presence also deters regional powers from jockeying for positions of dominance. 469 
However, today' s military strategies, and especially the United States National 
Military Strategy, also emphasize the promotion of stability through regional cooperation 
and constructive interaction. 470 This leads to military engagement in peacetime, with 
elements like: Military-to-Military Contacts, Nation and Security Assistance, Humanitarian 
Operations, Counterdrug Operations, Counterterrorism Operations, and Peacekeeping 
Missions. Most of these tasks require stationing of troops over more than a short period of 
time. Thus, achieving the 'National Military Objectives' means thus having an 'Overseas 
Presence'. 
Stability is the prerequisite for United States' central strategic goals of spreading 
democracy and enlarging the community of free market states. Worldwide stability is 
furthermore dependent on deterrence and conflict prevention, which can be conducted 
only limited from American soil. Consequently, forces of sufficient size and capabilities 
have to be present at the right time and the right place. This is only possible if there are 
places of forward deployment. ,Power projection is not possible without bases, and 
particularly, without bases on the opposite . shores of the world's oceans", 471 because 
'time' is an essential factor and only quick reactions often can be decisive. 472 Because of 
its geographical position, its maneuvering grounds, airports, harbors, depots, and well 
prepared support installations especially Europe and Germany are such an important basis 
for United States Power Projection to regions 'out of area'. 473 America's overseas 
469 H. Binnendijk, P. Clawson, New Strategic Priorities, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
Strategic Assessment 1995, Washington, p. 17. 
470 see: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America, Feb 1995, p. 4. 
471 W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1995, p. 18. 
472 For further details about this aspect see: G. Bernhard, Die Zeit ist immer zu kurz -
Anmerkungen zur Krisenreaktion, in: Europaische Sicherheit, 1195, pp. 21-26. 
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presence thus has not only a deterrence function against direct threats and a commitment 
to the inner balance of the states (and probably continents), but it can also be seen as a 
clear signal for the United States will to be a leading nation. This political signal cannot be 
given by increasing mobility, deception, stealth, and electronic warfare; means which are 
inherently combined with an increased capability of power projection.474 However, a 
credible power projection complements the overseas presence ,in acting as a deterrent to 
potential adversaries". 475 Enhanced mobility and flexibility make it possible to react 
quickly if military means are necessary. 'Power Projection' is an element for deterrence, 
conflict prevention and warfighting. When a crisis turns to a conflict, these forces will 
assist allies and friends who do not have the advantage of forward deployed American 
forces or cannot restore a peaceful situation on their own. Thus, 'Power Projection' 
underlines the decisiveness of America's armed forces. 
The deployment of United States armed forces has different reasons in every 
region. In Europe especially the leadership in NATO, which has been and will be the 
bedrock of European security in the near future, is the reason for retaining circa 100,000 
troops. The main purpose is to have a capability for multinational training and crisis 
response in the framework of collective defense. On the other hand, Europe is 'the' 
American base for missions involving rapid deployment to conflicts outside Central 
Europe and peace-enforcement operations. 476 It is however important that in the long run 
America's ,Forward Presence" in Europe defends 'common' American and European 
interests. Otherwise, the European function as an 'American logistical turntable' would be 
only barely accepted by the European population which is not willing to serve exclusively 
American interests. 477 
473 As a matter of fact, it takes only 60 percent of the efforts to transport capacities to Western 
Europe than, for example, to Saudi-Arabia. See: S.E. Dean, Sichere Kantonisten?, in: Europaische 
Sicherheit, 12/94, p. 627. 
474 
see: D.S. Yost, The Future of U.S. overseas Presence, in: JFQ, Summer 1995, p. 78. 
475 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America, Feb 1995, p. 7. 
476 
see: Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-up Review, Sep 1993, p. 14. 
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In Northeast Asia regional threats require the stationing of an amount of troops as 
large as in Europe. Prepositioning of material furthermore increases the crisis-response 
capability in this region. In Southwest Asia local sensitivities to a large-scale Western 
military presence on land necessitate heavier reliance on periodic deployment of forces on 
ships. In Africa only a very small contingent of troops is deployed to provide logistical 
support for American forces transiting the African continent. In Latin America United 
States forces help to promote and expand recent trends toward democracy and to combat 
drug traffickers. A special American presence remains in Panama to defend the canal 
during the transition to full Panamanian control in 1999.478 
As a result it can be pointed out that 'Forward Presence' is especially worthwhile if 
a clear threat assessment leads to the assumption that allies, friends or partners will 
otherwise suffer from an aggression. On the other hand, as in Europe, a regional overseas 
presence can be used as a base for further deployments of forces to other regions. Europe, 
from this perspective, can be seen as the biggest aircraft carrier worldwide. But stationing 
an amount of 100,000 troops in a region like Europe and Northeast Asia is also a political 
sign ofreliability, partnership, real cooperation, and has a lot of psychological effects. For 
example, thirteen million Americans served in Germany during the last fifty years, so that 
contacts and emotional links from country to country have been developed. Overseas 
presence is thus an essential mechanism to support mutual friendship and an advertisement 
for the values of the Western democratic hemisphere. For Japan, the situation is more 
complicated. American power is ,the linchpin that holds Japan in place. By doing so, it 
delays the full transition to an independent Asian sub-system and allows time for forces 
that can mitigate the effects of multi polarity to gain in strength. 479 Beside these general 
stabilizing factors there are three more benefits of ,Forward Presence":480 
477 see: see: H. Mey, Die USA und Deutschland, Studie des Institut fur Strategische Analysen, 
Feb 1993, pp. 31 and 57. 
478 
see: Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-up Review, Sep 1993, p. 15. 
479 A.L. Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry, in: International Security, Vol. 18, No.3, Winter 1993/94, 
p. 32. 
480 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 10. 
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- an enhancement of the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace 
operation, by improving the ability to operate with other nations, 
- the possibility to use the United States position of trust to prevent the 
development of power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting 
regional stability by precluding threats to regional security, and 
- a facilitation of regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to 
work together in absence of strong armed forces may be willing to coalesce 
around the United States in a crisis. 
As shown above, there are a lot of advantages for being forward deployed and 
having troops overseas, ready to fight or engage in 'operations other than war'. When 
those forces are deployed in areas of crises which could become conflicts, the force size 
might not be sufficient for response actions or for fighting a regional war at the side of an 
ally. Thus, the United States must anticipate the need for force-augmentations. This power 
projection will assist the regional allies ,in creating a viable defense to halt the invasion 
rapidly and will form the basis for the subsequent buildup of combat power needed to 
defeat the aggressor decisively". 481 The difference between '"Forward Presence"' and 
'power projection' therefore is that ,Forward Presence" prevents regional conflicts from 
occurring while power projection is necessary especially if deterrence fails. 482 
The National Security Strategy stresses as one of its primary objectives the 
enhancement of American security by having a military capability to win two nearly 
simultaneous major regional conflicts, in concert with regional allies. Four phases of this 
two-wars scenario are generally planned: halt the aggression, augment the forces, counter 
the offensive, and, after the defeat of the enemy, provide for post-war stability. 483 In the 
481 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America, Feb 1995, p. 13. 
482 Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-up Review, Sep 1993, p. 7. 
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fourth phase, in case of a second conflict, the major parts of the armed forces involved in 
such a scenario would 'swing' into the second theater of war. This swing-strategy has 
consequences for strategic mobility, preparedness and technological superiority. In sho.rt, 
the ability to project power is necessary. In contrast to a stationary forward deployment, a 
power projection force must have the flexibility to perform in different critical parameters, 
including different threat, terrain and warning time. Instead of focusing military attention 
on containment and deterrence of one preeminent adversary, America thus ,must prepare 
for a world dominated by regional threats, uncertainty and change, and new mission 
priorities".484 Having the ability to project power in a world of decreasing military 
capabilities, increases the necessity for skill and readiness. 
Finally, because we are a military that has to be ready at a moment's notice to 
project our forces overseas, we have to not only retain our ability to be ready at all 
times to deploy. We have to do better than we were able to do before, because 
when you had a force that was as large as our force was yesterday, you had the 
luxury where not everyone had to be able to hit on all twelve cylinders 
simultaneously. 485 
In general it can be pointed out that 'Power Projection' is a required element if 
local sensitivities to an American military presence make an overseas deployment 
politically impossible. For example in Africa, military infrastructure is only poorly 
developed yet global responsibilities may lead to the necessity to 'cover' this region and 
possible conflicts in those regions where United States forces are deployed will make a 
military augmentation a necessity. Therefore, despite the fact that there is a strong 
tendency to see them as alternatives, 'Overseas Presence' and 'Power Projection' are 
'both' necessary strategic elements. 
483 see: K.-D. Schwarz, Amerikanische Weltmacht im Wandel, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Ebenhausen, Feb 1995, p. 118. 
484 Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions 
for Defense, May 24 1995, p. 1-2. 
485 General Shalikashvili, Speech at the Fiihrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Nov 9 
1994, p. 7. 
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There are differences, however, about the definition of those two elements and 
over which military service is inherently in which 'business'. Before looking to their 
abilities and claims for the future, it should be generally remarked that their demands are 
naturally also linked to other priorities than waging war with the best suitable force 
combination in a ,unified vision for joint operations".486 Getting involved means being 
important, which of course has an impact on the next budget. Thus, it is not astonishing 
that all American services try to acquire capabilities for all purposes. The key-word of 
'Four Air Forces' shows this approach quite clearly. On the other hand, it is only the 
Marine Corps with its task to 'prepare' a theater ofwar for the other forces, that has really 
a reason for sea, land, and air capabilities. 
The Army stresses, as its special characteristics, readiness, deployability, 
versatility, and sufficiency. 487 The combination of these characteristics gives the Army the 
ability to establish itself on the soil of another land, hold it for as long as necessary, and 
control its population and resources. The unique Army contribution is thus the ability to 
dominate the land, to occupy territory. It derives its duty to be a 'Power Projection Army' 
from the nation's strategic purposes and the strategic environment. 
Today the Army serves a nation that is engaged around the world- a troubled and 
uncertain world. 488 
By having a mechanized armor brigade afloat, by stressing preparedness and 
flexibility of force packages and its deployability, the Army underlines its power projection 
capability. On the other hand, it sees a clear necessity for going 'joint' if power projection 
is necessary. Very much stronger is the Army's claim to be the ,central element of 
America's Overseas Presence".489 With the objectives of 'Overseas Presence' which are 
486 Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions 
for Defense, May 24 1995, p. 2-2. 
487 
see: Department of the Army, Decisive Victory, A White Paper, Oct 1994, pp. 12-17. 
488 Ibid., p. 11. 
489 Department of the Army, The Army- The Central Element of America's Overseas Presence, 
Jan 9 1995, p. 1. 
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influence, assurance, deterrence, and posturing for crisis response, the Army provides 
itselfwith a wide range of possible overseas tasks from 'military-to-military contacts' over 
'combating drug-trafficking and terrorism' to 'humanitarian assistance'. 490 Thus, the Army 
can be seen as the 'cornerstone' for overseas presence. Through its obvious presence it 
delivers a ,strong message to friends and foes". 491 After the Cold War is over, the Army 
no longer has to concentrate on the European battlefield. Therefore, the terminology has 
switched from 'Forward Defense' during the Cold War, to 'Forward Presence' in the 
immediate period following the fall of the Soviet Union, to 'Overseas Presence' today. 
The basic documents of the Air Force are 'Global Reach- Global Power' (1992) 
and 'Global Presence' (1995). The first document stresses the basic characteristics of Air 
Forces to provide sustained, precise firepower, reconnaissance and surveillance, critical 
refueling, and global lift to rapidly deploy and sustain joint forces in theaters. The 'Control 
of the High Ground' with Space and C3I Systems492 marks the technological advance 
which the Air Force includes in its principles. Furthermore, the Air Force stresses that it 
can build United States influence by strengthening security partners and relationships. 
However, this does not mean that the Air Force must maintain an actual presence in 
foreign countries. Just the other way around, the Air Force tries to replace the 
preoccupation with presence with a 'regional focus', stressing at the same time that 
,distance does not mean disinterest".493 Though a long-term presence in Europe and Asia 
with reduced force structure and overseas bases is guaranteed, the emphasis is put on 
technological, ,extensive programs with partners like Great Britain and Japan [to] provide 
a conduit for Air Force professionals to share expertise". 494 Beside this techno-political 
element, the future 'military' purpose is the ability to employ and use space forces. The 
490 
see: Ibid., pp. 7-11. 
491 Ibid., p. 3. 
492 C31: Command, Control, Communication, Information. 
493 Department of the Air Force, Global Reach, Global Power, Dec 1992, p. 2. 
494 Ibid., p. 10. 
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expression: ,America is an aerospace nation"495 can be seen as the basic principle to make 
an exchange between 'necessary occupation of a territory' and 'being present without 
presence'. The United States Air Force can no longer afford to physically deploy forces in 
every region of concern. Thus, advances in technology, most notably information 
technology, open the fourth dimension of a 'virtual' battlespace.496 In short, technical 
advances which lead to the improvement of situational awareness, strategic agility, and 
lethality ,enhance the role of all military forces in exerting presence".497 As a conclusion it 
can be pointed out that the Air Force stresses its capabilities for a worldwide and effective 
power projection while being omnipresent due to its (future) technological advancement in 
space and information means. It can be seen quite clearly that not only the emphasis but 
also the meaning ofthe word 'Presence' differs between the services: from 'Showing the 
Flag' (Army) to 'Big Brother is watching You' (Air Force). 
While it seems the Army and Air Force concentrate on one of the strategic 
elements, the Navy and the Marine Corps take 'both' of them as their crucial capabilities. 
Thus it is not astonishing that the fundamental roles of naval forces are seen as: projection 
of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, 
strategic sealift, and forward naval presence.498 With its expeditionary forces the Navy and 
(especially) the Marine Corps can respond quickly to crises in distant lands and are able to 
sustain support because of their self-sufficiency. The Navy tries thereby to build 'power 
from the sea', which means both: maritime firepower by operating independently, as well 
as support for the other services when fighting a possible air-land battle.499 Because of its 
forward deployment, its high readiness and its independence of foreign bases, the Navy 
and the Marine Corps are very capable in the area of crises management and response. 
They can arrive, and 'show the flag and determination' of the United States, but are also 
495 Ibid., p. 15. 
496 Department of the Air Force, Global Presence, 1995, pp. 5-6. 
497 Ibid., p. 12. 
498 Department of the Navy, Forward from the Sea, 1995, p. 10. 
499 Department of the Navy and Marine Corps, From the Sea, 1994, p. 9. 
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easy to withdraw back beyond the horizon. Despite the massive firepower of an aircraft 
carrier which can be projected on land, its presence, for example, often is seen more as a 
signal than as a threat, but the mere presence is enough to deter a would-be aggressor 
from initiating trouble. 500 On the other hand, a friendly maritime force near the home-coast 
can also stabilize national developments in foreign relations as well as in domestic politics. 
Third World governments in particular are often reluctant to grant permanent basing rights 
to the United States forces because of the destabilization it could cause to the ruling 
regime. However, in case they do not have a fundamental anti-Western approach, a 
general prospect for support 'from the sea' is welcomed. For the Navy and the Marine 
Corps 'Power Projection' and 'Overseas Presence' are strongly linked together. To be a 
'Soldier of the Sea'501 thus means not having a sustained inland-role or an exclusive role 
on the 'blue waters' securing the sea-lines of communication. The Navy and the Marine 
Corps tend to embrace both: 'Power Projection' and 'Overseas Presence'; but they are 
linked to their medium 'water'. Thus, one can see them as traditional warfighting services. 
For 'operatons other than war', for example, the Army is more capable, and since people 
live on land, it is quite clear that also many other implications of an 'Overseas Presence' 
are linked to a real presence on land. Naval forces will never be able to march over the 
Champs-Ellysee, White Hall, or Unter den Linden. 
Most of the Americans agree with the idea of active United States engagement in 
world politics, but they also have the opinion that fair burdensharing among allies and 
friends has to be established. America's interests are no longer only determined by foreign 
threats but also by internal economic and social problems. What can be expected in 
relation to power projection and ,Forward Presence"? Without an American ,Forward 
Presence" neither credible alliances can be preserved nor nation-building, peacemaking 
and peacekeeping in order to restore or establish democracy is possible. 'Influence' and 
'Presence' are linked together whereby 'Presence' means more than a countries' coverage 
500 P. Kelley, H. O'Donnell,Jr., The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, in: J.A. Barber, Jr., The 
Maritime Strategy, 1986, p. 25. 
501 
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by satellites or a carrier battle group fifty miles in front of the coastline. Whether it is 
necessary to reach a certain number of troops and whether these troops must necessarily 
have only one purpose (e.g. the protection of Europe) and cannot be seen as a possible 
basis for other tasks (e.g. the basis for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa, former 
Yugoslavia, or the Middle East) is doubtful. As a minimum, a 'credible' presence is 
required. Credibility is not only a question of quantity and quality. It is also linked 
psychologically to contacts between people. Thus, as shown above, troop contingents of 
Land and Air Forces are indispensable if allies' interests are really also vital American 
interests. 'Power Projection' capabilities supplement the stationing of troops. The United 
States Armed Forces are improving their abilities to project power throughout the world. 
All services, without exception, try to increase their performance for this special task. 
They do it not least because they know that the United States will get involved in world's 
crises, as the only world power today. Thus, it can be doubted whether American Armed 
Forces can limit their deployment to cases where crises are containable, manageable, 
cheap and close-ended. Of course, America is not the world's policeman, but it cannot 
stand a ,self-containment" 502 without risking a dangerous isolation. The duty of a world 
power, as Hedley Bull describes it, includes that interests and views of other states are 
understandingly considered when the own policy is formulated. 503 
The United States should be resolute in upholding its commitments to key security 
partners. Backed by overseas presence and other capabilities, these commitments 
contribute to a structure of stability and order (albeit imperfect). This structure will 
be necessary, for the foreseeable future, to promote vitality in the world economy, 
sustain democratic reform, organize collective action against aggression and other 
hr d Am . ' . d . 504 t eats ... an ensure enca sown secunty an prospenty. 
502 K.-D. Schwarz, Amerikanische Weltmacht im Wandel, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Feb 
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D. PARTNERSHIP IN LEADERSHIP 
The times of a mere national foreign policy is over. No country, even not the 
United States, can manage the new global challenges alone. The international reaction in 
general is a ,Recovery of Internationalism", 505 stressing that scarcely any item of 
international politics, (for example, preventing aggression, stopping nuclear proliferation, 
promoting human rights and democracy, and redressing human disasters that normally 
attend civil wars) can have unidimensional or unilateral solutions. Partnership among 
nations of common interests, ideas and, importantly, of common ideals is, thus, not only 
necessary but crucial for the future. ,Partnership means: common action and common 
responsibility sharing. Responsibility sharing means conducting mutual political influence -
regional and worldwide". 506 Thus, on the one hand, Europe needs a strong America, as a 
strong ally of the developing 'old' continent. An economically and politically strengthened 
and combined European Union, for example, also in the future will consider the military, 
economic, intellectual, and cultural partner 'United States' and its participation on the 
European continent important and desirable, if it is possible in the future to establish a 
'partnership among equals' or, as the German Bundesprasident has expressed it, 'relational 
societies'. On the other hand, it was the United States which had figured out that the role 
of European partners was essential for Europe's own future world-power status. Despite 
the fact that Germany, due to its size and power, is not able to be an 'equal' partner, in 
May 1989 the American President Bush announced a 'Partnership in Leadership'. Even 
today, the precise meaning ofthis term is unclear, particularly in the effect the 'Partnership 
in Leadership' would have on future transatlantic relations from the United States-German 
bilateral standpoint. Four explanations are obvious: first, 'Partnership in Leadership' builds 
the contrary pole to the former American policy of containment of Germany. 'To keep the 
Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down' had long been functions of 
505 see: D.C. Hendrickson, The Recovery oflntemationalism, in: Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 1994. 
506 V. Ruhe, Europa und Amerika - eine neue Partnerschaft fur die Zukunft, Speech at the 
Sicherheitskonferenz, Munchen, Feb 4 1995, p. 4. (translated by the author) 
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NAT0.507 Despite the fact that the last function has evolved into 'keeping the Germans 
integrated',508 even today this rationale is no longer adequate, because Germany after its 
unification has shown that it is not only integrated in NATO, the European Union, the 
Western European Union, and generally as a member of the Western societies, but that it 
is also 'the' promoter of a Western integration and a strong transatlantic link, based on 
common values and beliefs. That Germany is an equal partner of the 'society of Western 
nations', should be a 'truism' for everybody today. The United States have acknowledged 
this, by being the only Second World War country which really, without reservations, 
supported the German unification.· 'Partnership in Leadership' therefore can be seen as an 
evidence of trust. Second, the United States need a balanced American-European 
partnership. This means on the one hand, that it is especially Germany which can play the 
middle, compromising, balancing, and nevertheless forward-looking role between other 
European countries which have been traditionally Atlantic-centered or Europe-centered in 
their outlook. America, since the Clinton administration took office, is interested in close 
and intensive links to its mother continent, and at the same time, in strong capabilities and 
self-reliance of Europe itself, to establish a 'real' partnership among equals. On the other 
hand, Germany is seen as a partner of a 'strategic alliance' to contain the southern arc of 
crises of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as to integrate Central and 
Eastern European states into the Western community. It is necessary to concentrate its 
diplomatic, economic, and military resources to reach these goals. Germany, due to its 
geographical situation, its traditional good relations to most of the parties in the Middle 
East and Northern Africa, without any colonial obligations and debts, due to its own 
transition experiences of its eastern part, and due its economic skills is a capable and 
central anchor place and contact point for these efforts. Furthermore, America since the 
end of the Second World War has relied, as shown in the previous chapter, on the 
'logistical turntable Germany'. Thus, 'Partnership in Leadership' takes into consideration 
that former practical cooperation will also be essential in the future, but with the fully 
507 This was expressed by NATO's first Secretary General: Lord Ismay. 
508 
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acknowledged sovereignty of the re-unified German state. Third, the partnership between 
the two countries is based on economic reasons. Increasing interdependencies and 
differences with the trade partner Japan on the one hand, and on the other the (until today) 
very non-homogeneous European Union, were the reasons the United States began to 
search for an economic crystallization point in Europe. In economic problematic situations 
it makes more sense to strengthen alliances and partnerships, to establish problem solving 
communities and to combine, than to rely on protectionism and subsidized industries. 
Trade wars and even a policy of being 'tough on trade'509 are counterproductive. 
Therefore Germany, due to its hard currency, its advanced industry, technology, and sheer 
economic growth was the natural partner for the United States. 
It is the economical leadership in the European Union that, from the American 
view, predestines Germany for being a partner in a leadership role. 510 
Fourth and finally, it is the calculation that a stronger Russia would not be a useful 
counterbalance to the strength of the newly unified Germany, but that in fact Germany can 
help to stabilize a Russian economy and state, which was a basic reason for a strong 
strategic partnership between the United States and Germany. 511 Russia is still -in a 
transitional process without a clear outcome and sometimes even without a clear goal, 
towards which this development shall happen. Harsh Russian statements against NATO 
enlargement, fears of a new Russo-Chinese entente which would ,foreshadow a tum away 
from democracy in today' s single-superpower world", 512 the installation of the new 
Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, who is expected to support Islamic 
fundamentalism and Iraq's resurrection while trying to create alliances against America's 
509 
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'destabilizing support of democracy', 513 make it more necessary than ever to keep an eye 
on Russian developments, to keep Russia on track towards democracy, free markets and 
stability, but also to find a common policy towards Russia among Western nations. 
In the new, unpredictable multipolar world, and given the potential danger from 
China over the next few years, Western policy towards Russia should in my view 
be devoted to keeping options open, and keeping an eye on the West's possible 
future need ofRussia as an ally. 514 
By stressing a greater European responsibility for its own defense, while being 
anchored in NATO, it can be demonstrated to Russia, that it does not face a United 
States-led anti-Russian coalition, but ,an instrument for managing crises in which the 
Europeans are undertaking their full share of the political and military burden". 515 Until 
today, Russia has only mildly criticized the WEU' s associate partnership strategy and 
EU' s actual and future-planned enlargement. Thus, it is pretty clear that America's 
partnership with Europe is necessary, beside other elements, to have a foot in the door of 
the European Union's and the Western European Union's defense and security policies 
towards Russia (which probably can develop more smoothly, more steadily and more 
undisturbed than NATO's). 
Having European partners, ~erica could speak through them or, at least, could 
have a European advocate in topics of vital interests. Germany, as a 'Partner in 
Leadership', can fulfill this role. It has historical and geopolitical interests in a good 
relationship with Russia, as well as those on a personal level. 516 It has heavily supported 
the renewal of the Russian economy by spending a lot of money, is the only Western 
European nation with 'personal' experiences with Russian troops on its soil, and is 
strongly enough engaged in NATO that a close German-Russian relationship could 
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supplement a United States-Russian relationship. Such a relationship could occur without 
the fear of an developing new power center or of a tendency towards a European 
unilateral policy towards Russia without transatlantic cooperation and with the eventual 
aim of isolating America. Russia surely is not 'irrelevant', as Zbigniew Brzezinski has 
called it. 517 Its nuclear potential and sheer magnitude, its dangerous potential for 
environmental pollution, for being a proliferator of nuclear, biological or chemical 
material, arms, knowledge and delivery systems, its huge population, its resources, and its 
actual transition·from a Communist world power to a, (hopefully) democratic and western 
value-oriented state, makes Russia to a country which should be taken into consideration 
when formulating international and foreign policy. However, it is dangerous for the United 
States only to concentrate on Russia, while leaving its European allies on the side-lines. If 
Western policies towards Russia are only be conducted through a bilateral American-
Russian dialogue, it will be far harder to offer meaningful support for Ukraine, to turn off 
Moscow's (nuclear?) deliveries to Iran, to contain Russia's orientation towards China, and 
to avoid military, economic, and political crises with Russia, if Russian-American relations 
deteriorate. A multipolar relationship, with more than only two participants, can produce 
flexibility and avoid stalemates in the East-West dialogue, despite the fact that 
coordination processes among the Western partner's policies towards Russia will take 
time, effort, and necessitate political compromises in some cases. 
If the United States more willingly accepts that leadership has to be shared and 
that, when dealing with other states, it has more and more to be a 'receiving' country as 
well, as opposed to being the 'giving and dominating' state only, it will have the chance to 
take part in an ,aggregate West European productivity, aggregate West European 
population resources, and aggregate West European defense potential". 518 However, it has 
to abandon a policy which Charles Evans Hughes in 1924 formulated as follows: 
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... while Washington favors certain forms of international collaboration, it will not 
tolerate the submission of crucial questions related to America's diplomatic and 
security interests to the determination of any group of outside countries. 519 
It becomes clear that there are other countries which might have found better 
solutions to some problems. Social and educational policies, health care, and industrial 
policies may be examples of internal affairs, relations to the United Nations, an example of 
external affairs. Thus, when President Bush offered Germany a 'Partnership in 
Leadership', this probably meant more than a coordinated foreign and security policy. 
Furthermore, by mobilizing the support of other nations and leveraging its resources 
through alliances and institutions, America can achieve important objectives without 
bearing all the risks or paying all the bills. As President Clinton expresses it: 
When America's partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt it 
undermines our ability to secure our interests and to convince others to work with 
us. lfwe do maintain our partnerships and our leadership, we need not act alone. 520 
If these words really mean political partnership with others, probably under the 
leadership of America, there is no future reason for irritation about who initiated a political 
solution, who became involved in a right or wrong moment, and about anybody looking at 
an affair from a great distance for a long period, as happened in the Western world in 
relation to the war in former Yugoslavia. 521 It is however the general and understandable 
desire that the United States no longer take the main part of the global responsibilities. 
There is no longer the will, political and financial capability to ,defend any area ... without 
regard for the victim's merit or its contribution to the co~on defense",522 as it was the 
519 Quoted in: C. v.Crabb, Jr., Postwar American Diplomatic Doctrines and National Security 
Policy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, 
Massachusetts, 1985, p. 43. 
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case when America's [missionary] national interest was the principle guide only. 
'Partnership in Leadership' requires an adequate reaction and contribution, even taking 
special situations into consideration, in case of Germany for example its internal 
transitional difficulties after the unification. 'Contribution' means, among mere financial 
and material expenditures, an active policy, bringing in ideas and solution proposals, 
taking risks by eventually being politically outvoted and taking part in multilateral actions, 
whether they are political, military or other actions. Second and not lesser important, it is 
necessary to avoid a ,widespread indifference or ignorance concerning affairs in the 
backyard"523 of the partner(s). The central strategic issue in the years ahead relates to the 
development of a policy framework within which the more regional-oriented European 
concerns can be brought into coherence with the global interests of the United States. 
European allies must be made to realize that fundamentally they would be among the first 
to suffer if America at some future date faced a really major strategic threat at its southern 
border, and the United States should understand that a challenge like the Yugoslav crisis 
or the dangers from Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Africa dangers not only their 
interests but also their own national security. Hesitating by working together when such 
crises occur, should be avoided under all circumstances. ,Only a shared perception of 
threats to common interests and a mutual conception of how best to preserve such 
interests"524 can overcome divisive issues in alliance relations. 
'Partnership in Leadership' is a fundamental future concept for the transatlantic 
relation. Germany is an adequate country for this partnership with the United States. It 
must be stressed, however, that these two 'partners in leadership' are not isolated from the 
outer world, especially not from other West European countries. The 'special relationship' 
between Great Britain and the United States , as well as the so called 'Quiet Alliance' 
between Germany and Great Britain and the politico-economical axis between France and 
Germany, promoting as the leading powers the 'European idea', are essential elements of 
523 P. Seabury, American National Interests and American Alliances, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 88. 
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the European and trans-Atlantic politicallandscape.525 'Partnership in Leadership' between 
the United States and Germany thus is a supplementing partnership, not an exclusive one. 
There is no reason for a European competition between Germany, working hard to 
'become' a real American partner, Great Britain, assuming that for long it 'is' the real 
American partner, and France, stressing that America 'should be' its partner, but will it 
never really be due to fundamental political differences. The only important thing is that 
Western policy efforts support themselves, so that it can influence the world in a positive 
and effective manner on its way towards the third millennium. 
525 A very expressive and explainatory graphic of the relationships between the U.S., Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in the mid-1990s is shown in: H. Brill, Geopolitische und 
geostrategische Leitlinien deutscher Sicherheitspolitik, Amt fur Studien und Obungen der Bundeswehr, 
Verteidigungsanalysen, Vol. 6, Jul1994, p. 8. 
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Vll. THE ASIAN OPTION 
Already after the Second World War, Admiral Douglas MacArthur announced that 
in the next thousand years the world's history would be written in the Pacific. 
Furthermore, he had prognosticated a great American prestige in the Far East, especially 
due to the intense and decisive involvement in Asia with the effect of the re-establishment 
of the liberty and freedom of many Asian countries during the 1940s. 526 However, at the 
present when in the 1980s masses of Filipinos demonstrated with slogans like 'Yankee go 
home!' it became clear that after the Second World War every country had its own 
understanding of America's contribution and function in the Asian-Pacific region. Each 
bilateral and multilateral relation was seen from different perspectives, even among 
partners, as for example Japan and the United States. For Japan, the bilateral alliance 
offered the possibility to regain strength, to concentrate on its post-World War II 
economic recovery and also to live in a diplomatically protected world, far away from the 
necessity to define its own foreign policy goals dealing with neighbors and, especially after 
the war, its potential enemies. The United States, on the other hand, saw the primary 
necessity to bolster political, friendly states against the rising threat of international 
communism. Japan, with its sea-connection to Russia, was for this approach, not only any 
country among others, but had a strategic importance. Thus, the American tendency 
towards being a major player in the Asian-Pacific region is only understandable when 
taking into account this military dimension, and especially the United States - Japan and 
the United States - Korean security relationship, which has been ,reaffirmed by every 
incumbent President since Eisenhower". 527 Furthermore, the normalization of Sino-
American relations derived in some degree from the hope and expectation that China 
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would play an active and influential role in containing both North Vietnamese and Soviet 
expansionism. On the other hand, it was America's aim to create an economic sphere of 
influence and a new market for goods, in a sense that security cooperation and economical 
development belong together as the prerequisites for an enduring stability. 528 Domestically 
only an engagement in this region would be agreeable within a combination of both. 
The end of the Cold War changed this basis towards the latter element, especially 
for the United States. A new definition which takes into account the changed distribution 
of political and military power became necessary. The new world order allowed all 
participant states to concentrate more and more on economic matters and problems than 
being fastened to the former military stalemate. For the first time in this century the Asian-
Pacific region is on a track towards ,welfare without warfare". 529 The United States with 
its financial problems shifted from its overwhelming security role to a policy of 'jobs first' 
and 'fair trade'. This created conflicts with Cold War friends, such as Japan that has 
previously benefited from 'free trade' policies. Asian companies could no longer rely on 
open United States markets to achieve economic stability and growth in exports. In some 
American circles even a 'Japan bashing' became 'en vogue', showing that changes had a 
greater dimension than assumed. On the one hand, it is clearly seen that Asia produces a 
quarter of the world's gross national product, that it creates enormous markets for 
consumed goods and high-value foods and conducts big infrastructure programs, in which 
America's participation would create jobs at home and decrease the foreign trade deficit. 
On the other hand, Asian companies penetrate more and more the American market, so 
that domestic companies become new competitors and are more and more 'under the 
weather'. Furthermore, especially Japan and increasingly Korea are accused ofbeing 'free 
riders' in the security realm. United States' troop deployments to these regions, it is 
argued, do not develop the necessity for an adequate financial and military contribution to 
their own security. Increasing pressure and partially overstretched demands towards 
528 
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America's responsibilities put the superpower's capabilities and motivations on the 
brink. 530 Therefore it becomes clear, that ,what will be especially distinctive about any 
new world order (and Pacific order) is the linkage between security and economic 
concerns". 
531 Asian countries' economic power can and must be translated into political 
considerations and perhaps political and military responsibilities. Additionally, not only the 
security environment of Asia but also the whole world is getting closer as 
interrelationships become greater importance. ,A whole set of issues has surfaced that can 
only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, 
the population explosion, and economic interdependence". 532 Furthermore, in the 
emerging unipolar world-system regional cooperative security arrangements have become 
important. 
There are special dependencies in the East Asian region which make predictions 
and a clear assessment of threats and power difficult. If, for example, the United States 
should move away from its forward deployment policy and withdraw most of its forces 
from the region, Japan's role, for example, might increase significantly. This, on the other 
hand, would create destabilizing rivalries between Japan and China, which could affect 
again the United States- Chinese relationship. Taiwan and South Korea, also emerging as 
new powers in East Asia, add a ,new level of complexity to the already complicated 
power relations". 533 Thus, it is only possible to describe very generally and 
monodimensionally the power constellatiqns and their effect on America's contribution 
and attraction in/to Asia, especially the East Asian-Pacific region. 
The enormous rise of Asian economies and the sheer volume of Asia-Pacific 
commerce attracts not only the strategic thinking in economics but also in politico-military 
affairs. President Clinton's emphasis on a concept of an American-led Pacific community 
530 
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based on free trade and political cooperation, articulated at the 1993 Tokyo G7 summit, 
thus showed not only the opportunity to revitalize the American economy, but articulated 
a view of the region as key to a foreign policy centered on geoeconomics. 534 This gives 
rise to the idea of a 'Pacific Community', of a continent based on common values, goals, 
interests, and mutual respect. However, this seems only to be the case, if one looks from a 
certain distance. Local security dynamics and economical, as well as political competition 
set the region more 'on the fence' than ever before. The two regional giants, Japan and 
China, have not worked out their relationship's problems, there are shifts and changes 
since the break-down of the Soviet Union and all the major actors are devoting more of 
their national resources to the military. With a degree of good-will one can find a sense of 
identity in the Confucian culture, a new informal, non-confrontational style, and a self-
confidence of the newly industrializing economies. But this identity tends to be Asian, not 
Pacific. 535 Thus, the more symbolic than practical declaration of ten nations of Southeast 
Asia being a 'nuclear weapon-free zone' in 1995 is seen from an American perspective 
more as a possible interference with the movements of ships and submarines in the region, 
than as an example of increased peace and stability. 536 Moreover, when dealing with other 
states, most Asians are likely to act opportunistically rather than based on common 
grounds, so that a real partnership cannot be developed due to differences in basic 
understandings of the behavior of nations. Nevertheless, there is no possibility for an 
international policy without or against Asia, despite all fears of a loss of preeminence. 
Calls for more restrictive policies towards technology transfer will not produce long-term 
solutions. One has to accept and adapt to a situation ·in which the relative shift of 
economic power to the Pacific has strengthened the image of Asiah countries, especially in 
comparison to the United States. Additionally, one has to take into consideration that: 537 
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- Japan-Russian relations remain chilled due to continuing unresolved bilateral 
Issues, 
- the increasing primacy of domestic policies can be taken as a trend towards 
nationalism, which might be counterproductive against the rise of interdependent 
and internationalized major industries, 
- drastic cuts in military spending in the United States call into question the 
credibility of its continuing defense commitments and increase the pressure on 
states like Japan for expanded burden sharing, and that 
- this, as an effect, draws Jap'an to its traditional position of' doing the least 
required' militarily to maintain close relations while pleading special 
circumstances as reasons to avoid larger responsibilities. 
These considerations come together with challenges to the East Asian security. 
They arise from the standoff on the Korean Peninsula, which could initiate regional 
nuclear proliferation, China's refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, 
particularly if it declares independence, and the continued disputes about territorial 
questions (e.g. Russia-Japan: Kurile Islands, Japan-South Korea: Use of waters around 
northern territories, China-Taiwan: Senkaku Islands, China-Others: Spratly Islands, etc.). 
Furthermore, all the major Northeast Asian actors- Japan, China, and South Korea- are 
acquiring regional force projection capabilities.538 Thus, the American allies, Tokyo and 
Seoul, have been particularly keen in the Post-Cold War environment to meet with their 
Northeast Asian neighbors: North Korea, China, and Russia, and the United States to 
discuss regional security problems related to arms buildups. These neighbors, however, 
have their special interests, problems and probably dangers: 
538 
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1. Russia 
With its improved relations with China, the recognition of South Korea in 1990 
and, despite the disputes over the islands ofHokkaido, cooperation with Japan, Russia has 
normalized its regional relations. Although Russia has not remarkably reduced its military 
capabilities, it tries to make a more ambiguous and friendly policy towards the attractive 
high-growth economic area. Difficult relations with its former allies North Korea and 
Vietnam, the conversion of military industry and internal problems, however, will hold 
Russia back for a while 'being a player on stage'. 
2. China 
China's growth-minded leadership. is focusing on the creation of an undisturbed 
investment and trade-oriented neighborhood. It desires increased economic relations with 
the United States and Japan to counter the overwhelming dominance of both in this 
region. Although in 1993 it agreed to participate in regional security dialogues, such as the 
Asian Regional Forum, 539 it is presently consolidating its political control over Hong Kong 
and attempting to counter Taiwan's independence. China faces internal problems with 
nationalist movements, inefficient state enterprises, and a growing income gap between 
rural, poverty-stricken, resource-depleted areas and booming coastal provinces. 540 Despite 
the economic problems, it has increased its defense budget between twelve and eighty 
percent per annum. , The acquisition of new weapons could make it a formidable regional 
power, affecting the ... balance in the region".541 Because China is Russia's biggest 
customer of arms for cash and due to the newly elected Russian foreign minister Y evgeny 
Primakov, there are fears about a new Russo-Chinese remarriage, which ,would 
foreshadow a turn away from democracy in today's single-superpower world". 542 
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Predicting such events however, is as difficult in the changing political landscape of Asia, 
as to deny them. 
3. North Korea 
After the United States-North Korea negotiations and the accord, signed in 1994, 
which calls for immediate suspension of the North's nuclear projects in exchange for 
provision of two light water nuclear reactors and steps toward diplomatic recognition, a 
major problem and touchy issue was set aside. Sanctions against North Korea, for 
example, being supported by Japan and South Korea but opposed by China, had otherwise 
led to new frictions. China has special interests in good relations to both parts of Korea 
because it sees itself as the new mediator after Russia terminated its economic support to 
North Korea, particularly due to ideological differences. Taking into consideration a 
United States partial withdrawal from the peninsula, it would be possible that China 
becomes the most influential power. This would be furthered by the fact that Seoul tries to 
conduct its own reunification policy, no longer strongly relying on United States advice, at 
the same time ensuring that Japanese payment of war reparations to Pyongyang would not 
jeopardize the process of unification. Japanese and United States influence thus may 
decrease over the peninsula. 543 Because it remains a communist regime and due to its still 
strong military capabilities, within which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons cannot 
been explicitly excluded, North Korea will remain a key power for the Northeast Asian 
region. 544 The explicit danger of nuclear proliferation will have the United States keep an 
eye on North Korea. 
The different approaches, tendencies, perceptions and links show that the idea of a 
'Pacific Century' is almost a cliche. In contrast to today' s Europe-Atlantic region the 
Asia-Pacific region has a vast geographic expanse, as well as cultural, political, and 
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historical diversities. Because the United States is not willing or capable, as the only 
remaining world power, to guarantee freedom and peace for the region, despite its 
remaining, eventually decreased, presence, all regional powers have to find a way to a 
peaceful co-existence and eventually co-operation. Under certain circumstances this may 
lead to regional cooperative arrangements, 545 as the most likely way to guarantee the 
mutual security of a whole region. It is clear, however, that stability in the Pacific cannot 
be 'created' by establishing an important all-overwhelming organization at a special time. 
Only a more overlapping, multitiered system can provide order and peace in the Asian-
Pacific region. Bilateral, intra-Asian; transpacific, and global elements have to come 
together. That seems to be an unmanageable task. But, if members accept the territorial, 
political, and ideological status quo, no state seeks hegemony, and security is viewed not 
in absolute terms, then there is a good chance for regional cooperative arrangements. 
An important question is, how the United States, especially in relation to the 
economy giant Japan, can and should possibly participate in such arrangements and in the 
region in general. As well as, what is its role and responsibility for the future. There is no 
doubt about the fact that the global tasks of creating peace and security, to promote 
human rights and the rule of the law, as well as to save the environment can only be 
fulfilled with a participation of Asian-Pacific governments and groups. Thus, it is essential 
that these states take full responsibilities and that they become 'partners for mutual 
benefits'. 546 It should be moreover agreed that intensive cooperation in economical, 
technological, and cultural issues can bring partners closer together. This will make 
governments able to concentrate their efforts in a 'responsibility partnership', as the 
German Foreign Minister Kinkel had proposed during his visit to Japan in November 
1995.547 Nevertheless, there are irritations and disputes about the 'how' this could be 
545 Paul Kennedy has suggested to create an Asianized 'Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe' (OSCE) as a logical first step. see: Business Korea, Prof. Kennedy suggests East 
Asia Conference on Security, Feb 1994, p. 52. 
546 
see: Der Bundesminister des Auswartigen, Asien-Konzept der Bundesregierung, Oct 12 1993, 
p. 3. 
547 
see: German Info Center New York, Kinkel: Japan und Deutschland wollen ,Partnerschaft der 
Verantwortung", in: Deutschland Nachrichten, Nov 3 1995. 
176 
established and under what circumstances. For example, although the 1992 Tokyo 
Declaration, signed by U.S. President Bush and Japan's Prime Minister Miyazawa, 
committed the two countries to ,create an even closer partnership [based on the 
acceptance of their] special relationship [for building] a just, peaceful, and prosperous 
world", 548 there are disharmonies about burden sharing and responsibility sharing aspects. 
President Clinton's policy toward Japan is concentrated on trade issues, with a ,new 
determination to get hold of Japanese technology''. 549 Japan's firms, which own certain 
technology, see no reasons why they should share this technology with others. Such 
tensions lead the Japanese to seek other partners and to balance their traditional 
dependence on America for defense by more self-reliance. Calls for closing United States 
bases in Japan are becoming more and more intense. Yet, Japan knows, on the other hand, 
that ,neither Europe nor self-reliance can replace America; and America knows it has to 
underpin security in East Asia. The worry is that small frictions [often] will frustrate the 
planning needed if the alliance is to pass the test of future crises".550 Officials in the United 
States point out, that a strong cooperation with Japan ,lies at the heart of our [U.S.] 
efforts to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom in the region". 551 By most nations, 
especially Japan, it is taken for granted that this implies a strong overseas presence and a 
further engagement. However, the end of the Cold War and the reduced military power of 
Russia (though it keeps a large amount of nuclear weapons) has given the opportunity and 
the incentive to reduce overseas deployed forces, to stress more than before, United States 
power projection capabilities and to put emphasis on economic problems. Thus today, the 
two traditional pillars of American predominance in Asia - economic strength from its 
markets and overall financial presence, and security strength from its bilateral alliances and 
military bases - are both diminishing assets. The latter because it is seen as no longer 
548 D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 
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necessary, the former because, unfortunately, others have taken over the United States' 
position. Although the engagement in the Pacific Region is increasing in absolute terms, it 
is declining in relation to upcoming multifaceted powers. 552 
Seeing Japan's success in exploiting the open U.S. market while placing barriers on 
foreign investment at home, China is building up a huge bilateral trade surplus .... 
With the illusion of being the 'last superpower' long shattered, Americans have to 
think about American interests in terms of ... other great powers. 553 
This attempts to answer the question: 'What do the Americans get in return for 
their ensuring of military security for states like Japan and Korea?'. The United States 
trade deficit with Japan is worse than official numbers lay out because Japanese 
subsidiaries in other Asian countries are exporting to the United States. On the other hand, 
the turnover of American subsidiaries in Europe is eleven times as great as in Japan, four 
times as much as in Asia entirely or Canada and Mexico combined. Europe and America, 
thus, should have many incentives to stay together554 in a transatlantic common market 
that practices a two-way trade. Therefore, there are proposals that the Clinton 
administration should ,follow up its successful tough line in trade talks ... giving Japan a 
stark choice between opening its market to the estimated $ 50 billion in American imports 
lost every year and setting up equally restrictive U.S. barriers". 555 However, America 
should not withdraw from the Asian continent, even if it could afford it. The United States 
remains a major and important power for the Pacific and Asian region. Washington's 
primary attraction for the Pacific Partners is increasingly found less in its military presence 
than through American investment to balance the Japanese, as well as continued access to 
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a United States market that absorbs twenty-five percent of Asian exports. 556 Despite its 
big trade deficit, America is still the biggest power in the economic and military realm. 
Thus, balancing Japan has different aspects. Asian states need not fear a major Japanese 
naval or air buildup to protect Japan's maritime trade routes and access to Persian Gulf 
oil, so Korea and China will be less tempted to increasingly build up their own long-range 
force projection capabilities. This will be hopefully, reason enough for the United States to 
continue - albeit at reduced levels of military forces - its presence. Its traditional interests 
are equal to the actual ones: 557 
- to prevent domination of the Asia Pacific region by any hostile power or 
combination of powers, 
- to assure United States access to and through the region, 
- to foster the spread of market-oriented economies open to United States 
exports, and 
- to further the growth of democratic values and institutions. 
All in all one can say that America tries to keep (or build) regional stability with 
favorable terms for the United States economy. This is not only its right and obligation, 
but it would be unresponsible to its people not to do it. In the same way, German-Chinese 
relations have been developed, especially in 1995, with mutual visits between the Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin and the German Chancellor Kohl. 
556 S. Simon, East Asian Security, in: Asian Survey, Dec 1994, p. 1049. 
557 
see: D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 81. 
179 
1 
The German-Chinese alliance scarcely means that Bonn is about to bolt the 
Western alliance; it does mean that, in the aftermath of the cold war, Germany has 
the maneuvering room to search for new tactical alliances. 558 
However, what Germany and America should care about when dealing with Asian 
countries is, that they not only support the integration of countries like China into the 
world's economical web, which probably might be a prerequisite for stability in Asia, 559 
but that they also make sure that it furthers democracy, human rights, and freedom as 
pillars of their foreign policies. This might create frictions especially with those states 
which perceive American insistence on these values as interference in their internal affairs 
and an attempt to change the nature of their regimes, which is, in certain cases, quite true. 
Insofar as Washington uses access to United States markets as a ,lever to change human 
rights policies by its trading partners, joint hopes of economic development are held 
hostage to the internal politics of these states. 560 Nevertheless, it should not be the case 
that America abandons its principles in search of accommodation, China, on the other 
hand, answers accommodation with belligerence,561 threatening Taiwan, pirating U.S. 
computer software, proliferating nuclear technology, supplying anti-American regimes, 
hammering dissidents, using forced abortion and starvation to control population, and 
slaving people as an intricately planned part of its economic program. 562 If close allies like 
Japan do not clearly take side against such facts, if they even mostly act ,as an 
opportunistic intermediary rather than an ally", 563 it becomes difficult to decide who will 
be a greater challenge for the future. Furthermore, often Asian societies see problems from 
a completely different standpoint of basic understandings and value system. In the past 
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thirty years, America has experienced a 560 % increase in violent. crime, a 419 % increase 
in illegitimate births, a 400% increase in divorce rates, a 300% increase in children living 
in single-parent homes, and a drop of almost 80 points in Scholastic Aptitude Test scores. 
Asian societies, unlike Western ones, sometimes see this not so much as a result of a 
vanishing consensus inside the United States' society, but as an example of an 'excess of 
democracy' or an 'overdose of freedom, worshipped as religiously as Hindus worship their 
sacred cows'. 564 
Real partnership cannot be built on such crucial differences; with such 
governments only a 'missionary Realpolitik' is possible, taking into consideration that 
isolationism would be no solution because it does not change anything in the future. 
America and its Western partners have to promote their values through active policies. 
This can be done by being a partner in an alliance, member in multilateral relations, and 
especially in Asia as a member of rising mutual and regional cooperative arrangements. 
The proposal to bolster Russia so that it becomes a strong counterweight in Asia against 
China and Japan, 565 therefore does not lie in the American national interest, for two 
reasons: first, America would become isolated, no longer being involved as a major 
'player' in Asia. Russia, with its new upcoming consciousness, being again an important 
power, would not only bind the Asian countries, but would concentrate the Western 
European awareness upon itself. The transatlantic link would be no longer of importance. 
Second, the United States would have to pay a price for expecting Russia to cooperate in 
Asia. In these days, this price obviously would be the abandoning ofNATO's expansion, 
or furthermore its replacement with a pan-European security organization that includes 
Russia. Whether this price would be acceptable is doubted heavily. Guidelines for 
strengthening a free trade in Asia should therefore at the same time solidify the United 
States position in the region. 566 
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What does all this mean to the, until today, very important United States - Japan 
relationship? It will not be possible, in the long run, to conduct an American foreign policy 
which 'contains' Japan economically and militarily, as some of its neighbors hope it. 
Japanese power and influence will grow in the Pacific region and worldwide as that of its 
competitors. Mutual friendship, common shared values and burden sharing, as well as 
responsibility sharing, will make it easier for the United States to reach its missionary 
goals and will thus be of worth for all the region. This however, is only possible by close 
cooperation and political coordination. The Nye initiative, a proposed extensive planning 
process designed to align, as much as possible, the strategic thinking of the two countries 
and to clarify the roles that each would carry out in the event of a military crisis, seems to 
be a step forward in the right direction at the right time. 567 Japan and the United States 
have no real alternative to keep their mutual friendship and alliance if they want to escape 
a situation similar to that of 1923, when the United Kingdom-Japan alliance was 
terminated and Japan tended to go too far, for fear of falling short. However, not all can 
be left as it is. Beside reducing asymmetries and sharing the costs and responsibilities, it is 
equally important to move the relationship beyond the Security Treaty and to develop a 
greater sense of common purpose and perspectives. Probably with this, Japan can become 
one of the first Asian states to participate in a strong transatlantic community. Although it 
will not be a member of a transatlantic military or economic treaty, it would be possible to 
integrate it, under certain circumstances and with the above prerequisites. Similarly, 
Russia could be integrated too. Nevertheless, Russia is too great militarily and 
geostrategically and Japan too great economically to be a 'member' in the already 
developing new European transatlantic security order. 
APEC into a regional framework of enhancing trade, concentration on near-term results, forging a link 
between the North American Free Trade Agreement countries and Asia, advancing an 'open regionalism' 
by sharing information and designing dispute settlement mechanisms, and developing sources of domestic 
support to underpin United States engagement in Asia. 
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In case of Japan, the task will be to resist mercantilism and the insular 'if only' 
mentality (e.g. if Japan had only another constitution, then ... ). 568 Finally, in case of the 
United States, the challenge will be to avoid a return to isolationism and narrow economic 
nationalism. Washington's approach to a Pacific security should place a greater emphasis 
on multilateral arrangements, mutuality, consensus, local contribution, and on a 
contribution to regional cooperative arrangements. This, however, is not only a 'plan for 
America', 569 but also a plan for Japan and for all the states of that region, probably in 
connection with Europe and the whole world. 
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Vlll. MODERNIZED TRANSATLANTIC LINKS 
We, the United States of America and the European Union, affirm our conviction 
that the ties which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the 
past half century. For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been the 
leading force for peace and prosperity for ourselves and for the world .... We 
reaffirm the indivisibility of transatlantic security. 570 
This 'transatlantic' statement gives an answer to the question of whether 
transatlantic links are 'a continuing necessity' or 'just an option'. It draws a line from a 
common past to a common future, trying to preserve the 'epic achievements' into a world 
which has changed politically, militarily, ~conomically, and even sociologically. To find a 
strategy in an uncertain scenario, a changing and unknown surrounding, and a domestic as 
well as international fragmenting and, at the same time, integrating world, it is always 
good to use fixed and well-known procedures, stabilized paths, and to conduct only those 
changes which are obviously necessary. From this perspective, it is not only enormous but 
also astonishing how great the changes in the political landscape over the last five years 
have been. Nevertheless, the initial transition phase after the fall of Communism and the 
dissolution of the East-West confrontation is over. There are more and more countries, 
politicians, groups, and individuals which today are disappointed about the actual 
decreased pace of change. 'The winds of change' are no longer hurricane-like, but seem to 
have become only breeze-like, with an additional uncertainty in their direction. The 
prospects which had been promised by the international community in the early 1990s are 
neither reached nor sometimes any longer aimed at. The reasons for this lie in the human 
capability of imagination which is often bigger than the mathematical and unemotional 
probability offuture reality. Additionally, however, the tasks have increased exponentially. 
For example, with the tectonic shifts of the last years, building economic upon military 
strength, and vice versa, is no longer possible. While Paul Kennedy had argued that ,the 
ability simultaneously to maintain economic vitality and military capability - the skill with 
570 United States-European Union Madrid Summit, The New Transatlantic Agenda, Dec 3 1995, 
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which statesmen balanced each against the other - has been the single most important 
determinant of influence in world politics", 571 today this 'marriage' is divorced. Further 
fragmentations, due to race, religion, language, nationalism, protectionism, and a new 
drive for power, ,gratify intangible desires",572 but make it by far more difficult to plan and 
to conduct a multidimensional policy with a strategic vision . 
... but people have also been known to seek 'freedom' through nationalism, 
terrorism, racism, authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism. . .. The search 
for freedom, then, tends toward fragmentation in the political realm, while the 
search for prosperity tends toward integration in the economic realm, and therein 
lies a historical pattern of considerable importance for the post-Cold War world. 573 
The more uncertain the way of politics becomes, the more necessary it is to look at 
the goals or, if there are no goals, to formulate them. Germany, after its unification, had 
gained this experience as well as the United States, France, Russia, Japan (and there are 
many more examples) still today. Finding 'common' goals with others, normally is an 
advantage, bringing up the possibility for mutual problem solving, creating synergetic 
effects, and giving the possibility for the societies of being a 'reference' to the other. 
Although called a 'Joint U.S.-EU Action Plan', the New Transatlantic Agenda, beside 
providing only vague proposals on how to reach them, mainly points out common goals 
under the headlines: 
- Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development Around the World 
- Responding to Global Challenges 
571 Paul Kennedy; The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, Random House, 1987, p. 
XVI. 
There are, however, some doubts whether Paul Kennedy is right with this argumentation. 
572 J.L. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 1992, 
pp. 200-201. 
573 Ibid., p. 201. 
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- Contributing to the Expansion ofWorld Trade and Closer Economic Relations 
- Building Bridges Across the Atlantic 
Despite the fact that it is a great achievement that the United States and the 
European Union are agreeing on their main international directions, every country and 
organization still has the choice of how these goals are obtained. It may be the same, 
parallel, or completely different ways which are taken into consideration. Mostly there are 
options between which sovereign states or international organizations can choose, 
sometimes, however, there are only necessities. The difference between 'option' and 
'necessity' lies in the fact whether there are real alternatives or not. An 'option' always has 
alternatives, mostly being of nearly equal importance and value. On the other side is a 
'necessity' an option which has only worse and more unimportant or lesser value 
alternatives. The transatlantic link, often cited in the plural as 'transatlantic links' to show 
its multiple dimensions, is 'one option' to reach the above goals. It has been established in 
the past mainly through NATO, and thus under defense and security aspects. NATO has 
been a concrete, organized security partnership, based on common values and beliefs, but 
also on a common threat assessment. Moreover, although not brought into an official 
multilateral form of agreement, the transatlantic community has always had positive 
economic consequences, so that the Euro-American region evolved as a 'zone .of 
prosperity'. The old transatlantic 'bargain' was ,protection in return for influence". 574 
After the end of the Cold War, it is possible today for the United States to pull back on the 
American continent, renewing the Monroe Doctrine, or to move its interest center into the 
Asian-Pacific region. Furthermore, it would be an imaginable option to install a global 
balance of power system between the three dominant states United States, Russia, and 
China. For all these options, the United States would not necessarily need NATO or the 
transatlantic link. Nevertheless, to maintain its great power status it would need allies. 
574 J. SchOnbohm, Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in the Context of 
the developing future Security Structure in Europe, speech at the Trilateral Commission, Copenhagen, 
Apr 24 1995, p. 10. 
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These allies, at least would guarantee America's influence in Europe. A consequence of all 
these options would be that something new has to be created. Concentrating on an 
existing organization like NATO would no longer be of important value. Beside possibly 
changing alliances, this would mean much effort, politically, financially, economically, and 
militarily. 
European partners, on the other side, would have to face the consequences of 
balancing Russia on their continent alone. Due to the fact that the EU is far from able to 
do this, there would occur uncertainties in the security realm, political competitorship, and 
eventually economical weaknesses. 575 Internal squabbles do not question the organization 
itself but only its internal shifting of weight, emphasis and importance. Especially for 
Germany, a scenario with one of the above mentioned options would be a great challenge 
and probably a step back on its ladder of development towards becoming a 'normal' 
European country. In these cases, Germany has to arrange its relations with Russia and its 
neighbors, as well as inside the EU and NATO, relying more on itself, especially in 
military matters. It is imaginable that the disadvantages could be minimized by a strong 
bilateral relationship with the United States. However, neither America nor Germany 
would be politically able to conduct such a policy without damaging their relations with 
other European partners. Furthermore, the dissolution or devaluation of European security 
organizations, like NATO, would leave behind a big 'pile of smashed crockery', an 
obstacle on the way towards any form of security in Europe. There is no doubt about the 
fact that there are good arguments why especially Germany should be a special partner of 
the United States. 
Unlike the French, they feel embarrassed by any mention of ethnic glory. Unlike 
the British, they live in the present and have no occasion for nostalgia for World 
War II .... Moreover, as the world's third largest economy, controlling, willy-nilly, 
the third of world production in the European economic area, Germany can afford 
to be generous politically .... with nine neighbors and the longest borders in 
Europe, it also understands the need to jawbone compromises .... Yet the striking 
575 From this perspective it becomes clear that it is neither a fear of something new, nor mere 
inertia orpolitical fashionable wording, if Europeans declare their belief in NATO. 
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aspect of Germany's stance is the regularity with which the popular consensus 
chooses enlightened, long-term self-interest over short-term gain. 576 
Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship is and should be moreover important under 
the notion that it is implemented into the multidimensional and multi-state transatlantic 
relationship. As the United States Ambassador Kimmitt expressed it, the American-
German link has European facets: 
As goes Germany, so goes Europe. As goes Europe, so goes the Trans-Atlantic 
relationship so vital to American and European security. 577 
One could say that there are alternatives to the preservation of the transatlantic 
relationship. Those would be mainly conducted through NATO. Nevertheless, none of 
those mentioned above is obviously equally desirable. There are no 'real' alternative 
options, but 'contrasts' against which the continuing necessity of Europe's and America's 
'old' security landscape become significantly apparent. The basic consideration that the 
transatlantic relationship is still essential to the partner's future security and prosperity did 
not vanish with the 'Berlin Wall'. 
Nothing is, however, to be preserved in an eventual 'old-fashioned' Cold War 
format. ,The Euro-Atlantic partnership must remain the foundation and nucleus. It must 
be given a 'fresh impetus' so that states on both sides of the Atlantic are not tempted to go 
their own ways. The common challenges make cooperation necessary, and the common 
basis of shared values and interests make cooperation possible". 578 
Modernized transatlantic links differ in two ways from former ones: first, they 
inherently comprise not mainly the defense dimension but also a variety of other elements, 
especially and essentially economic considerations. A new transatlantic agenda, however, 
is even more than the sum ofNATO and a Euro-American region of prosperity. 'Strategic 
576 E. Pond, Germany finds its Niche as a Regional Power, in: The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
19, Winter 1996, pp. 29-30. 
577 R.F. Kimmitt, speech at the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Jun 8 1993. 
578 J. SchOnbohm, Common Foreign and Security Policy ofthe European Union in the Context of 
the developing future Security Structure in Europe, speech at the Trilateral Commission, Copenhagen, 
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stability' spreads from external, international affairs to internal problems. Second, over 
time European unification will produce a common identity. Although this still will take 
some time, in the future the United States will probably not have to cope any longer with a 
multiplicity of single and independent states but with 'one' partner, which is becoming, 
more and more, equal. A new transatlantic relationship, developed and established now, 
must be initially prepared for such a future 'bilateralism'. 
The next chapter gives an outline of the dimensions of cooperation and how the 
transatlantic relation should or should not be established. Beside this, it is essential to 
notice that the maintained link between the two continents America and Europe, mainly 
characterized by the United States, NATO, the EU and today's European nation states, 
has an underlying vision of a common great future. This vision is not constructed by itself; 
it must be supported and promoted wherever and whenever it is possible. Only then, will 
there be ,little to fear but much to gain". 579 
A. DIMENSIONS OF COOPERATION 
The question, therefore, is not primarily one of reshaping the trans-Atlantic 
partnership. The main objective is to find solutions to a range of problems that 
Europe and the United States can master only by working together. 580 
The transatlantic partnership has to be maintained, not just by going on in the day-
to-day business but by modernizing and multiplying the links. During the last five decades 
the Cold War had limited the dimension of the 'bridge over the Atlantic' because the need 
for military security was an 'overwhelming' topic. There is no doubt that the relations 
which evolved from this military and security partnership are to be preserved also in the 
future. Nevertheless, having changed completely, the international landscape gives new 
579 President Clinton, cited in: V. Riihe, Die pazifische und atlantische Dimension gemeinsamer 
Sicherheit, speech at Stanford University, Feb 27 1995, p. 5. 
580 K. Kinkel, Germany sees an evolving Agenda for a still much needed Alliance, in: 
International Herald Tribune, Mar 30 1995. 
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possibilities to use other facets of the common European-American potential for mutual 
problem solving and for the creation of prosperity and welfare. Now it is necessary to 
create structures for political coordination, for the solution of urgent questions of the 
West's modem industrial societies, and for the transatlantic trade and economic relations. 
The coordinator for the German-American cooperation, Werner Weidenfeld, thus has 
proposed to build a ,European-American Political Cooperation",581 with the task to define 
a common position to all questions and problems of mutual interest. Additionally, one has 
to mention that this exchange of ideas and cooperation in the future does not explain itself 
just with its existence. While during the Cold War the transatlantic security was a well 
known and mostly accepted reality, today it must be able to affect peoples' life and daily 
problems. This has two effects: first, the European and the American states of the 
transatlantic community must become a reference to each other. Learning from each other 
and using the experiences is thus the first necessity of future cooperation. The prerequisite 
for this is mutual openness, truthfulness, and the political courage to point out own 
failures in domestic and foreign policy. Second, the European-American relations can only 
grow from the sympathies of the citizens. The fundamental element therefore are contacts, 
exchange of views, and connections between the societies. In todays information-age this 
should not be too difficult. However, it is very seldom that somebody falls 'in love' by 
telephone-contacts alone . . . . 
Internationally, it is often stressed that the United States will need to 'fulfill its 
leadership role' in the future. Especially in Europe, where the states ,still quarrel too much 
among themselves to accept any single European political authority, [so that] leadership 
on tough issues still has to come from the outside power". 582 Furthermore, America's 
leadership, being the only world power today, is a general necessity for the promotion of 
United States' interests and ideals, as President Clinton puts it: 
581 This European-American Cooperation should work like the European Political Cooperation. 
See: W. Weidenfeld, Wir brauchen die Transatlantische Gemeinschaft, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 9 
1995. 
582 E. Pond, Germany finds its Niche as a Regional Power, in: The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
19, Winter 1996, p. 31. 
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Today, because of our dedication, America's ideals, liberty, democracy and peace, 
are more and more the aspirations of people everywhere in the world. 583 
Nevertheless, although America alone often 'makes the difference', it is not willing 
and able to be the worlds policeman. 'Leadership' does not mean to be everywhere and 
always internationally involved. Today, leadership is more and more based on the 
contributions of others. According to the allies' perspective 'allegiance' has to be replaced 
by 'contribution'. The Latin origin of the word 'contribution' (com+tribuere) means to 
give its own share voluntary but with others for the common good. 584 This has two 
consequences: one is that no longer all states should look to the United States to 'make 
the first step' and then to follow afterwards. It is often required that America takes the 
lead, but its allies should from the beginning on show their contribution and willingness to 
act. The second consequence is that the 'principle of contribution' should not be 
undermined by a differentiation about where it is 'really' necessary to act, where the risks 
are only minimal, where a 'good press' and publicity is guaranteed, or where the least 
price has to be paid. Despite national fears to be submerged in numerous different 
contributions, it is necessary in the future that one orients his contribution more at the 
necessities and no longer at the sufficiencies. The form ofthese contributions (e.g. being a 
logistical basis, sending troops, giving money) does not really matter if every state can 
credibly confirm that this is its best possible share and a burden which it can carry. 'Fair 
share' and 'free riding' have been questions in the realm of cooperation since European 
security institutions had been originally constructed. The United States had especially 
proclaimed that in quantifiable and unquantifiable ways its allies could do more. 585 
Due to the changed international security situation, it is understandable that 
defense spending is decreasing. Nevertheless, Western Europeans have to acknowledge 
583 President Clinton's remarks on Bosnia, in: The New York Times, Clinton's Words on Mission 
to Bosnia: 'The Right Thing to Do', Nov 28 1995, p. A6. 
584 
see: A.K. Henrikson, Fiihrung, Zusammenarbeit und das Beitragsprinzip, in: NATO Brief, 
Dec 94-Jan 95, p. 18. 
585 For further details and arguments of both sides, see: W.R. van Cleave, The Military Sinews of 
a Global Strategy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon 
Books, Massachusetts, 1985, pp. 169-172. 
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that they are still and will continue to be dependent on America's strategic nuclear forces, 
air transport capabilities, strategic reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities. 
The desire to develop a 'common foreign and security policy' on the basis of an 'European 
security and defense identity' it is thus necessary that the balance between American forces 
and capabilities in Europe and Western European efforts is still maintained on a secure 
level. Future cooperation should neither make United States contributions obsolete nor 
European efforts unnecessary and only 'nice to have'. This implies that there be a further 
stationing of American troops and assets on European soil. This stationing is not to be 
taken as a necessity but must be actively promoted, especially by those countries which are 
'bearing the burden' or 'having the honor' of being a host nation. Host countries should 
coordinate their interests and their security assessment with the United States to prevent 
America from seeing its overseas troops only as power projection. Only then will NATO's 
solidarity, common commitment and strategic unity be demonstrated. 
Cooperation mostly implies a division of labor between the participants. This can 
be done in three different ways: dividing roles, tasks, and/or geographic priorities. 586 As 
already discussed, America is seen as having the leadership role. It is the strongest nation 
and nothing can be achieved against its will. 
But U.S. leadership cannot be conducted as before. After the end ofthe Cold War 
other states no longer need U.S. protection as they did. The U.S. government must 
now lead more consistently and with a greater understanding for others than it did 
before. 587 
A division of labor within general roles is no longer always adequate due to the 
multiplicity of new challenges and tasks, and the need for all to share in responsibilities 
and contributions. 'Functional task sharing', on the other hand, might come more into the 
foreground. While America is still the keeper of global nuclear stability and has unique 
power-projection capabilities, there exist other allies which are, for example, especially 
trained in mine warfare, coastal water operations, or electronic combating. Thus, task 
586 
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sharing contributes to a decrease of redundancies, standardization, functional cooperation, 
and probably to a specialization with synergetic effects for all. There are, however, some 
consequences as eventually limitations to act alone, certain obligations to do something 
although it is not fully in the national interest, loss of the capability to be a 'lead nation', or 
just a need for differentiation in 'research and development'. Because of these negative 
consequences, it should, however, be possible to maintain certain core capabilities so that 
the necessary security of the national country and crucial lines of communications is 
guaranteed. 
While the United States can and must retain its global responsibilities, Europeans 
are concentrating mostly on their continent and its surroundings. Therefore, there are 
supporters for a geographical division of labor: 
A geographic division of labor is, therefore, in the making, with Western Europe 
assuming greater responsibility in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and North Africa, 
and the United States retaining global responsibilities and also concentrating more 
on Asia and the Americas. 588 
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has shown that Europeans are not yet 
capable of taking over some responsibilities of their own. A geographical division of labor 
has the disadvantage that cooperation between partners will decrease if their 'zone of 
effort' is not the same. Additionally, this might lead to commitments that are neither 
possible due to capacities or due to the lack of support of its citizens. ,The division of 
labor must serve the 'national' interest, not jeopardize it". 589 Thus, the transatlantic 
community is often neither able nor willing to promote it. 
Cooperation is essential to tackle problems mutually and to increase integration. 
This can be essentially done by binational or multinational forces and force structures. For 
example, to be embedded in a multinational structure is the root for a successful role 
within an alliance or an ad-hoc coalition in a crisis or conflict. NATO's Airborne Early 
Warning Force (NAEW) and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) guarantee 
588 Ibid., p. 35. 
589 Ibid., p. 36. 
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a peacetime readiness which is valuable for all NATO partners. After the Cold War 
Western states have to learn what it means to deploy and command forces of many nations 
with different equipment and doctrines to achieve the right result. A deep integration 
within headquarters is a prerequisite to develop a common sense of handling these 
problems. The more there are forces used, trained to work and fight in an alliance or 
coalition the more successful they will be at accomplishing the mission. Interoperability 
and standardization in peacetime is one kind of life insurance on the battlefield. While the 
United States should be further engaged in these programs and in NATO's multinational 
troop contingents, the Europeans should make these capabilities more 'usable' when 
American interests are at stake. That does not mean a possible worldwide deployment and 
employment. It should however not exclude any possibilities from the start on. 
Transatlantic cooperation is possible and essential in many cases and in different 
fields. Despite the necessity of promoting national industry and thus being 'tough on trade' 
it would be advantageous for all if the idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) 
could be realized. As Newt Gingrich points out provocatively, the link over the Atlantic 
should not only be based on D-Day festivities. 59° Furthermore, it would make sense and 
save money if the United States, and of course the European partners, were willing to 
cooperate in a spirit of partnership in the realm of arms sales, production, and 
development. 
There is actually a feeling among European allies that the United States is only 
interested in selling black boxes, lacking stability and predictability, seeing others only as 
their 'junior partners', and promoting the exclusive 'buy American' principle. 591 It is thus 
not astonishing that the German Defense Minister demands to concentrate on European 
technological capabilities, to consolidate the European market and make it capable for 
competition with the United States. 592 It is even dangerous for the planning of future 
590 N. Gingrich cited in: J. Koar, Briicke tiber den Atlantik fur feien Handel, in: Tagesspiegel 
Berlin, Apr 21 1995. 
591 see: H.H. Mey, Extended Air Defense - Germany between European and Transatlantic 
Orientations, in: Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, Jan-Mar 1995, p. 82. 
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transatlantic cooperation to threaten America's behavior with the prospect of a 'true 
European Monetary Union', having an even greater weight than the Deutsche Mark and 
allowing the United States no longer to set the tone for global trade negotiations. 593 'Buy 
American' should not be replaced by 'buy European' but by 'buy Transatlantic'. Especially 
if one takes budget constraints into consideration, European-United States financial, 
economic, and especially armament cooperation is an attractive option. This would make 
nations able to speak with one voice. For example, closely coordinating the spending of 
money and supply of assistance to Russia and other states for their weapons 
dismantlement and disarmament would eliminate needless duplications. 594 It will be 
necessary in the future to spend more money and to engage more actively in the 
development of Third World countries in an attempt to limit the number of conflicts and 
the suffering of people. Since 'development' can neither be easily sold nor exported, 595 it is 
necessary to tackle this problem with mutual, coordinated concepts and active engagement 
to have a chance for real development. It would be possible to produce much better results 
than in the past if the states of the transatlantic community were able to overcome partially 
their financial unilateralism. It is self-explanatory that in the same coordinated way the 
stabilization ofthe former Warsaw Pact region and especially of the former Soviet Union 
states and Russia could be conducted if America and the West European countries would 
'pull on one string', politically, financially, and economically. Washington's proposal that 
in a regional approach it would care mainly about Russia while Germany stabilizes the 
Central and East European states towards the goal of becoming EU members596 is 
counterproductive to a real coordination and 'commonality' of Western approaches. The 
evading of political coordination discussions because of uncertain outcomes, national 
593 see: W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1995, p. 31. 
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egoism, and decreased or non-available willingness to compromise, means to sacrifice 
Western effectiveness on the altar of national greatness and sovereignty. 
There are many more dimensions of cooperation, like nuclear cooperation between 
the EU and the United States, 597 environment protection, and common problem solving in 
normally internal affairs of states like health care, that cannot all be listed here. It is 
however essential to notice, that there is a huge 'open field' which must be tilled, if the 
harvest should be rich and valuable for all. The former United States Secretary of State 
James Baker had called this architecture for the future a 'New Atlanticism': 
Working from shared ideals and common values, we form a set of mutual 
challenges, in economics, in foreign policies, the environment, science, and a host 
of other fields. So it makes sense for us to fashion our responses together as a 
matter of common course. 598 
As a response from the European side, Germany's Foreign Minister Kinkel had 
taken over these ideas, stressing that ,the transatlantic agenda is not exclusively a matter 
of security policy, ... [but] economics as well, ... [and] must be intensified in cultural, 
scientific and human relations". 599 
To sum up, in future the transatlantic community should mainly be constructed on 
four pillars: first, a political one, to let the United States participate in the European 
development and the Europeans become real partners of their American friends. This 
political cooperation is conducted best in a parallel process of bilateral agreements 
between the different states and between the European security organizations and the 
United States. Furthermore it should contribute to coordinate the policies of the European 
Union, the Western European Union and NATO. Second, the transatlantic connection 
should be based on organized and institutionalized economic relationships. The 
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transatlantic economic common development is already on a positive and much promising 
track. Nevertheless, the 'Asian option' and the integration of the East will be a big 
challenge, which should be managed with mutual efforts and not in a way of 'first come, 
first serve'. The third pillar is the traditional one: security. The security pillar, since long 
established through NATO, is the backbone of the transatlantic community. New dangers, 
crisis management, preventive diplomacy, and eventual new coalitions for new tasks, make 
it necessary to keep in close contact, maintain the American presence on the European 
continent and to adapt all related matters. Nevertheless, the core function of NATO, 
collective defense, should not be a secondary topic. It is necessary to keep in close contact 
to recognize now the answers to future problems. Finally, a fourth lane of the 
'transatlantic highway' should emphasize human relationships, cultural exchange, and 
mutual understanding on the individual level. On the one hand, America's stationing of 
troops on European soil has contributed to this over the last fifty years. But these contacts 
should be extended to civilians and the other side of the Atlantic. One sees a country from 
a completely different perspective, with more understanding for problems and chances, 
and without filtering glasses of the national press reports, if it is possible to live abroad for 
a certain amount of time. 
The fourth part of the Joint United States-EU Action Plan within the New 
Transatlantic Agenda, 'Building Bridges across the Atlantic' is most important, if not the 
prerequisite for the first three parts which deal with worldwide challenges and 
developments.60° Commonly the erosion of the belief, that the West, as the richest and 
most modern portion of human society, has a special responsibility for itself and for the 
world as a whole, has to be stopped. Only with the basis of real mutual understanding over 
all levels of contact it is possible to build a transatlantic zone of stability which can, will, 
and probably must spread its achievements and ideals around the world. 
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B. SPECIAL TRANSATLANTIC TREATIES 
Although most Western politicians on both sides of the Atlantic agree that there 
should be a transatlantic partnership and ,a system of interlocking institutions and 
relationships rooted in a common commitment to democracy, individual rights and the rule 
of law", 601 it is not equally obvious whether this should be underlined in a legally binding 
treaty or pact between the two continents. Objectors against the idea argue that there are 
too many differences between American and European opinions, not to speak of the 
difficulties to find a common opinion inside Western Europe itself. These differences 
would be made obvious if a transatlantic document was negotiated and then would 
eventually lead to an unsuccessful result. Closer European-American political 
harmonization, beside day-to-day business and case-by-case results, therefore would be 
something only for illusionists. 602 Furthermore, a transatlantic pact would only make sense 
if it was signed by the European Union, the United States and additionally Canada. Since 
there is not yet a common foreign and security policy, or currency, it is difficult to bring 
'meat to the bones' of such a treaty. As long as the Western European nation states are 
not really willing to 'pool' parts of their sovereignty, there cannot be any real progress in a 
EU-American common policy. Promoters of NATO and the WEU even try to keep the 
defense component out of the discussion about a transatlantic treaty because they fear 
possible damage to their well established organizations and because they underline that 
,economic policy and defense are jealously guarded separate bailiwicks in all national 
bureaucracies". 603 
In relation to proposals for a 'strategic partnership treaty' with Russia, there is an 
additional questionmark: if it is not conducted and negotiated cautiously, such a treaty 
601 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, June 1995, 
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would stabilize the idea of 'two' linked security areas. The actual situation would be fixed, 
granting Russia free action in their 'sphere of influence'. A transatlantic treaty could 
eventually have likely dividing effects, delimiting America's interests and areas of 
responsibility from Western Europe's. An United States-Russian bilateralism can be 
imagined as one ofthe negative results. 
Nevertheless, the same argument is used as a 'pro' for a transatlantic treaty. If 
carefully formulated and adequately set into practice, it would be the core for all common 
politics, preventing single states, the EU, and America from unilateral actions. Since in the 
past Western Europeans and Americans mostly have agreed on their national and 
international policies, as far as they were affected, it should be possible to do this in an 
increased effort in the future. The basis for this cooperation lies in the common 
understanding about basic values, democratic ideas and structures, pluralism, and market 
economy which, in the last fifty years, have been promoted and further developed 
commonly in both continents. 604 A new transatlantic pact might keep in check the harsher 
economic competition between the United States and the EU which has emerged since the 
end of the Cold War. It could underwrite the transformation of the military structure from 
an anti-Soviet alliance to a more general purpose military organization, and it might help 
the governments, especially in the United States, to fight isolationist tendencies. 605 
It is no longer sufficient that there is a list of topics in which the transatlantic 
partners 'sit on the same side of the table'. Necessary is a binding mandate for mutual 
actions which gives guidelines and a reference point for the governments. In the near 
future, such a mandate would be very helpful when the EU members are discussing their 
future relationship during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. At least a small danger 
exists that this conference concentrates on EU-WEU relations, internal matters, and a 
revival of 'European economic nationalism' as a reaction to President Clinton's economic 
policy of 'being tough on trade', without giving a clear Euro-Atlantic signal to the United 
States. This could damage not only future developments but also established transatlantic 
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links and the NATO partnership. Surely, there will be advocates in the Intergovernmental 
Conference for the American perspective. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have reliability in 
one's partners and clear, well defined relationships. This is best underlined and promoted 
by a clear contract under international law. This contract would be made valuable for 
future developments if the signatories were the EU, the United States, Canada, and 
NATO, despite the fact that every member state had to ratify it. A transatlantic treaty 
would not replace the present cooperation; but would put it into a new framework. 606 It 
would keep NATO as the basic element of relations. The treaty would add questions and 
topics to the agenda which were not yet mentioned in 1949 but are essential today. It 
would provide a ratio for European-American friendship, which is no longer self-
explanatory after the former potential enemy in the East has changed its outlook and might 
and after a generation of politicians has resigned for whose the relation over the Atlantic 
always had a symbolic embodiment of the 'free world'. Additionally such a treaty would 
prevent the Atlantic from becoming 'broader' due to economic and political competition. 
However, beside all treaties, it is 'human relations' which is most important. 
The loss of purpose evident in both continents ... can hardly be repaired by piling 
additional alliance structures on those that are already weakening. How it can be 
renewed ... is a mystery that lies below the level at which diplomats and 
bureaucrats do their work. 607 
606 
see: A. Dregger, Ein 'transatlantischer Vertrag' ist notig, in: Die Welt, Feb 2 1995. 




The Western alliance must now defeat a force more powerful than the Soviet 
Union: the force of history. For history teaches that coalitions are as much 
threatened by victory as by defeat. Only the most careful dedication to common 
purpose and to coordinated policies can overcome that legacy. 608 
This fact is the reason why it has to be pointed out so frequently, so intensively, 
and to all sides that the transatlantic link is not 'just an option' but a continuing necessity. 
In the new security environment with uncertainties not only about the question where the 
real power lies, but also about who will be a future friend or foe, it is necessary to search 
for commonality, for equal belief and for value systems. On this basis, 'old' partnerships 
can be renewed and modernized, 'new' ones can be built. Looking back at the last fifty 
years, ,the democracies of Europe and America, working together, have been one of 
history's most successful combinations".609 They defeated Communism, thereby carrying 
the democratic principle safely into the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the Western 
states will face new dangers from external threats and from internal competition among 
each other. These challenges can be best met commonly, and ,the world as a whole will be 
a steadier place if the 20th century's series of temporary liaisons between Europe and 
America is turned into a permanent marriage". 610 Europe needs America. It lacks military 
means to project power to parts of the world, to protect itself, and to engage decisively in 
wars like the former Yugoslav conflict. It is on the way towards a closer Union, but still 
having not yet decided the complete goal and the way to reach this goal. Nevertheless, 
Western Europe will get new security partners from Central and Eastern Europe, while at 
the same time having to cope with the uncertain, but still big and powerful neighbor 
Russia. After the fall of Communism, America is necessary to give the basis for Europe on 
608 W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Giitersloh, 1995, 
p. 13. 
609 International Herald Tribune, An Atlantic Community, Feb 14 1995. 
610 Ibid. 
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which the future itself can be built. America equally needs Europe. Pointing out the 
common heritage, it is possible to find a reference for internal problems which seem to 
become overwhelmingly important in the near future. The United States will have 
European partners, if not 'the' European partner, if it needs 'partners in leadership' and a 
community which 'raise its eyes to other parts of the world', economically, politically, and, 
under certain circumstances, militarily. America, thus, has something to gain also from 
such a partnership. The major advantage for the transatlantic link is, that it combines 
political hardware with a long since developed 'spirit of commonality'. This goal will not 
be possible with Asian partners, although they may be attractive because of their economic 
rise and power. It is also necessary to keep close links to countries like Japan, however the 
'dimensions' of cooperation will never reach the transatlantic link, if this bond is 
maintained and modernized. 
Europe is, therefore, an essential security partner for America in every sense of the 
word. It has military force, economic strength, and diplomatic links throughout the 
world. Its interests broadly coincide with America's, although it may have different 
areas of concentration. 611 
Today, often people are used to being persuaded and influenced by keywords and 
symbolism rather than by rational arguments. The Western democracies thus are often 
concentrating more on symbolic actions and simple pictures than on explaining complex 
relationships and problems of reality. That a successful politician needs symbolism, was 
already clear to Macchiavelli.612 The danger is however, that it is no longer the goal to get 
a consensus over the possible and manageable in politics but to create an ostensible world, 
behind which the reality is no longer visible. The 'transatlantic community' is slowly on its 
way to becoming such an irreal world; more and more Americans point out that the 
common heritage and commonality between America and Europe is no longer of any value 
for the state. 613 Economic problems and expectations for the future make European 
611 W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Giitersloh, 1995, 
p. 19. 
612 
see: A von Muller, Handschlag fur Deutschland, in: Das Sonntagsblatt, No. 42, Oct 20 1995. 
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Union, and generally Western European states, concentrate more and more on their 
Eastern neighbors. Established transatlantic structures are no longer instruments that do of 
themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of politicians, economists, and 
citizens. To miss this trend would mean to pay a higher price in the future, when it is 
recognized that a transatlantic link has to be newly established and must be re-invented. 
This would be an enormous challenge and would probably only be manageable over 
decades. Therefore, it is necessary to engage actively, to name the problems, to try to find 
solutions, and to explain to the people why all this has to be done and why it has a real 
pay-off 
International order will in the end be brought about only by those who are 
prepared to make sacrifices to construct and enforce it.614 
This means, Europe has to come to grips with forming its identity of becoming an 
equal partner for the United States. America has to overcome isolationist and unilateralist 
tendencies and to lead where it is needed. It should remember ,that those who don't lead 
are likely to be led. By whom?". 615 Common institutions must be established, as Jean 
Monnet emphasized: ,Nothing is possible without the people, but nothing lasts long 
without institutions". 616 These are the 'necessities' for future efficient transatlantic links. 
No state today, no matter how powerful, is able to manage the challenges of the modem 
world alone; cooperation with others is essential. ,And because each state is different, 
they need to find formulas under which each can contribute that which it is best able to 
contribute".617 These formulas are rules how to divide labor, how to inform each other 
613 Especially America's west coast officials often see that a connection with Asia is even more 
advantageous than one with Europe. 
614 M. Wight, The Balance of Power and International Order, in: A. James, The Bases of 
International Order, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p. 115. 
615 H. Jensen, If it's foreign, we don't care, in: Monterey Herald, Nov 28 1995, p. 9A. 
616 Jean Monnet cited in: R.C. Holbrooke, Amerika bleibt eine europaische Macht, in: Die Zeit, 
Mar 30 1995, (translated by the author). 
617 W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Giitersloh, 1995, 
p. 12. 
205 
about what one is doing separately, but also how to make common analyses, common 
approaches, and if possible common policies. ,Such a program of 'sufficient cooperation' 
may well be what is needed to render the next period of European-American relations 
another success story". 618 
The difficulty for all the practical implementations is that the world in which we 
live so rarely allows any kind of reflection. The day-to-day business often is so 
overwhelming that things which do really matter are overlooked due to their long-term 
perspective and long-term planning necessities. However, wise policies, and to work on 
the transatlantic link is one of these, blossom from good historical analyses, from 
separating out what is important and what is not, and from trying to think about the 
relationships of all of the parts of the present to the whole. ,It is a matter of getting calm 
in the midst of turmoil, and from that calmness, perspective". 619 God might help our world 
to always have this perspective. 620 
618 Ibid., p. 6. 
619 
see: J.L. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 
1992, p. 17. 
620 W.P. Merrill, Not Alone for Mighty Empire, in: The Armed Forces Chaplains Board, Book of 
Worship for United States Forces, 1974, No. 195, p. 191. 
Not alone for mighty empire stretching far o'er land and sea, 
nor alone for bounteous harvests, lift we our hearts to thee. 
Standing in the living present, memory and hope between, 
Lord we would with deep thanks-giving praise thee more for things unseen. 
Not for battleships and fortress, not for conquests of the sword, 
but for conquests of the spirit give we thanks to thee, 0 Lord; 
For the priceless gift of freedom, for the home, the church, the school, 
for the open door to manhood, in a land the people rule. 
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